FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1944

Our Sovereignty: Shall We Use It? . . . . . *Wendell L. Willkie* 347
UNRRA, Sample of World Organization . . . *Philip C. Jessup* 362
America at War: The Climactic Year Begins . *Hanson W. Baldwin* 374
Population and Power in Postwar Europe . . *Frank W. Notestein* 389
The Future of the Skyways: A British View
Sir Frederick Handley Page 404
Native Self-Government . . . . . *Melville J. Herskovits* 413
Japan's Power of Resistance . . . . . *H. Foster Bain* 424
Potentialities of Japanese Liberalism . . . . . *C. Burnell Olds* 433
African Facts and American Criticisms . . . . *Margery Perham* 444
Spanish Dreams of Empire . . . . . *Thomas J. Hamilton* 458
Labor and the Peace . . . . . *George Soule* 469
Korea in the Postwar World . . . . . *A. J. Grajdanzev* 479
Representative Government Emerges in China . . *C. Y. W. Meng* 484
Recent Books on International Relations. . . . . *Robert Gale Woolbert* 489
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 504

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ISAIAH BOWMAN
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
JOHN W. DAVIS
STEPHEN DUGGAN
ALLEN W. DULLES
EDWIN F. GAY
CHARLES H. McILWAIN
CHARLES SEYMOUR
HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and Business Offices, 45 East 65th Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $5.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 22, No. 3.

Copyright 1944, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U. S. A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WENDELL L. WILLKIE, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States in 1940; author of "One World" * * * *PHILIP C. JESSUP*, Professor of International Law at Columbia University; former Assistant Chief of the Secretariat of UNRRA; author of "The United States and the World Court" and other works * * * *HANSON W. BALDWIN*, military and naval correspondent of the *New York Times;* author of "The Caissons Roll," "Strategy for Victory" and other works * * * *FRANK W. NOTESTEIN*, Director of the Office of Population Research, Princeton University; author of many studies in the same field and joint author of the forthcoming League of Nations volume, "The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union" * * * *SIR FREDERICK HANDLEY PAGE*, Managing Director of Handley Page, Ltd., Vice-Chairman of the Air Registration Board * * * *MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS*, Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University; leader of various expeditions in Latin America and Africa, 1928–1942; author of "The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples" and other works * * * *H. FOSTER BAIN*, recently Adviser on Mines to the Philippine Government; interned at Santo Tomas in Manila and returned on the *Gripsholm* in December 1943; formerly Secretary of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers; author of "Ores and Industry in the Far East" and other works * * * *C. BURNELL OLDS*, a missionary in Japan from 1903 to 1939; for many years Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Kobe College * * * *MARGERY PERHAM*, Reader in Colonial Administration, Oxford University; member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies; author of "Africans and British Rule" and other works * * * *THOMAS J. HAMILTON*, former correspondent in Spain of the *New York Times;* author of "Appeasement's Child;" now on duty with the Navy, though his opinions are not to be taken as reflecting the views of the Navy Department * * * *GEORGE SOULE*, Editor, the *New Republic*, since 1924; author of "A Planned Society," "The Strength of Nations" and other works * * * *A. J. GRAJDANZEV*, member of the Research Staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Assistant Professor of Economics at Oregon State College; author of "Formosa Today" * * * *C. Y. W. MENG*, of the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of China, Chungking.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

Notice to Readers

As a result of paper restrictions imposed by the War Production Board, the weight of the paper used in FOREIGN AFFAIRS has been reduced and the size of the type-page has been enlarged. Even so, it may be impossible to meet the full demand for individual copies. New yearly subscriptions will be accepted, however, as long as possible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 22 APRIL 1944 No. 3

OUR SOVEREIGNTY: SHALL WE USE IT?

By Wendell L. Willkie

SINCE the turn of the century we have lost the power of directing our own national destiny. We must regain it. To show how much we have lost control over our destiny I need only point to our unwilling participation in two world wars and to the instability of the American economy during the period between them. We have sought to escape war and to maintain our economy as a separate entity in the world by jealously guarding our sovereign rights. I am forced to the conclusion that something is wrong with what we have meant by the term "national sovereignty" if it produces Hawley-Smoot tariffs; the banking failures, depressions and misery of 1929 and ensuing years; highly nationalistic economic policies, with consequent deficit financing and violent discords among groups within our own society; agrarian unrest and farmers' strikes; and, finally, two decades after we brought our boys home from one war in Europe, the loading of transports to take their sons across submarine infested seas to fight in another.

I believe that if we are to avoid the same disastrous cycle when the present war in Europe and Asia has been won we shall have to give up the idea that sovereignty is something simply to be conserved, like the talent which was laid away in the earth in the biblical parable, and accept the idea that it is an active force to be used. That is the thesis of what I have to say here.

I want to see our Government and people use the sovereign power of the United States in partnership with the sovereign power of other peace-loving nations to create and operate an international organization which will give better protection to the rights of all nations, on a wider political, economic and social basis, than has ever yet been attempted in history. To my mind, mutuality of responsibility and service represents more real free-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dom, in the sense of freedom from wars and economic disaster, than can be gained through adherence to all the sterile formulas of exclusive national sovereignty written into all the books of international law ever published.

This means that we must expand the use of our sovereignty to the extent that other nations will expand theirs to accomplish the common purpose. If we decide to do this, we may succeed in turning the page of history which we fumbled at but failed to turn 25 years ago. If on the contrary we decide to continue the same static, passive and essentially frightened isolationist policy which we adopted after the last world war I feel sure we shall be heading into a third one.

II

"It will be a long time, I venture to believe, before there will be any necessity or any justification for the United States engaging in a foreign war." The statement was made in January 1934, one year after Adolf Hitler took control of the destinies of Germany. It was made by the late William E. Borah, Senator from Idaho and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a man greatly respected, profoundly sincere and, in matters of foreign policy, tragically shortsighted. "Internationalism," continued Senator Borah in the same address,[1] "if it means anything more than the friendly coöperation between separate, distinct and wholly independent nations, rests upon a false foundation. And when undertaken, it will fail as in the name of progress and humanity it should fail."

Ultimate proof of a nation's freedom, Senator Borah saw, resided in its ability to choose freely between war and peace. He also knew that peace was the fundamental condition of all useful activity by the people of the United States or by their Government. The primary aim of governmental policy, then, was the preservation of peace. Near the end of his life he stated the sort of policy which, in the light of the nation's experience, he considered most likely to achieve that aim. It would have to be one which "offers peace to all nations, trade and commerce with all nations, honest friendship with all nations," but it should be based, he thought, on "political commitments, expressed or implied, with none." Only if the United States pursued that sort of policy did Senator Borah think it would have freedom of action — the freedom "to remain aloof or to take part in foreign wars."

[1] Made in New York before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 8, 1934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today open-minded and alert Americans are drawing a different lesson from our national experience. They perceive that the United States has not been free to choose peace or war in the twentieth century. Our area of decision has not extended to whether or not we would go to war. We have only been able to decide that temporarily we would postpone going to war.

In 1914 we approached a "foreign" war in a spirit of determined neutrality. In 1939 we did the same, armed with a specific program designed to make us immune to any external shock. Both times we were forced, contrary to our desires and efforts, to abandon our neutrality, point by point. Both times we found that our national existence was at stake. Both times we had to fight to defend it. In the present war, the very hour and minute at which we had to resort to arms was dictated to us by our enemies.

In the modern world, an American foreign policy which assumes that nations are "separate, distinct and wholly independent" is a foreign policy which permits other nations to make decisions affecting vital American interests at *their* convenience and when *they* choose.

Our loss of the separate power to control our own separate destiny in economic affairs is scarcely less striking. We have faced the fact with reluctance. For a century — thanks, in part at least, to the fact that our country within itself was largely an undeveloped world — we prospered magnificently on the assumption that we needed to consider only our own wants, our own resources, our own energy — and the enjoyment we took in putting all three to use. Yet even in the nineteenth century the cotton growers of the South discovered important exceptions to the rule that the American economy was self-contained. In 1915 the farmers of the Middle West and West discovered their close relationship to countries 5,000 miles away.

This discovery of the farmers was pleasant at first, for the prices of farm products shot upward under the demand of Allied buying, and 40,000,000 additional acres were put to the plough to meet the world's cry for food. But then came the drastic post-war deflation and the emergence of the 20-year "farm problem." The memorable McNary-Haugen Bill, twice passed by both Houses of Congress and twice vetoed by President Coolidge, represented a first attempt to find a solution for the farmers' problems in terms of the international situation. It was an effort to devise a special kind of farm tariff which would free agricul-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tural prices from the deflationary pressure of surplus production. Perhaps it was not scientific. But it showed that the western farmer was coming to realize that his own well-being was closely connected with policies and actions in other parts of the world.

When the depression began the country turned to extreme protectionism in the search for economic security. The Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930 raised our duties on imports to the highest level in history. Retaliation followed in the form of discrimination against our products by Spain, Italy, Switzerland, France and a score of other countries. In 1932, Great Britain and the dominions instituted their system of "imperial preferences." Which was cause and which effect in the economic chaos of the depression years need not be argued here. The war debts, the reparations tangle, the foreign loans, the speculative mania, the panic of 1929 on the New York Stock Exchange, the collapse of the Kredit Anstalt bank in Austria, Britain's abandonment of the gold standard — these were only high spots of the general debâcle. All the events were interrelated and the effects of all were world-wide. The United States found out with a vengeance that it was not exempt from those effects, that it was, in fact, an integral part of the wide, wide world.

Our Government, faced with this stubborn fact, pursued contradictory policies. Our only consistency, indeed, was that we stuck to nothing long. One Administration attempted to revive foreign lending and stimulate international trade by pressing for a suspension of reparations payments and placing a moratorium on war debts. But at the same time it raised the tariff. The next Administration initiated a program looking to international currency stabilization and dropped it, spectacularly, soon after its own emissaries had gathered with those of other nations in a World Economic Conference. It then attempted to institute a program of planned economic nationalism of its own, supported by heavy deficit financing.

This program and its inevitable results accelerated the decline of the economic structure of the European democracies which were then beginning to feel the pressures of totalitarianism (a system of political action and economic organization growing, in part at least, out of the nationalistic policies almost universally practised by the nations of the world). Winston Churchill in 1937, on the floor of Parliament, pointed out that, "Those who are keeping the flag of peace and free government flying in the Old World have almost a right to ask that their comrades in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New World should, during these years of exceptional and not diminishing danger, set an example of strength and stability. The well-being of the United States may spell not only the well-being but the safety of all sorts and conditions of men. . . . A prosperous United States exerts, directly and indirectly, an immense beneficent force upon world affairs. A United States thrown into financial and economical collapse spreads evil far and wide, and weakens France and England just at the time when they have most need to be strong."

All this is recalled to emphasize one point: our experience demonstrates that we are not "wholly independent." As Senator Capper said on behalf of the farmers back in 1927: "Wherever we turn we find the Middle West and its economic woes entangled in the elusive 'foreign situation' with which it used to concern itself very little."

Some farmers again show signs of being misled into thinking that high protectionism will give them security after this war. I do not believe that many of them will wish, on second thought, to resume the hopeless effort to "lock up" wheat prices on a purely national basis. The price of wheat in the United States is not a "separate" affair. Similarly, the price of cotton will continue to be determined, not solely in the United States, but also in Egypt and India and Manchester and a dozen other cotton-producing and cotton-processing centers. Conditions in Argentina and Australia will continue to affect the livelihood of cattle and sheep raisers in North America. Our businessmen and our farmers alike know in their minds, if not yet fully in their hearts, that the economy of the United States is irretrievably intertwined with that of other nations.

III

Congress and the press have been discussing the steps which should be taken to bring the peacetime foreign policy of the United States into harmony with twentieth century realities. Much of the talk has centered about the term sovereignty.

In the whole literature of political theory no word has occasioned more disputes. Students of politics hold generally, I think, that few countries have contributed more significantly to the development of political institutions than the United States. But since the days when Madison, Hamilton and Jay wrote for *The Federalist* we have made few notable contributions in the realm of theory. Perhaps we should be grateful that Americans are tradi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionally interested in finding out, not the fine shadings in a word's meaning, so much as the essence of the thing it represents. Even so, we cannot dismiss the conflict in opinion over the term sovereignty as mere juggling with words.

The word sovereignty does represent a most important idea. And it is of additional practical importance for us now because some of our deepest emotions and loyalties, our pride in our country's past and our concern for her future, are associated with it. But we had best be aware also that it often gets into the forefront of our thoughts for other and less legitimate reasons. Often it is deliberately invoked to create confusion. And often, as with other words which receive a lot of attention, it becomes a catchword, a slogan. Many people now feel the necessity of putting the word "sovereign" into any sentence describing our relationship to other nations in the postwar world as automatically as they put on a necktie when they dress in the morning. I believe it is much too important a word to be used as a mere convention of speech.

The word has had many meanings in the course of humanity's long effort to perfect the idea and instruments of self-government. Only comparatively recently did it come into use as a specific name for the source of power and authority within a state. Toward the end of the Middle Ages it described the position of the feudal chief to whom allegiance was due. There were then layers of "sovereign lords," beginning with a very small "sovereign" who controlled the lives and property of a miserable handful at the bottom of the heap, up through somewhat more impressive sovereigns who ruled over several small ones, to a group of great barons who recognized no superiors. In the course of time and much fighting these many sovereigns yielded to one, and the nation-state emerged with all power in the hands of one ruler, the king.

The story of how the absolute authority of the monarch yielded in turn to the authority of the community — that is, of the people — is the story of the development of democracy, the great theme of modern history.

The line of development was by no means straight. Sometimes it doubled back — as in the Fascism of our own time. There have been variations in the theory designed to widen the base of popular authority in the state or to narrow it, to keep things as they were or to make way for change, to restrict the electorate or to extend it — as when the franchise for women was debated. It is sufficient for us to note about these theories simply that they were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developed in response to the pressure of practical circumstances — political, military, economic or social.

Some ardent theorists have endeavored to separate sovereignty from reality altogether in their search for a completely logical system built up out of words. Sometimes the search for a mystical point called the ultimate source of sovereignty has turned into a game for special devotees, as in the studies which find the ultimate pinpoint of sovereignty in the sub-section of the Constitution which provides for the amending of the Constitution. I have no quarrel with those who enjoy such academic pleasures. But there need be no confusion regarding the central fact of the matter. Sovereignty within the United States resides in the people of the United States. The people of the United States exercise the supreme power of the state. They are sovereign.

IV

What, then, is the difficulty? It comes from the effort to extend the sovereignty concept beyond the purpose for which it was developed and apply it in the field of relations among nations.

Does the sovereignty of the American people extend throughout the world? The question has only to be put to be answered: obviously not. Two states, at the moment, pretend that they have a right and duty to enforce their will throughout the world. They have dressed their claim up in fancy and most offensive theories based on blood, race and mythology. It is now in the course of being put down. The idea of the absolute sovereignty of any nation in international relationships is as impractical in operation as the idea of the absolute separateness of any nation.

To the extent that the term sovereignty is taken to mean that we have the right to do exactly as we please in dealings with other nations, and that what we choose to do is not properly of concern to any other nation, it is out of date. During roughly 125 years of our national existence we assumed that this conception of sovereignty was valid. We even got into the habit of believing that it was an essential part of national freedom. Its invalidity was brought home to us only with the development of modern communications. To try to defend it against the facts of modern life would be unrealistic and dangerous. Nor would we thereby be preserving freedom.

Many of us remember when there were so few motorcars that each driver was left free to make his own rules of the road. It was generally understood that a good citizen behind the wheel of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two-cylinder runabout would slow down on corners and either stop or make as little noise as possible when he encountered a horse. Beyond that, if he didn't deliberately run into people, "reckless driving" meant only that he would break a spring or his own neck. But as the roads became filled with powerful automobiles there had to be traffic lights and motor cops. A man could no longer make his own rules of the road. Today if there were no traffic laws no one of us would dare take his car out of the garage. The red and green lights give us freedom to use our automobiles.

Let us face the analogous situation in the relationships of nations. The highways of the world now are crowded. From Hong Kong to Narvik, and from the North Pole to the South, there are no empty seas, no air spaces which are not traversed, no land where rights and interests of many peoples do not meet and may not conflict. The United States or any other nation cannot make the rules of the road all by itself.

In this matter I think we must prepare to revise our ideas even further. Nations cannot as a matter of principle refuse to arbitrate international disputes which arise from domestic policies. Speaking on this question, one of the most distinguished statesmen of our day, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said in 1923 in a speech before the Canadian Bar Association: "In these days of intimate relations, of economic stress and of intense desire to protect national interests and advance national opportunity, the treatment of questions which, from a legal standpoint, are domestic, often seriously affects international relations. The principle, each nation for itself to the full extent of its powers, is the principle of war, not of peace."

Understand, I am not suggesting the abolition of sovereignty. I am merely following out logically what seems to me an obvious line of reasoning. Senator Austin of Vermont recently expressed it when he said: "In order to save sovereignty we must use sovereignty in joining other nations for security."

Sometimes the suggestion that sovereignty be used causes unnecessary alarm lest thereby sovereignty be lost. I think these fears are based on nothing more serious than a misunderstanding of method. "As I speak of sovereignty," said Senator Wiley of Wisconsin in a recent debate in Congress, "I speak of something which is precious. I speak of that which my grandfather obtained when he came to this country. Although he still could not understand the English language, he could obtain 160 acres of land, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he never forgot that that was his soil. . . . After he came to this country he became inspired with something called American sovereignty, and he was a part of the national sovereignty. I say that I do not think we, as trustees, can barter that thing away — the sovereignty of the State or the people."

Each of us shares the feeling for the American soil expressed so movingly by Senator Wiley. Each of us values the backbone which the feeling of self-reliance he extols has given the American people. Each of us, with him, gets angry at the suggestion we might "barter away" something which we hold so precious. But this, it seems to me, is another example of the way in which shades of meaning can obscure the essence of what a word stands for. The actual proceeding of give and take described by the word barter has nothing unworthy about it. Indeed, the phrase "enter into a contract to do such-and-such on such-and-such terms," which might properly be substituted in this connection, carries only honorable and businesslike implications.

I think that if we wish to establish relations between nations based on law instead of force the method which must be followed is the one employed when men enter into a contract of partnership. This has been developed over the years as a practical device for advancing the interests of civilized persons. A proper partnership involves clear rights and equivalent duties for all the partners, proportionate to their respective stakes in the common enterprise. The rights do not exist apart from the duties. This means that anyone who wants to enjoy the advantages of a partnership must give up some of his individual freedom of action. This voluntary limitation on his own future action constitutes the advantage which his partners gain in return for giving up some of their freedom of action in his favor.

It is a simple fact that we have often contracted to limit our theoretically absolute right to do as we liked in dealings with other nations, in return for something which we thought of equal or greater value. Let me cite a single example which we have come to take so much as a matter of course that many people will be surprised to be told it *is* an example. In 1874 we bartered away our "right" to require that inhabitants of other countries who wished to mail a letter to the United States must abide by postal rules fixed independently by the United States. Did we "lose" any of our sovereignty in joining the Universal Postal Union which set standard weights and rates for letters exchanged between Americans and people in other parts of the world? A hun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dred other equally elementary examples could be given — the rules of safety at sea of 1889, the international sanitary regulations of 1903, the international regulation of radio wave lengths of 1927. Together they show beyond dispute that in the world today no single state which wishes to have friendly relations with other states is able to exercise *all* its rights independently of other states.

The subject which therefore ought to be debated now is not whether we should join in any sort of give and take with other nations but what the items of give and take should be.

Let me indicate by a simile the sort of thing I have particularly in mind. Visualize several big apartment houses which touch one another in a single city block or occupy adjoining blocks. Is it sensible and profitable for each to depend for protection against fire exclusively on a fire-fighting organization composed of its own dwellers and employees? Or is it better for the owner of each to make agreements with the others as to the conditions under which he will allow his stand pipe to be used and under which fire brigades from neighboring houses may use his roof in fighting a neighborhood fire? Going one step further, should the owners not agree to pay taxes at agreed rates to maintain a fire department which will serve them all?

Common support of a common fire department does not affect the individual titles of ownership to individual properties. The point is, that unless the owners do arrange for common support of some kind they will wake up one day to find that their title deeds are indeed perfect and without a flaw but that what they apply to are piles of rubble and charred beams. A title deed in a safe deposit box does not afford protection from fire and many other forms of trouble and loss. Only the wise and proper exercise of the rights and powers inherent in the title deed can afford protection. So with sovereignty. The proper exercise of sovereign rights protects sovereignty; the failure properly to exercise sovereign rights puts it in jeopardy.

Much of the current confusion over the term sovereignty comes, of course, from those who are willing from considerations of apparent personal or party advantage to promote discord between the United States and other nations. Usually the nations they seem to hate most are our two chief allies. One of their methods of argument recently has been to shout that they will never permit a "mongrel flag" to be substituted for the Stars and Stripes and to say that the Moscow Agreement was "a victory for the Axis." Senator Reynolds, who contemptuously opposed the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measures which put this country in a position to resist Germany successfully, assumes to defend our sovereignty now by managing to imply, in the most insulting language, that we should not have diplomatic relations with Russia.

It is true that today as we try to find the right road through the complicated problems raised by this war we sometimes feel baffled by various aspects of British or Soviet policy. But when that happens we should not be surprised or discouraged and we should not feel unfriendly toward either of them as a result. We do many things which are baffling to them, too. Under our constitutional system, for example, our Government is not permitted to make commitments regarding future action to the same extent they are allowed to do under their systems. Let us remember that none of us can read the future exactly and that what we all are searching for is a means to safeguard our nations from future shocks in unpredictable situations. It would be a sad commentary on the human intelligence if three such great peoples allowed irritations caused by temporary uncertainties to make them cynical. They must not despair. They must not give up the search for a thing they all three want in common — a thing I believe they can find if they have the faith to act in common.

None of the arguments used against necessary international coöperation really pretends to be addressed to reason. One of the chief organs stirring narrow nationalistic emotions in this country is the *Chicago Tribune*, the newspaper which published the most secret military plans of our army and navy high command for national defense on the eve of Pearl Harbor; which tries to make martyrs of warped and twisted Americans who have been indicted for conspiracy to undermine the morale of the armed forces; and whose proprietor recently announced his heroic action in saving the United States, some years back, from an invasion by a British Army. The hurt surprise of that particular individual when his activities are described as harmful to his country's welfare reminds me of a tag-line popular in my boyhood. It was taken from Owen Davis's famous play, "Nellie, The Beautiful Cloak Model." In the first act the villain pushed Nellie under a descending elevator. In the second he threw her off the Brooklyn Bridge. In the third he tied her to the tracks of the elevated railroad as a train was approaching. In the last act he climbed through her bedroom window in the dead of night, and, as the poor girl drew back in alarm, demanded reproachfully, "Why do you fear me, Nellie?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Only a very small group of Americans, however, live in those shadowy caverns of the mind. For most of us who look at the problem of sovereignty without personal or party bias the question that arises is simply: What specific actions are necessary and wise for the extension of the use of our sovereignty?

Here opinions can and will differ. Given the premise that some action is proper, and that many forms of action may be necessary, disagreement is natural and healthy. Agreement in such cases can be reached by argument and mutual give and take. As the war enters its final phase, proposals as to how the peaceable nations of the earth should organize to prevent new conflicts will multiply and take more definite shape, and we shall begin to examine and discuss them in detail. Let us enter upon this great debate with the object of coming to an agreement and not, as once before at a similar moment in our history, in an irreconcilable spirit and the determination to vindicate a particular point of view.

V

In the League of Nations debate of 1919 and 1920 the sharpest differences of opinion within this country arose over the question whether the United States should commit itself to the use of force in upholding international agreements. Friends and foes alike of the proposed international organization saw that this would be the test of its usefulness. Persons who wished to prevent the United States from joining any world organization at all inflamed emotions and awakened prejudice by proclaiming that such a commitment would be "treason." Those who wanted to make the organization the instrument for preventing a second world war saw that it would succeed or fail according to the willingness of member states to pledge themselves to the use of force to maintain the rule of law, by an agreed procedure and in agreed circumstances.

Today this is still the core of the decision which we must take. Are we willing only to talk when any situation arises which plainly threatens war? Or are we willing, in agreed circumstances, to act?

Two episodes gave Hitler his cue and made the present war certain — the unchecked Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and the unchecked Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935. The chief reason why the Powers now joined together as the United Nations did not check those aggressions was because

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

none of them believed that any of the others was prepared — psychologically or militarily — to do more than talk.

The growth of that state of mind can be traced all the way back to 1919. Apportionment of blame for it among the various countries concerned is not at this moment important. What is important today is that unless the American isolationism which we are now putting out the door is to fly back through the window, we must preface any discussion of details of the international organization which we expect to help create by a clear statement that we are prepared in principle to join with other members of that organization in using force to sustain its decisions.

Would the creation of a joint instrument of force threaten our sovereignty? Or would it, on the contrary, represent a useful extension of our sovereign powers in an effort to protect our vital interests?

First of all let us consider the immediate and concrete postwar situation which will make an international armed force necessary. Obviously, it is the requirement that Germany and Japan be policed to make sure that they do not again acquire the military power to wage wars of aggression. The idea of "policing" parts of the world outside the boundaries of the United States is not a new one for us. Acting unilaterally — that is to say one-sidedly and by ourselves — we have used our armed forces for police work in other parts of the world more than 50 times in our history. (In this connection, incidentally, we might remind ourselves that certain of our one-sided expeditions into Latin America were part of a policy which we now believe to have been unwise and which by agreement with the Latin American countries has now been renounced in favor of coöperative action in cases where police work in this hemisphere may be necessary.)

Besides these instances of unilateral action, we have on 25 or more occasions taken police action in coöperation with other nations. The agreements which we entered into with Great Britain in 1891, and with Russia in 1894, to patrol the Bering Sea against illegal fur sealers might be cited as examples of such international policing. These agreements gave both Russia and Great Britain the right to seize suspected fur hunters and their ships, even if they were American citizens sailing under the American flag. Both those countries in turn gave us a similar right to seize ships and men, of whatever nationality, including their own, if we suspected them of illegal activities. Those agreements were not destructive of our sovereignty or of British and Russians sov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ereignty. They represented a constructive use of sovereignty, mutually advantageous to all three parties.

This established principle of coöperative international policing gives us the foundation on which to build for the future. No dramatically long step is required. I can see the practical difficulties in attempting to create a closely integrated internationalized police force. But I do not have any difficulty in conceiving of an agreement between the peace-loving nations to the effect that each will maintain certain land, sea or air forces and that each will use them collaboratively, in agreed situations and within agreed limits, to prevent aggression.

This seems to me the minimum requirement to ensure that international disputes which are clearly covered by international law shall be submitted to courts and judges, and that those which are not shall be settled by conciliation and compromise. For such a procedure to work successfully, the members of the international organization must say plainly, in advance, that if peaceful methods fail the aggressor state will encounter sufficient armed forces to ensure his eventual defeat.

In planning how this force would be operated as a practical matter we have a model in the combined chiefs of staff with which this war has made us familiar. Such a staff would make the necessary technical preparations for effective collaborative action in the event that should ever become necessary. I would hope that the mere preparation for action would forestall the need of ever taking it. But if the time should come when collective action had to be taken, it certainly is in the interest of the United States and of all other peace-loving states that it be taken promptly and decisively.

To repeat once more: I think that our use of our sovereignty to create an effective instrument of peace is the best way of protecting our sovereignty. If this is called "bartering," I would say that it is a profitable transaction, and I would rather see the United States enter into it than pursue its own aloof way into a third world war.

After this war we shall face many tough problems which can be met only by international action. Some will be scientific or technological, some cultural or educational. Some will be economic — our struggle, in partnership with our allies, to use the raw materials and the markets of the world to increase living standards everywhere. Some will be political — the delicate and hazardous adjustment to freedom and self-government of millions of people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who have now heard those magic words and will need our help as they grope dangerously for a way to turn them into reality.

In an international organization which was backed by the machinery needed to enforce its decisions the United States for the first time in history would be in a position to deal boldly and effectively with the problems which will confront it. In coöperation with our allies, we shall still be leaders by virtue of the strength and ingenuity of our people. To use this leadership, for our own enrichment and that of mankind, will not be to weaken the sovereign power of the American people; it will be to widen it and make it more real.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNRRA, SAMPLE OF WORLD ORGANIZATION

By Philip C. Jessup

MOLOTOV, Eden, Hull and Foo Ping-Sheung, speaking for their governments, jointly declared at Moscow on October 30 that "they recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a joint international organization . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security." As indicated by the House's adoption of the Fulbright Resolution by a vote of 360 to 29, and the Senate's adoption of the Connally Resolution by a vote of 85 to 5, this country recognizes the necessity for such an organization. As for the other countries, there is abundant evidence that we are merely in the position of catching up with the rest of the procession.

This is not said, of course, to underestimate the importance of the fact that the new "Big Four" saw fit to make public confession of their faith in this matter. The fourth article of their now famous Moscow Declaration constitutes a challenge for the production of a master plan. Attempts to meet that challenge are being made daily in pamphlets, in the press, between stiff covers, and on the platform. The challenger, however, still rides the lists, waiting the entry of his conqueror.

The problem of how to maintain international peace and security is now of a respectable age. The doubt is not whether there is such a question but whether we have learned enough from the mistakes which have already been made in the effort to solve it. Perhaps it is worth while to add to the current flow of ink some comments on past efforts to draw up master plans and then to discuss one current laboratory sample.

II

As we look back at the trends in international organization, from the time of the extraordinarily perceptive decisions reached by the Powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 down to the inspired but hapless decisions of Versailles in 1919, we are able to identify certain phases and characteristics.

In the first place, there were steps toward international organization which had their roots in political group decisions. These early manifestations of the conviction that in international affairs peace and security were to be found only in some kind of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

union we now rather derisively style "alliances." Frequently they were dual, but in many instances triple or multiple. In the seventeenth century they abounded to such an extent that the diplomats, or their legal advisers, evolved a pattern which made the drafting of many clauses of each new treaty almost as simple as the modern dispatch of a government form letter. These primitive microcosmic international organizations were decentralized and were almost invariably of a strictly regional character, in the sense that they dealt with the affairs of a particular region. The keepers of the peace were interested less in keeping the peace, however, than in keeping their own status unimpaired until such time as they could hope to improve it by a deliberate breach of the peace. They were quite frank about this, as was indicated by some of the stock clauses which began by asserting that there should be firm and inviolable peace between the parties, and then hedged by inserting provisions concerning what was to happen if the peace were broken — "which God forbid."

In this earliest period nothing that one could call a permanent international organization emerged. The Congress of Vienna, however, perhaps stimulated by the length and breadth of the Napoleonic Wars, moved forward. We see there a development of that rather conventional amorphous group known as the Concert of Europe. We also see the development of certain technical organizations created to achieve a common international end. The most striking of these was the European Commission of the Danube, which had a real function to perform and the vitality to perform it on the basis of a continuing technical organization. On through the nineteenth century, we can see a continuation of these two approaches to the international problem — one through a breakdown according to practical functions, the other on the broadest lines of *Grosse Politik*.

Between 1815 and 1914 these developments were still of the decentralized type. Some of them were organized on a regional basis — that is, with reference to a particular geographic area — as in the political alliances or as in the Berlin Conference of 1885 on African affairs. Others proceeded on a functional basis — that is, with reference to a particular subject matter or function to be performed — as when the Congress of Berlin and the succeeding meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle regulated the rank and standing of diplomatic representatives, or when the Berlin and Brussels Conferences turned their attention to abolishing the slave trade.

Although no permanent organization grew out of these con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferences, there is an important fact about them to which Frederick S. Dunn called attention some fifteen years ago,[1] namely that the conferences themselves began to develop the notion that they were entities separate and apart from the states represented. As for motivation, there does appear to have been a consciousness of the general interest. This was recognized by the admission of small states to the international conferences. However, it was forthwith flouted by the big Powers which, in total disregard of acknowledged doctrines of international law, proceeded to revise *in camera* the treaties which had been entered into by the collectivity of European states.[2]

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of international organizations of a new sort. These organizations, which were the outcome of non-political group decisions, came to have the name "unions." The grandfather of them all, of course, was the Universal Postal Union which has functioned with consistent success, both in peace and in war, since 1874. The formation of the Postal Union followed by ten years the Geneva Red Cross Convention, which was stimulated by the humanitarian reactions to the Crimean War. In 1890, the Pan American development began with a typical Yankee business note, which produced not the present Pan American Union but a "Commercial Bureau." The earlier political aspirations of Bolívar have yet to be realized.

Between those days and the outbreak of World War I, these technical organizations developed apace on both sides of the Atlantic and played a genuine part in accustoming governments and their peoples to acting on an international basis. In strict contrast to their prototypes, they were characterized by a high degree of centralization in their administration. Although regionalism was still a factor, the emphasis was upon functional organization. In motivation, the interest was clearly general rather than particular, even though the generality was confined frequently to specific groups of states.

III

This century plant flowered in 1919 in the League of Nations and its two affiliates, the International Labor Organization and the Permanent Court of International Justice. They revealed a

[1] "The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929.

[2] The late Harold J. Tobin followed the vicissitudes of these arrangements in "The Termination of Multipartite Treaties." New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fairly complete union of the methods of political and non-political group decisions. Similar developments began to take place in the Pan American Union (although from the point of view of organizational development it lagged behind). There obviously was more centralization in these new administrations. Indeed, Article 24 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contemplated the merger into its own system of all of the preëxisting technical organizations. This merger did not take place, due partly to the intrenched international bureaucracy of the unions, partly to the fact that the United States was, to say the least, not helpful in bringing such a merger about. In this hemisphere, the political weakness of the Pan American system also tended toward the decentralization of the technical bureaus.

The functional emphasis was still strong in this development, but regionalism played an important rôle also. In the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, the functional objective of limiting armaments was fortuitously combined with an exploration of problems of the region of the Far East. This resulted entirely from a chance parallelism in British and American foreign policies. In general, the Government of the United States tended to stress the functional aspect of organization in order not to raise domestic political difficulties: in the 1920's it was much easier to go to Geneva to discuss questions like opium, health and the white slave traffic than to venture to show an interest in European affairs. Gradually, under Stimson and Hull, the line became bolder. Our established regional interest in Latin America led us through difficulties like the Chaco War and the Leticia incident to a pooling of interests and a momentary feeling that an international organization could handle the great problem of peace and war without regard to regions. The same trend appeared in the steps by which we reasserted our historic interest in the Far East.

Nevertheless, the most highly developed organizations which the world had been able to achieve up to this point were still too feeble to be of much use in the face of Italian and Japanese aggression. As the Ethiopian and Manchurian affairs revealed the difficulty of applying sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant, talk began to be heard about the desirability of revising the whole scheme on a regional basis.[3] As for motivation, this period showed the accrued strength of the concept of general international interest which led governments to seek popular support by avowing

[3] James T. Shotwell urged this in developing his theory of "circles of responsibility."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

devotion to that general interest. The Briand-Kellogg Pact was the prime manifestation of that tendency and the thought was summed up in the aphorism that "peace is indivisible."

Our current wartime experience is merely repeating, with minor variations, the patterns and experiences of World War I. In that conflict the British and French developed a network of organizations to carry out their common military purpose, although they did not achieve real unity until near the end. Sir Arthur Salter has demonstrated[4] the effectiveness of the organizations set up; and indeed American merchants were quite conscious of them. There were parallel but abortive attempts at organization among the neutrals. The Latin American states took the lead in this respect, a number of them evolving rather elaborate plans not unlike the eventual Covenant of the League but based on the attempt to establish a "league of neutrals." The Scandinavian states progressed to the point of joint discussions and meetings of their sovereigns. Like the Latin Americans, they wooed the United States. But Wilson steadily repulsed these and other suggestions to form a neutral organization.

As the organizations which developed during the last war were entirely military in origin and emphasis, they naturally collapsed when the common enemy had been defeated. Accordingly, when the Peace Conference set about the task of developing a postwar organization it had to begin *de novo*. The new master plan which appeared was a total plan — the League of Nations.

IV

During World War II we have witnessed a significant double line of development. Nothing of much importance in the shape of international organization was proposed prior to the time when the United States entered the war. Thereafter — probably as the result of preliminary foresight and planning — there developed the system of Combined Boards. These highly efficient organizations are distinctly Anglo-American, except that Canada has been admitted to partnership in some. Like the Anglo-French bodies in World War I, they are centralized, functional and narrowly motivated. An interesting variation in function, however, is found in the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. As it is now developing, it may make a real contribution to the elaboration of some international organization capable of dealing with the problem of dependent peoples in colonial areas.

[4] *Cf.* his classic study of "Allied Shipping Control." Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Today, unlike what happened in the last war, we fortunately are witnessing the parallel development of what is at least a piecemeal approach to the general problem of organizing the post-war world. The process began with the Conference on Food and Agriculture held at Hot Springs from May 18 to June 3, 1943. This was a genuine United Nations meeting. The Conference established an Interim Commission which immediately set about the task of preparing the framework for a permanent and genuinely international organization in its allotted field. The second step in the process was the actual establishment of UNRRA — the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration — at the White House meeting of November 9, 1943.

It has further been announced in general terms that a United Nations monetary and financial organization is in the offing. Lord Woolton recently told the British Parliament that the United Nations were already discussing the postwar problem of regulating cartels. On the political front, the Australian and New Zealand Governments have taken the lead in suggesting the formation of a political body which would deal with problems of the island area in the Pacific on a more permanent basis than the occasional meetings of the Pacific Council in Washington. As a result of the Moscow Conference, the European Advisory Commission now sits in London. There had already been established a Mediterranean Commission, in which Russia participated in token of her interest in that area.

Some specific lessons are already to be learned from our first laboratory sample, UNRRA. The way the negotiations for its establishment developed, the trends apparent at the inaugural session of its Council and the policies which it is now evolving all have significance. So has the fact that both Houses of Congress have authorized an appropriation of $1,350,000,000 to support its work.

UNRRA is significant because it is the first sharing of a major task which has both military and post-combat implications — the first sharing on a really international basis. Not only do all the United Nations participate as members of UNRRA; the associated nations do also. UNRRA's predecessor was the Inter-Allied Committee on Post War Requirements, commonly called the Leith-Ross Committee. This Committee had a purely European outlook. It was created before the United States entered the war, met in London, and was decidedly under British leadership. Since it was engaged in drawing up plans and requirement

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

schedules it was never thought of as an operating organization. The United States evidently had to be brought into any consideration of the relief and rehabilitation problem. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, that country was bound to be a recipient rather than a provider; its participation was therefore considered as being of more political than functional importance. The participation of China was vital, because of the enormous size of her relief and rehabilitation needs and because the Leith-Ross Committee had paid no attention at all to the whole problem of the Far East.

The organization which finally evolved, however, had a bearing not merely on the particular task of providing relief; it foreshadowed important subsequent developments in a wider field. It was in June of 1943, nearly a year after the start of negotiations, that the first draft of the UNRRA agreement was made public. This disclosed that a new Big Four had been created. China was included along with Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Central Committee where ultimate power would apparently lodge. This was the first appearance of the group which later signed the Moscow Declaration. The historical significance of the UNRRA agreement in terms of China's position in the world also cannot be exaggerated. From the point of view of relief and rehabilitation, it was important that although the greatest prospective suppliers and the greatest prospective recipients were linked together in the controlling organ of the new body, all the nations large and small which had combined in the struggle against the Axis were to be full partners in the endeavor. Nor should one fail to notice that UNRRA provided a first way to include Soviet Russia in an organization dealing with world problems.

V

Significant reactions to the publication of the UNRRA agreement came immediately from two sources, one domestic, one international.

On the domestic front, members of the Senate, and particularly Senator Vandenberg, raised the question whether the agreement was not a treaty and whether to enter into it through a joint resolution would not be a violation of the Constitution. There followed extensive and cordial negotiations over a period of months between Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, Mr. Francis B. Sayre, Governor Lehman's First Assistant, and a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The gist of the agreement reached was that the United States would become a member of UNRRA through an executive agreement but that Congress would then have an opportunity to review the matter and to control the extent of the obligations assumed through its authorization of appropriations. The State Department's handling of this matter and the coöperative attitude of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are encouraging signs that the United States may find a way to participate eventually in organized international life.

The international repercussions came from Powers which had not been "in on the ground floor" and which naturally sought to secure concessions for themselves. There was also a fear that too much power was being given to the Big Four, and that the pattern now being set foreshadowed big-power dominance in other fields.

The modifications which were introduced into the text before it was signed in the East Room of the White House on November 9, 1943, satisfied doubters on Capitol Hill that the United States was amply safeguarded against the chance imposition of unexpected burdens and satisfied the small Powers that at least a measure of control over the big Powers was to be retained by the Council, where all members would be represented. These results might not have been achieved had the agreement been concluded at a conference called for that purpose instead of being elaborated over the course of some sixteen months by negotiations carried on with all of the governments individually. In the field of food and agriculture, as already noted, the process did start with a conference; but it was continued through the appointment of an interim commission which has now spent over six months of work in elaborating and negotiating a plan of organization. Both methods, while not satisfying the impatient, are worth noting and keeping track of. Although they are not wholly new, they represent a deviation from the common prewar practice, probably inspired by the difficulties of wartime travel and the emergence of Washington as a principal center of world affairs.

There is no doubt that many of the smaller countries came to Atlantic City on November 10 with a mixture of hopes and fears. On the whole, they had good reason to be satisfied. Not too much significance is to be attached to the way committee posts of honor were distributed among the representatives of small and large states. That is the normal technique of international conferences, and while it was followed here with great goodwill it was not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggestive of any particular new trend. On the other hand, some of the newspapermen who have commented on the Atlantic City Conference have attached too much significance to what they considered the steam-roller technique of the chairman of the Conference, Mr. Acheson. It always seems to one who is not chairman that the chairman is excessively autocratic.

The real significance of the setup became apparent rather slowly during the course of the three-week session. In summary, what was done amounted to a democratization of the organization. The tone for this was set in the acceptance speech of Director General Lehman, which stressed the fact that he accepted his position as that of the servant of 44 governments and not as the representative of any one of them. The tendency was strengthened as it became apparent that the big Powers were not attempting to shut off debate in the committees, where the actual work was done, and that the chairmen of those committees were acting with real independence.

Director General Lehman gave a fair picture of the processes in his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 10:

> By way of example I should like to refer to the resolution and report that was developed by the subcommittee of the council on policies relating to agricultural rehabilitation and other means of raising food essential to relief. The chairman of the subcommittee was a member of the Soviet delegation, the vice chairman was the member of the Council for Costa Rica, the rapporteur, or drafting officer, a representative of the United Kingdom. Representatives of 35 other countries sat upon the subcommittee, with the representatives of the United States, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, France, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Poland, and Ethiopia taking active part in the discussion. Each paragraph of the report, on which the resolution was based, was discussed line by line. All were heard; the final version had the approval of all. The report and resolution, therefore, constitute an expression of the combined wisdom of the United Nations concerning just what should and what should not be attempted by U.N.R.R.A. in programs for the restoration of essential food production in the liberated areas.

One sensed the friendly atmosphere in the comments of many present who had labored in years past on the staffs of the League and the I.L.O. in Geneva. Of course there were disappointments, some of them bitter. Some of the small countries present undoubtedly secured from the meeting less than they had hoped for and less than they had a right to expect.

More important than all this was the rather unexpected emergence of the Council's various permanent committees as the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bodies which will probably carry the burden of consultation and planning between the sessions. There is the Committee on Supplies, with eleven members and a Canadian chairman. There is the Committee on Financial Control, with a chairman from the United States and seven other members. Then there are the regional committees. The Committee of the Council for Europe, with members from the European states plus Brazil, Canada and the United States, is likely to be most active. The Committee of the Council for the Far East, in view of the difficulty of arranging representative meetings in Chungking at the moment, has already held organization meetings in Washington. This Committee includes representatives of Australia, China, the French Committee of National Liberation, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet Government, for obvious reasons, did not wish to be represented on this Committee.

The Council also authorized technical standing committees on health, agriculture, welfare, displaced persons and industrial rehabilitation. Every member of the organization is entitled to be represented on these committees but the hope was strongly expressed that nations would not give notice of participation unless they had a genuine interest in the subject matter, for fear that the machinery might become clumsy and inefficient. These committees may, of course, develop an active rôle. But it seems more likely that their technical functions will be discharged through the technical subcommittees of the regional committees.

The Central Committee, which loomed over the horizon like a Frankenstein's monster in the pre-conference days, was hardly ever mentioned at Atlantic City. So far as is known, there has been no subsequent tendency to plan a lone hand for it at the expense of general team play.

The process of democratization was certainly facilitated by Article 3 of the UNRRA agreement which provides that, except in certain special cases, the Council shall vote by simple majority. Cromwell A. Riches [5] has noted the really surprising extent to which international organizations have been able to avoid the unanimity rule (most frequently, of course, in technical organizations and on technical points). Speaking at the closing session of the UNRRA Conference, the head of the Netherlands delegation

[5] *Cf.* his study "Majority Rule in International Organization." Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointed with satisfaction to the fact that the Great Powers had been voted down on several points during the meeting. This situation can really give some satisfaction to the small Powers without causing the Great Powers alarm. Much unnecessary attention is often devoted to the problem of setting up verbal safeguards for the position of the Great Powers in international organizations. One recalls the struggles over this point during the framing of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The draftsmen finally came out with a beautifully balanced plan of a Council controlled by the Great Powers and an Assembly in which all members would participate equally and in which, therefore, the small states would have a majority. The Covenant even named the states which should form the Council—five Great Powers and four small ones. Before the League system momentarily disintegrated under the impact of the present war, the Council was composed of four Great Powers and eleven small ones. The Great Powers are better protected by their greatness than by the most ingenious formula.

This sketch of certain aspects of the UNRRA development has not paid enough attention to the complicated problem of the Combined Boards. The resolutions adopted at Atlantic City leave important powers to these instruments which, being exclusively Anglo-American, are organized on an even narrower basis than the Central Committee of UNRRA. The machinery of the Combined Boards could conceivably be used to hinder and even hamstring UNRRA. However, this would not necessarily be true. The fact that the Soviet Union is not part of the Combined Boards mechanism is a political fact of great importance.

One final aspect of our laboratory sample may be noted. Some persons have felt concern lest the piecemeal development of international organizations might militate against the eventual establishment of the overall world organization. The same fear has also been responsible for creating much of the objection to plans for regional organizations. UNRRA has gone far to dissipate such fears. In the gruelling preparatory period before the Conference met, members of the Secretariat of the League of Nations and of the International Labor Organization were present and gave constant advice on the plans being elaborated. Their observers were most welcome at Atlantic City, along with representatives of other appropriate international organizations, and the Council resolved to welcome their participation in future meetings. There also was sympathetic discussion and approval of the idea of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interchange of personnel among international organizations, through the process known as seconding or otherwise.

We might imagine that when the world organization is eventually established, its head might have as his cabinet the Director of the I.L.O., the Director General of UNRRA, the Director General of the Permanent Organization on Food and Agriculture and their opposite members in such other functional international organizations as may be established. It is even conceivable that these officials might be formed into a Central Committee before the general international organization is created. Such a committee could facilitate the latter development.

The new organizations which are to be set up, whether general or particular, seem certain to have a centralized character. That development now seems to be settled. One cannot say with quite so much assurance that modern trends toward broad motivation will be maintained. It is not inconceivable that a very few strong states might so far forget the lessons of the last century and a half as to ignore the fact that their own interests are inseparably connected with general peace and stability. But the use of international organization, particularly with a centralized form of administration, may conduce to an acceptance of the broad motivation.

As for the supposed issue of functionalism versus regionalism, there seems to be no real antithesis between the two. Developments along both lines seem likely. One may expect to see a continuation of the trend toward establishing separate organizations designed to discharge certain functions, such as stabilizing exchange, liberalizing commercial policies, facilitating international investments and protecting the interests of dependent peoples. They probably will be organized on a global basis, but possibly with separate reference to various geographical regions. In the political field, one should watch for developments indicating that consideration and formation of policy will take place on a global basis but with enforcement left as the task of regional groups. It would not be surprising if the Big Four were accepted as the law-enforcing group. They might be unwilling to surrender their power but nevertheless be willing to harness it to the needs of an organized international community. They might agree not to use it except in accordance with the decision of the international organization. When they did act, they might do so through a Combined General Staff which would delegate authority to task forces of the state most strategically located.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA AT WAR

The Climactic Year Begins

By Hanson W. Baldwin

FOR the American forces in Europe the winter just past was a time of dogged though indecisive fighting, but even more a time of preparation, a preface to the great campaigns of 1944. In the Pacific, the major strategic offensive by the United States which started with our move into the Gilbert Islands in November recorded its first great advance in February with the capture of the Marshall Islands, an operation which will long be studied as a model of amphibious action.

Despite the continued military gains registered by the United Nations, the winter was on the whole marked by anxious anticipation. There was intense propagandistic activity on both sides and much political manœuvring. Although — or perhaps because — the military situation in Europe was rapidly drawing to a climax, the political situation was by no means firm. The passage of time made evident that the Moscow and Teheran conferences had not settled the basic political issues which threatened to produce schisms between Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States. Russia's actions during the winter months indicated that she was determined to pursue a "spheres of influence" policy. She did not bar international collaboration. She nevertheless continued to develop two parallel and different foreign policies — the one based on, or leading toward, coöperation, the other based on, or leading toward, a sort of ideological imperialism. As she showed herself rather intransigent both in word as well as in deed, and as the Russian Armies advanced further toward the West, Britain commenced to cast about for some means to offset this new growing power in Europe. The Smuts speech, carrying implications of a new foreign policy for Britain, was a straw in the wind of official British thinking. To many it suggested that Britain, too, would revert to the prewar policy of regional spheres of influence.

In other words, by the beginning of 1944 power politics was again being "waged" in Europe and rivalries between the United Nations not only threatened the winning of the peace but were influencing military strategy. The rôle assigned the United States seemed to be that of acting as a bridge between Russia and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Britain. We were already finding this difficult and thankless, and in the opening phase we had already shown that we were not particularly adept at playing it.

Although the international political picture was in general dark during these months, there came flashes of brighter vistas. For example, the great differences that had for so long marred the work of the French Committee of National Liberation and prevented the creation of a united French movement against Fascism were, by early 1944, in process of gradual resolution. Out of the fires of resentment and argument a French government was coming into being in exile, and on the training grounds of North Africa and the battlefields of Italy a new French Army — hard-fighting and competent — was being born.

Not as much could be said of the Italian political situation. Contrary to our wildly exaggerated and over-optimistic expectations, the Italians proved to be of little practical military value.[1] The principal characteristic which marked them was apathy. In the Balkans the political situation was volcanic. Bulgaria, shaken by Allied bombing and connected by Pan-Slavism to Russia, grew more restless with each Russian advance to the West. Hungary, also, was war-weary. Jugoslavia was seething. In Northern Europe, Finland, as these lines were written, was continuing to fight but showed signs that she would welcome any way out of the war short of unconditional surrender and her elimination as a sovereign state.

With the advent of spring, then, and as the time for the climactic operation of our whole European strategy drew near, the Old World seemed to be, politically speaking, in a condition where literally anything might happen. But not merely might political events affect military strategy. Conversely, a sharp military reverse for either side might set political avalanches moving.

II

It was for reasons such as those indicated, including its influence upon the general political and psychological situation, that the battle of the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead in Italy, which still rages as these lines are written, assumed such importance. Neither side, in a time like the winter of 1943–44, could afford a heavy reverse. For the Allies it would be a severe moral blow,

[1] On the contrary, many of them were joining Graziani's neo-Fascist puppet army in Northern Italy. Also, Italian saboteurs against Germany were conspicuous by their absence. German retaliation, in the form of the execution of hostages, which had proved ineffective in countries like France, Norway and Jugoslavia, worked wonders in Italy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perhaps entailing even a sharp revision of their preconceived grand strategy for 1944 and probably lengthening the war. For the Germans it would add another — perhaps the final — straw to the great burden of defeat and retreat which was now exerting a crushing weight on her own shoulders and those of her satellites.

The beachhead battle in the flat coastal land 30 miles south of Rome started as a bold Allied attempt to break the virtual stalemate which had gripped the mountain warfare in Italy since soon after the capture of Naples on October 1, 1943. Initially it was highly successful.

The attempt had seemed long overdue. After our first landings at Salerno many observers had expected us to progress up the Italian coast by a sort of amphibious "leapfrog" procedure, successively outflanking the German positions across the peninsula by means of our control of the sea and our air superiority. But they had reckoned, first, without a continuing shortage of landing craft, which at the beginning of the year 1944 was one of the few material bottlenecks in the Allied armaments program. And they had not considered the campaign in Italy in the perspective of grand Allied strategy. After the capture of Naples and Foggia, and after the Teheran conference of December 1943, Italy became a secondary theater.

Our remaining objectives in Italy were to capture Rome — of combined political, psychological and military importance — and to hold down as many German divisions as we could. We were trying to accomplish them with as limited a force as possible. Some officers have criticized this as "piddling." But it was wise, for our main effort was clearly to be made in Western Europe. This does not, however, explain German tactical and technical superiority in various types of operations and in various kinds of weapons, *e.g.* the "Nebelwerfer," or six-barrelled rocket launcher; it does not explain the misuse and wastage of our highly-trained specialized parachute troops and Rangers; it does not explain our lack of cavalry (we had to improvise some after the start of the campaign), or the use of inadequately trained replacements, or our failure to employ specially trained mountain troops or to use tanks in force in every situation where they could be employed.

After the capture of Naples and a limited advance northward, the Allied advance bogged down in the rain-soaked valleys and snow-crested Apennines along a line roughly paralleling the Garigliano and Sangro Rivers. At the nearest point, this line lay some 80 airline miles from Rome. The Germans took full advan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tage of the great defensive possibilities of the rugged terrain. They tunneled and dug into the rock, and defied ousting. Their strength in line or in immediate reserve soon amounted to some 10 or 12 divisions. The Allies slowly built up their strength to an estimated 13 to 16 divisions, including one or more French divisions under General Juin which came into action late in 1943.

When the Allies reached the outposts of the main German defensive positions — called, along a part of the front, the Gustav Line — they progressed only slowly and painfully, yard by yard, hill by hill. This was the war primarily of the infantryman, the little-glamorized but ever-glorious "doughboy." Hand grenades and bayonets, mortars and light automatic weapons were our principal arms. Our artillery was plentiful, but perhaps because of more precise German knowledge of the terrain it seems to have been less accurate than that of the Germans. Tanks were not used as often or as advantageously as they might have been. The execrable mountain weather of an Apennine winter mired the armies in mud. The battle in those months of November, December, January and February was a struggle of endurance. Divisions stayed in line for weeks on end. Men half-stumbling with fatigue, who had seen most of their officers killed or wounded and a good percentage of their comrades casualties, were "relieved" by other weary men, red-eyed and haggard. When the full history of this war is written, the Battle of Italy may loom as only a small part of a great drama. But in it, even more truly than in North Africa or Sicily, the American soldier was true to his traditions.

The Anzio-Nettuno operation which started on January 22 attempted to break this mountain stalemate and open the road to Rome. It had been planned as long ago as the preceding October but had been delayed primarily because of the shortage of landing craft (there were other reasons also), and secondarily because of the limited forces available. Also, preliminary operations had to be carried out along the Garigliano-Sangro line before the new beachhead could be established.

The British Eighth Army, fighting on the Adriatic flank, forced a crossing of the Sangro in late November and December, and advanced to within 12 miles of Pescara, the terminus of a trans-peninsular highway to Rome. Together the British and Americans won Mignano, reached the banks of the Rapido River in the center, and on the Tyrrhenian Sea flank probed across the Garigliano. But by mid-January the line was still virtually stalemated. On the east flank, the Canadians were bogged down

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

around Arielli; and the Americans were still trying to break into the southern approaches of the Liri Valley, commanded by the mountain town of Cassino.

Five days before the first troops landed near Nettuno, 30 miles south of Rome and just north of the Pontine Marshes, the Allies began a simultaneous attack along the entire Italian front from the Garigliano to Arielli. The Canadian attack on the Adriatic flank was a holding attack; the British struck sharply on the Garigliano, and forced their way across; but the main effort was made by the Americans — by the 34th and 36th Divisions — across the Rapido River and toward and around Cassino. This main attack against the so-called Gustav Line made some progress; and to meet it Field Marshal Kesselring, the German commander, transferred to the support of the six German divisions already in line three Nazi divisions which had been in reserve near Rome — the 3rd, the 29th and the 19th Panzer Grenadier Divisions.

The general Allied attack was accompanied by an air blitz directed at German airfields and communications. It was concentrated in the Rome area, but also extended as far as northern Italy and southern France. This blitz temporarily blocked railroads and some roads leading through Rome toward the southern front, and seems to have put six out of seven Nazi airfields near Rome temporarily out of operation. German headquarters near Frascati were smashed, and when our first troops got ashore near Nettuno, some 50 miles north of the trans-peninsular front, they encountered virtually no opposition.

The beachhead battle developed slowly. Our troops were landed and supplied chiefly across open beaches, for the ports of Anzio and Nettuno, seaside resorts and fishing villages, are tiny. They gradually expanded their beachhead, and pushed inland toward, but not across, the Appian Way, a main supply route of the German forces fighting on the Garigliano-Gustav line in the south. Despite the slight opposition, our movements were sluggish. Apparently no serious attempt was made to cut the Appian Way or to establish positions in the Alban hills inland which would command that important highway. We expanded and consolidated our beachhead, but we made no attempt to use it as a springboard for offensive operations against the enemy's army, his line of communications, or Rome.

Our seeming over-cautiousness in developing our favorable opportunity can be partially explained. In the first place, we were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not established in any great strength. According to the Germans, we had built up our strength in the beachhead area to about six divisions by February 10. Secondly, the beachhead was initially intended as a diversionary move, not as the hammer, but the anvil. Our main blow was to come from the south. Our expectation was that our threat to the German rear would force the withdrawal of Nazi units from the Gustav line and thus permit a break-through at Cassino into the Liri Valley. Apparently that break-through was expected to occur shortly after the beachhead was established; at any rate, our attacks on Cassino gained in fierceness at the time our troops went ashore at Nettuno.

The beachhead operation was successful in forcing the Germans to switch some of their strength from the Gustav line to the Anzio-Nettuno area. Elements of the same three divisions that had moved down from Rome, plus units from the front facing the Eighth Army, were pulled back toward Nettuno. But the German command took as few troops as possible out of the Gustav line and the expected break-through there did not occur.

A grim fight ensued both around Cassino and in the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead itself. Americans broke into and took part of the town of Cassino, and edged yard by yard into its shattered buildings in seventeen days of grim fighting; but the Nazis counterattacked continuously. At the beachhead, bad weather handicapped our air power and rendered supply and reënforcement of our troops over the open beaches difficult. At one time, a 60-mile gale roared above the armies locked in combat.

As time went by, the Germans were able to build up their forces opposing our exploitation of the beachhead. First, they "contained" it; then, seizing the initiative, they commenced to attack it. These attacks mounted in scope and intensity. The Germans took back Aprilia and Carroceto, and our beachhead became only ten miles deep. Up to the time of writing, however, our reënforced forces had prevented the enemy from splitting the beachhead in two. On the other hand, we had failed to cut any of the principal German communication lines to the southern front; our entire beachhead area was within range of German artillery; and we were still forced to supply our troops over open beaches, handicapped by wind and weather, under fire of Nazi guns.

This epic struggle reached a peak about February 15 to 21. Despite our air attacks against enemy lines of communication, the Germans succeeded in reënforcing greatly their forces in southern Italy. Some nine divisions of a new German 14th Army

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under Field Marshal August von Mackensen were concentrated against our beachhead. Nine others, forming the Tenth Army under General Heinrich von Vietinghog, held the Gustav line further south. About this time, New Zealand and Indian divisions were brought into the Cassino front from the Eighth Army flank to support the mauled American divisions in the Fifth Corps. The first attacks of these troops were successful; but German counterattacks then won back most of the gains. At the time of writing the issue was still in doubt.[2]

These fierce struggles in Italy are clearly of more than local Italian significance. The Germans have had to call upon available reserves to increase their strength in southern Italy; and to match this increase there is little doubt that we were forced to call into action divisions possibly earmarked for other operations. Thus the strategic plans of both sides have been somewhat affected. To both sides a local victory was of great importance. The Germans required one badly for political and psychological reasons, as well as on purely military grounds. The Allies could not afford a reverse on the eve of the invasion of Western Europe. Both sides, therefore, knowing the stakes were high, exerted great efforts. In a sense, the battle in Italy became a test of ultimate strength. Despite our air superiority, there was little doubt that the Nazis could reënforce their forces in the Anzio-Nettuno region faster than we could reënforce ours because of our lack of a good port. Thus, *if the Nazis had the divisions to spare*, they could hope, in time, to overwhelm us by numbers. If they did not do this it was because their manpower was stretched thin. The Anzio-Nettuno beachhead was a kind of Tobruk. Its dramatic possibilities for either side were still to be fully exploited; and for both sides it held elements of great danger.

The strategy and the tactics of this phase of the Italian campaign invited many questions. First, if we were attempting to conduct the Italian campaign as a secondary operation and did not wish to earmark enough strength for the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead to exploit it properly, why was it attempted at all? Second, once it was attempted, why did we not exploit to the fullest possible extent our early tactical surprise? Why, specifically, did not American troops, at nearly any cost, push across the Appian Way and establish gun positions in the Alban hills? Even

[2] American casualties in the Italian campaign (exclusive of the Anzio-Nettuno battle and the later stages of the Cassino struggle) totalled 25,665 — 3,707 killed, 16,510 wounded, 5,448 missing (most of the latter prisoners). British Empire casualties in the same period were 36,626.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though the main effort was to come from the south, through Cassino, even though the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead was intended in large part as a diversion, such a move — more surely than any other that could have been made — would have forced the Germans to pull back troops from the Gustav line and would have aided the break-through at Cassino. Third, why was the attack at Cassino made with such limited superiority of force? Why did the Allies wait three to four weeks before switching troops from the static Eighth Army front to assist at Cassino?

In this phase of the Italian battle, there seems to have been a definite lack of boldness, a failure to observe the primary military principle of concentration of effort, and a lack of flexibility, perhaps incident to the changes of command in the Mediterranean and in Italy.

III

In western Europe the winter period was one of preparation, organization and aerial softening-up.

The long-anticipated changes in the high command to make ready for the forthcoming invasion of Western Europe were announced after the Cairo and Teheran conferences. At one time it had been definitely decided that General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, was to be appointed as Supreme Allied Commander. The decision to retain him in his post of usefulness in this country was finally made at Cairo, following the Teheran conference. It was based on objections to a shift in General Marshall's position made by high-ranking American military and naval officers as well as by Congress and the public, and also on the fact that no final agreement could be reached with the British as to the scope of his projected power.

In these circumstances, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the successful Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Western Europe. Other key appointments were as follows: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander; General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander of British ground forces, Western Europe; Lieutenant-General Omar N. Bradley, Senior Commander, U. S. Army ground forces, Western Europe; Air Chief Marshal Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, Commander of all Allied Expeditionary Air Forces; Major-General William O. Butler, Deputy Air Commander; Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, Commander of British Second Tactical Air Force; Major-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General Lewis H. Brereton, Commander of Ninth U. S. Army (Tactical) Air Force; Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Naval Commander; Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Commanding U. S. Naval Task Forces in the invasion; Lieutenant-General Carl A. Spaatz, Commander, U. S. Strategic Bomber Forces; Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, Commander British Strategic Air Forces; Major-General James H. Doolittle, Commander, U. S. Eighth Air Force; Major-General William Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower.

Other appointments not directly in the invasion forces but of great indirect importance were those of General Sir Harold Edmund Franklin as Commander-in-Chief of British Home Forces and of Air Marshal Sir William Sholto Douglas as Commander of the RAF Coastal Command. Major-General John C. H. Lee, who had headed the U. S. Army supply services in England, was appointed Deputy Theatre Commander, under General Eisenhower, of the European Theatre, a position which put him in charge of all rear area and supply installations.

As a result of these changes the Mediterranean command was also altered. The Eastern and Western theatres were amalgamated under command of General Sir Henry Maitland ("Jumbo") Wilson, while Lieutenant-General Jacob L. Devers, who had formerly commanded in Britain, was appointed his American Deputy. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Central Mediterranean Forces and of all Allied forces in Italy. Lieutenant-General Mark W. Clark continued to command the Anglo-American Fifth Army and Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese took over from General Montgomery the command of the British Eighth Army, operating on the Adriatic flank of the Italian front. Lieutenant-General Ira Eaker, shifted from command of the Eighth Air Force in Britain, assumed command of all air forces in the Mediterranean area, with Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor, formerly in command of the British Coastal Command, as his deputy. Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham, of the British Navy, retained the Mediterranean naval command, with Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, American, in command of American naval forces.

Some of these selections occasioned surprise. It had been generally expected that General Alexander, rather than General Montgomery, would receive the highest British command. But General Montgomery received the command for the same reasons that the Germans chose Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to head

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Nazi anti-invasion command. Both have had a great public "build-up," both are popular figures in their own countries, and both have the confidence of the enlisted man. In other words, they were selected for psychological as well as military reasons.

Details of command and organization were being ironed out during the winter. England became a tremendous armed camp as hundreds of thousands of troops and much equipment poured into the island preparatory to the great culminating operation of the European war. It had been generally assumed that the invasion of Western Europe would occur in spring or early summer. But some doubt was cast on this by the February speech of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and it seemed possible — at the time of writing — that massive bombardment of Germany might be continued for some months.

During the winter the bombardment of Europe by Allied planes continued and increased in intensity, despite the bad weather. There were several significant developments:

1. The use of secret bomb-aiming and navigational devices by U. S. Army Air Forces permitted the bombardment of unseen targets through overcasts and clouds. This meant that attacks continued on many winter days when precision bombardment would have been impossible under previous conditions. Occasionally some of these "blind" attacks achieved almost precision results; but in considerable measure the new development meant that American daylight bombers, like British night bombers, were frankly attacking area or city targets.

2. A tremendous increase in the American air strength in Britain permitted raids by 800 or more heavy bombers. For example, 2,000 heavy bombers and escorting fighters struck on February 20 at eight important German centers producing aircraft for the Luftwaffe. February was the biggest month in the history of American air operations over Europe.

3. Our percentage of losses in day bombardments decreased to less than the RAF percentage in night bombardment, due to the great increase in our numerical strength, which was more than the German defenses could match, and the use of long-range escort fighters.

These persistent and furious attacks by day and by night undoubtedly reduced German production, devastated German cities and impaired German morale, but there was no evidence that Germany had been hurt vitally. Although we are probably "over the hump" in the air war, the German air opposition still con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinues very strong. The figures for American operations in this theater during the winter months were as follows: [3]

	Tonnage of Bombs Dropped	*U. S. Bomber Losses*	*German Planes Claimed*
November.....	7,670	93	257
December.....	12,000	167	330
January.....	11,789 (approx.)	175	545 (?)

The above figures represent the tonnage dropped by the Bomber Command of the Eighth Air Force and do not include bombing raids made by all the American medium and fighter bombers based in Britain. If these were included, the sorties flown by American planes and the bomb tonnage dropped exceeded, for certain weeks and months during this period, the corresponding figures for RAF aircraft based in Britain. But all statistics for air fighting are liable to considerable error and all statements based on them must be qualified. Different methods of keeping records account for some of the confusion; Washington and London accounts rarely agree.

A target which received particular attention during the winter months was the so-called "rocket-gun coast" of northern France. This new German weapon has not as yet been tested in battle, but its threat is taken seriously both in London and Washington. The specific objectives of the forays into northern France have not been publicly revealed, but they must have included rocket-launchers, power houses and other installations. The new German devices, which probably will not be used until the eve of the invasion, are believed to be rocket-powered bombs, with wings. They probably are not radio-controlled, but rather are launched from fixed launching tubes which can be "aimed" against a specific target, such as a large city. If these devices were erected in sufficient quantities they might be able to pour into a city like London many more thousands of tons of explosives than the greatest bombing armada could carry. Probably such rocket bombs can "fly" for well over 100 miles, but their accuracy is limited. Whatever the efficiency which they may reveal, the mere

[3] Up to January 1, 1944, the RAF and the U. S. Eighth Air Force together had dropped more than 330,000 tons on Germany since the start of the war. Of this total, the U. S. Eighth Air Force dropped more than 50,000 tons in 1943 alone. The U. S. Eighth Air Force made 64,000 offensive sorties during 1943, lost not quite 1,000 heavy bombers, and is believed to have destroyed 4,100 Nazi fighters (this claim seems excessive to the present writer). Its losses (in action) amounted to less than four percent of its heavy bombers. In addition, the Northwest African Strategic Air Force and the 15th Air Force, operating in the Mediterranean, dropped 74,000 tons of bombs on Axis targets in 1943. Most of these targets were short-range ones, but a few really strategic bombings against southern Germany and Balkan targets, particularly against Sofia, had political and psychological as well as military results.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threat of them has already affected our bombing campaign by diverting much of our strength from the business of bombing Germany to northern France. Some of the installations in northern France may, of course, be fake, designed to accomplish that very purpose. However, the threat must be taken as real.

During January and February the Nazis struck back against London. Their forces were not large — generally less than 100 bombers — but they pressed the attacks home and caused some casualties and damage. In a raid of February 18–19 enemy planes penetrated British defenses more effectively than usual, dropping strips of tinfoil to jam the British radar, probably the same trick they employed in their raid against Bari in Italy.

IV

The war against the submarine continued satisfactorily during the winter. One American troopship was lost with 1,000 men, in an unannounced area at an unannounced date. On the whole, however, there were few ship sinkings as a result of enemy submarine operations. More ships were lost from marine accidents during four months of the fall and winter than from enemy submarine action. But there continued to be a great need for shipping as our armies overseas expanded, and there was an increase in ship sinkings from other causes — mines, glider bombs, bombs, shellfire, motor torpedo boats and surface craft — in the course of our preliminary operations against the coast of Europe.

V

The tempo of the Pacific war increased tremendously during the winter months. Indeed, the invasion of the Marshall Islands, the second great step in our major strategic offensive in the Pacific, was so successful that our schedule was advanced by about two months.

The invasion of the Marshalls followed our move into the Gilberts in November 1943. The feature of that operation was the historic Battle of Tarawa, in which the assault battalions of the Second Marine Division suffered heavy losses but which led to the capture of the atoll in 76 hours. Thereafter, airfields were developed at Tarawa, Makin and Abemama, and planes of the Army's Seventh Air Force and of the Navy's Fleet Air Wing Two commenced to "soften up" Japanese air bases in the Marshalls.

Far to the south, simultaneously, forces under General Douglas MacArthur moved across Vitiaz Strait into New Britain Island.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They established extensive beachheads at Cape Gloucester on the western tip, where the First Marine Division got into action again for the first time since Guadalcanal, and also on the south coast. Meanwhile, on Bougainville, in the Solomons, our patrols operating from our beachhead had penetrated across the island to the east coast. A little later another amphibious hop was made to the Green Islands, north of the Solomons, off the coast of New Ireland, site of the important Jap base at Kavieng. General MacArthur said this move signified the virtual entrapment of 22,000 Japanese troops left as isolated garrisons in the northern Solomons and meant the virtual end of the Solomons campaign. This remained to be seen. Nevertheless it was true that both Rabaul and Kavieng were now blockaded from the air, to a lesser extent by sea, and were subjected to virtual daily bombardment. The two bases are no longer of significant importance in the Japanese scheme of defense in the Western Pacific.

What was probably the greatest combat fleet that has ever sailed the seas moved into the Marshall Islands on January 31–February 1 under the command of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Said to total 2,000,000 tons of fighting ships and transports, this armada steamed directly against Kwajalein, an atoll in the western string of the Marshalls. It probably included as many as a score of aircraft carriers, and many battleships, both old and new. Divided into task forces, these ships made simultaneous sea and air attacks upon all of the principal Japanese bases in the Marshalls. These attacks, on top of weeks of bombardment from land-based planes, smashed Japanese air power in those islands. No air interception by the enemy was encountered until we reached Kwajalein, and only about two submarine contacts were made. The degree of tactical surprise achieved at Kwajalein was almost unbelievable. Evidently the enemy had expected us to strike at the eastern rim of the islands.

The total garrison on the various islands of the atoll was apparently under 10,000 — perhaps less, and at any rate not so large as we had expected. The most heavily defended islands were Roi and Namur in the north, Kwajalein in the south. The fortifications and pillboxes were strong, but not as thick as those on Tarawa. In the initial waves of the assault we used many more amphibious tractors than we had used at Tarawa and hence our troops had less difficulty reaching shore. Furthermore, we first put men ashore on islands adjacent to those which were most heavily fortified, dragged field guns ashore after them, and then

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the sea and sky attack added a bombardment from shore-emplaced field guns. The Seventh Army Divison, veterans of the Aleutians, took Kwajalein, and the Fourth Marine Division captured Roi and Namur. The attack commenced on February 1, and by February 5 the atoll was ours beyond any shadow of doubt. Because of our overwhelming force, the long bombardment and the careful preparation, our casualties were relatively light — 286 dead, 1,148 wounded, 82 missing. The entire Japanese garrison was wiped out except for 264 prisoners.

Though this great success advanced our Pacific front some 2,000 miles closer to Tokyo we did not rest upon our laurels. On February 18 and successive days the Twenty-second Marine Regiment and the 106th Army Regiment took Eniwetok atoll, northwesternmost of the Marshall Islands, thus effectively severing the Japanese air route to the Marshalls and isolating Wake Island. The same tactics were followed at Eniwetok as at Kwajalein. An intensive and overpowering bombardment was followed by seizure of islands adjacent to the main Japanese strongholds. About 2,000 Japanese were wiped out; while our losses were about 150 dead and 350 wounded.

Simultaneously with this blow, land-based bombers struck Ponape and Kusaie, Japanese outposts to Truk; while on February 16 and 17 the largest carrier-task force ever assembled and handled as a unit struck directly at that key Japanese base itself. In this daring attack we destroyed an estimated 201 enemy aircraft, 127 of them in air combat, and sank 23 enemy ships, including two light cruisers and three destroyers. This was achieved at a cost to us of 17 planes and moderate damage to one of our ships. Although this raid was a heavy blow to the Japanese system of defenses in the Western Pacific as well as to Japanese psychology, it did not accomplish all that had been hoped. Our real objectives in Truk were two small Japanese aircraft carriers and two battleships which had been reported there by air reconnaisance previously; but apparently these ships had left before our air "strike."

Following the raid on Truk, elements of the same carrier task forces under Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher attacked Japanese shipping and installations at Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the Marianas. On February 22, planes from our carriers, plus anti-aircraft guns, destroyed 135 enemy aircraft. One enemy cargo vessel was sunk, others were damaged. Our losses were six planes.

The victories of February 1944 were of great significance to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whole Pacific war, and that they were recognized as such in Japan was indicated by a shake-up in the Japanese high command which relieved the chiefs-of-staff of both the Army and the Navy. These victories greatly weakened Japan's Western Pacific position; justified the contentions of those who held that carriers, properly used, could meet and conquer Japanese land-based aviation; and fulfilled the expectations, generally entertained, that the Central Pacific route would prove to be the least difficult of all the routes to Japan.

They were complemented by additional operations in the South Pacific. On February 29 amphibious forces under General Douglas MacArthur's command invaded the Admiralty Islands, 660 miles south of Truk and seized the air strip there. Elements of the First (U.S.) Cavalry Division (dismounted), a part of Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army, made the landing. This action imperilled the lines of supply of some 50,000 Japanese troops in Rabaul and New Britain.

These February victories promise some hope for shortening the Pacific war. But it must be remembered that our major strategic offensive in those waters is just getting under way and that so far the Japanese have deliberately avoided action by their main forces and have kept their fleet intact. We are not likely to encounter the full strength of Japanese resistance until we are much closer to Japan.

In Burma, operations still were of a preliminary and limited nature. American and Chinese engineers were pushing the Ledo Road deeper into northern Burma behind a screen of American-trained Chinese troops, while British forces engaged in fierce fighting for limited gains in Arakan. China was still a secondary theater. The ground fighting there is unimportant; our air forces are a thorn in the Japanese side, but nothing more. China's principal importance today is in diverting a large amount of Japanese military and economic strength to garrison, policing and military duties.

As the great campaigns of 1944 open, then, our major military objectives are fairly well defined. In Europe, there may be an invasion from the West. In the Pacific, we shall neutralize or capture Truk and carry our amphibious drive on through the Central Pacific. The military situations in Italy and Burma, meanwhile, leave much to be desired. But it is in the political realm that the primary cause for disquiet is found as the war approaches its climax.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POPULATION AND POWER IN POSTWAR EUROPE

By Frank W. Notestein

THE population of the world is changing rapidly, and the spread of modern technology is giving these changes new political meaning. Yet in the present welter of ingenious political formulations one finds scant recognition of the fact that many of the terms in which international problems are posed have changed since 1918 and will continue to change in the future. There appears to be no general awareness that the postwar settlement, to be just and durable, should take account of the shifting demographic and technological setting.

Of course, these are the views of a demographer riding his hobby. He is not one, however, who thinks that "population change is the cause of war," or that manpower is the only factor in political strength. Let us agree that position, resources, technical skills, economic and political organization, the psychological characteristics of the people, national aims, leadership and doubtless many other factors in addition to the size of population are components of political power and national influence. Let us agree also that numbers do not always count in the same direction — that Alaska would be stronger with more people but that India and Java might be stronger with half their present populations.

It remains true that at relatively equal levels of economic development sheer numbers count heavily in political strength. They should count even more heavily in the appraisal of future strength because the rapid spread of modern technology will bring power to populations now comparatively impotent. The success with which the Soviet Union has brought to bear the manpower of a population that was relatively ineffective twenty years ago demonstrates that fact. Moreover, in general, technological developments and population change are not independent terms in the equation. They are both dependent variables of the same broad processes of social change that are rapidly altering the world's balance of power. Political formulations that fail to

Author's Note: The materials drawn upon in preparing this article were developed in the Office of Population Research, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, with the generous financial assistance of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Milbank Memorial Fund. Neither of those organizations, however, is in any way responsible for the results or the interpretation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take these changes into account are worse than futile. The world's changing people and power cannot be locked in the vise of the past, nor long contained in the framework of the present. Surely realistic planning can be undertaken only on the basis of as much information concerning the changing terms of the problem as the exigencies of an uncertain world make possible.

The writer thinks that such useful forecasting of relevant changes is possible in a number of fields. He undertakes, in what follows, to validate that opinion in the field of population, drawing heavily, in the process, on a study of the prospects for population change in Europe and the Soviet Union recently made by his colleagues and himself.[1]

II. CAN POPULATION CHANGES BE FORESEEN?

Obviously no one can say how many people will be living in any specified area at any specified date. War losses, forced and free migrations, changes in political boundaries and a host of other factors make attempts at such prediction foolish. But in spite of the impossibility of obtaining final answers, forecasting is far from futile. The components of future change range from those that are wholly unpredictable to those that are as predictable as the passage of time. Therefore, we need to simplify the terms of the problem by introducing artificial assumptions that eliminate the less predictable factors. Having established a frame of reference, we can reinstate the uncertain factors with such accuracy as the circumstances permit.

We shall ask, then, not what the populations in the area under consideration will be, but what they would be: (1) if there were no migration across the national boundaries of 1937; and (2) if the trends of fertility and mortality which prevailed during the inter-war period developed in an orderly manner during and after this war. Obviously both assumptions are false. Migration has occurred and will continue, and the war's impact on both fertility and mortality has been far from orderly. However, the assumptions have the advantage of making the problem manageable; of showing the population changes implicit in the underlying demographic situation; and of encompassing the variables that, in spite of war and movement, have been in the past the major determinants of population change.

Even on these simplified terms the problem is difficult, but per-

[1] Notestein, Taeuber, Kirk, Coale, and Kiser: "The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union." Geneva, League of Nations (Columbia University Press, Agent), 1944.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

haps not so difficult as it appears at first glance. One fact helps greatly. Whatever the future brings, population change must start from existing age distributions. The old people of the years between now and 1970, the older workers, and most of the younger workers and potential parents, are already born. Their respective numbers will greatly affect the number of births and deaths just as the amount of money in the bank affects the size of interest payments. Moreover, we start from existing levels of fertility and mortality, which in the 'thirties ranged from those that would ultimately yield declines of 25 percent per generation to those that would result in increases of more than 60 percent.

Of course neither mortality nor fertility will remain fixed at their levels during the 'thirties. Peacetime mortality rates have been declining for a long time in accordance with rather well-established patterns and will probably continue to decline. In Europe they are lowest in the North and West and in general become progressively higher as one moves to the South and East. In general, they were declining most where they were highest.

Fertility, too, has declined throughout the area under consideration since before the turn of the century. It has dropped largely as a result of the growing rational control that characterized populations becoming increasingly industrialized, urbanized and educated. The trend has followed that of mortality, spreading in lagging fashion with the current of modernization from the highly developed regions of the North and West toward the South and East. In general, it too has been dropping most where it was highest, but even where it is very low there is no indication of a fundamental reversal of trend. Some increases have come since the middle of the 'thirties. However, there is every indication that they were, for the most part, the result of economic revival and war. To marriages and births postponed from the depression have been added those advanced by the anticipation of war. Thus far they reflect no fundamental change in family size. Greater Germany was an exception. There energetic governmental policies favoring births, assisted by the large-scale reemployment of the armament boom, brought Germany's reproduction from levels that would yield declines of 30 percent per generation in 1933 to levels that would maintain a stationary population in 1940. However, in the absence of a very strong governmental policy there is every reason to believe that fertility will continue to decline.

These qualitative predictions concerning the trends of fertility

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and mortality can be given explicit form. The technical details need not detain us. It is sufficient to note that the procedures incorporate generalizations drawn from past European experience in a manner to make them systematically applicable to the situation of each country considered. In accordance with past experience they provide that both fertility and mortality will decline rapidly where they are high and gradually where they are low, and that the decline will become progressively slower as time goes on. Existing populations can be systematically depleted by the appropriate mortality and recruited by the appropriate fertility to yield projected populations for any selected dates. The writer and his colleagues have constructed a series of such projections for the U.S.S.R. and each country of the Europe of 1937, covering the years 1940 to 1970.[2] These projected populations are not the ones that will exist, but those that would exist if the basic assumptions were valid. The actual populations will differ because of migration, war losses and any new factors of peacetime that modify the orderly development of the vital trends of the inter-war decades. Nevertheless, because they show the population changes implicit in the underlying demographic situation, they afford a valuable frame of reference with which to analyze the prospects for future change.

III. PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN TOTAL POPULATIONS

In Figure 1 the actual total populations for the demographic regions of Europe [3] as they were from 1900 to 1940 are shown by heavy lines. The populations as projected to 1970 are shown by the lighter extensions of those lines. It will be seen that (without making any allowance for war losses or migration) the total for Europe and the Soviet Union increases by about 96 million between 1940 and 1970. However, only 18 million of that increase occurs west of the 1937 Soviet boundary — an amount less than the total population deficits caused in that area by the last war. Moreover (without allowance for war loss), the maximum population is reached by 1960.

The small change projected for Europe west of the Soviet Union (as existing in 1937) is the resultant of widely divergent

[2] Notestein and others, *op. cit.*

[3] The following classification of countries into regions is used: 1. Northwestern and Central Europe: United Kingdom and Ireland (England and Wales, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland); West-Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Switzerland); Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Sweden). 2. Southern and Eastern Europe: Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain); Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania). 3. U.S.S.R.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE I. POPULATION TRENDS OF REGIONS, 1900–1970

This regional classification (defined in Footnote 3) is demographic rather than political. A logarithmic vertical scale is used to permit the comparison of proportional instead of absolute changes in population. The broken lines used in two cases have no significance other than to facilitate their identification.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trends within that area. The population of Northwestern and Central Europe increases only 3 million to its maximum by 1950, and thereafter declines. Moreover, every country of this region reaches its maximum before 1970, and most of them prior to 1960. By 1970, France has a population about 4 million smaller than in 1940. So does England and Wales. The German total is about the same as in 1940. War losses, in terms of direct casualties, excess civilian mortality and birth deficits will speed these declines. It is apparent that this region's period of population growth is coming to an end, and that progressive decline can be forestalled only by heavy immigration or a sharp reversal in the past trend of fertility.

The projected population of Southern and Eastern Europe increases by about 27 million between 1940 and 1970. However, even here there is evidence of slowing growth quite apart from war losses. Two-thirds of the projected increase comes between 1940 and 1955. By 1970 the populations grow rather slowly. War losses will check the growth sharply, but they would have to be extremely heavy to eliminate it. In the absence of heavy emigration a considerable growth may be expected, particularly in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union is now in a demographic position somewhat analogous to that of Western Europe during the latter part of the nineteenth century.[4] Death rates are high and birth rates higher, and the age structure favors rapid growth. Although the projections are based on the assumption that such rates will decline sharply, they yield very rapid increases. Between 1940 and 1970 the population increases by 77 million to attain a total of 251 million. The increase alone exceeds the total present or prospective population of Germany. Between 1900 and 1940 the population grew by 55 percent despite war and revolution. The projected growth of about 44 percent between 1940 and 1970 is not unreasonable (war losses being disregarded).

Such differences in rates of growth sharply modify the distribution of Europe's people. As may be seen from Figure 2, the population of the Northwestern and Central region in 1900 was more than half again as large as that of either Southern and Eastern Europe or the 1937 territory of the Soviet Union. By 1940 the differences were much reduced. By 1970, if the projec-

[4] The material for the Soviet Union was largely prepared by Dr. Frank Lorimer of the Office of Population Research, and will appear in a forthcoming study, "The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions were to be realized, the population of the Soviet Union would be the largest of the three, and that of Southern and Eastern Europe only about 15 percent less than that of Northwestern and Central Europe. In 1900 the latter region contained 45 percent of the total population; by 1970 it would have just over one-third. Differences in war losses may considerably modify these trends, as may migration. However, they are not



Figure 2. Absolute and percent distribution of population by region, at intervals from 1900 to 1970

likely to nullify them. The balance of Europe's population will almost inevitably shift sharply eastward in the coming decades.

IV. CHANGES IN AGE COMPOSITION

Changes in the age composition of populations are more important, from many points of view, than those in total numbers. They also come more rapidly than those in total numbers. These changes are illustrated in Figure 3 by a series of pyramids. In these diagrams each bar represents a five-year age group with the males to the left and the females to the right. The group aged 0–4 years is at the bottom, that 5–9 years next above, and so on to the top bar, which represents the persons who have survived 85 years or more. The three pyramids at the left represent populations of the demographic regions in 1940; those at the right, the corresponding populations as projected to 1970.

Some common elements stand out in the 1940 structures. Each

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 3. AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC REGIONS IN 1940 AND PROJECTED TO 1970

Each bar represents a five-year age group. The pyramids at the left portray the populations of 1940, those at the right the corresponding populations as projected to 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shows a relatively small number of males aged 40–55 in 1940 because that group bore the brunt of the casualties of the last war. Each has a gash at age 20–24 as the result of the birth deficits of 1914–1918. The differences in shape are characteristic of the different stages of demographic evolution.

Thus the pyramid for Northwestern and Central Europe is relatively large at the top, reflecting both the low death rates and relatively slow growth of past years. The erosion of the base shows that births had been declining progressively for many years. The concentration of population in the childbearing ages, which has recently supported growth, is clear. No less clear is the fact that only time is required to make that same concentration foster decline.

The pyramid for Southern and Eastern Europe has the profile characteristic of regions with a history of high mortality and still higher fertility. The number of babies has become progressively larger with passing time. The pyramid is relatively narrow at the top because persons in the older age groups are the survivors of the smaller birth cohorts of earlier years whose ranks have been sharply depleted by high mortality from birth onward. The age structure favors growth because parental stocks will increase for some time without equal gains in the ages of high mortality. It also foreshadows an eventual end of growth. The oblong base shows that fertility declines of the past fifteen years have begun to check the increase of births, a development that occurred about twenty years earlier in Northwestern and Central Europe.

The pyramid for the Soviet Union shows even higher fertility and mortality, and greater potentialities for future growth. It also records catastrophes. The war and revolution, and the hardships of the early 'thirties, plus policies toward abortion in that period, are evident in the recurrent notches. However, as yet there is no suggestion of a check to the increase of births.

In the pyramids for 1970 all age groups have been moved up thirty years (6 bars) from their position in 1940, after making allowance for deaths in the interval. New groups have been substituted for the ages under thirty on the basis of the assumptions concerning fertility and mortality.

The heavy erosion of the 1970 pyramid for Northwestern and Central Europe might give the impression that sharp declines in fertility have been assumed. Actually, since fertility is already low, the declines projected were the most gradual of all. The heavier undercutting of this pyramid is due less to the assump-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions concerning what will happen in that region than to what has already happened to fertility and to the contingents of potential parents.

The 1970 pyramid for Southern and Eastern Europe shows a population nearing the end of its growth. The undercutting of the base has gone a little beyond that of Northwestern and Central Europe in 1940.

In 1970, the Soviet Union still has rapid growth ahead. In spite of the largest of all assumed declines in fertility, undercutting does not appear here because of the counterbalancing increase in the parental group. The oblong base begins to show about twenty years later than it does in the case of Southern and Eastern Europe. In general terms, then, the populations of the major demographic regions under consideration are in growth stages separated by somewhat less than a generation.

Changes in the component age groups of the population have an important bearing on nearly every phase of social, economic and political life. For present purposes, the matter may be sufficiently illustrated by confining attention to the males aged 15–64, the group that corresponds rather closely to the male labor force. In some respects the coming changes in this group are less speculative, in other respects more speculative, than those in the population as a whole. Until 1960 these ages include only persons born prior to 1945. Postwar changes that might reverse the trend of fertility therefore cannot become effective until after 1960. On the other hand, this is the group that suffers the most casualties and supplies the most migrants. On the whole, it appears likely that the projections represent maximum numbers.

In Northwestern and Central Europe, the projections show rather small changes in the number of males aged 15–64. By 1970 the number exceeds the 1940 number by about 2 million, although the total population declines by about 9 million. The region can therefore withstand sharp war losses without impairing its present ratio of productive males to total population. It can do so, however, only on terms of the effective use of older workers; for within the productive group the shifts are rapid. The projected young workers (15–34) decline by 7 million, or nearly as much as the total population; the middle group (35–44) remains relatively unchanged; while the group 45–64 increases by nearly 9 million. This latter gain is much too large to be wiped out by war losses. The economic prospects of the region will turn heavily on the effective use of this group.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Southern and Eastern Europe between 1940 and 1970 the increase in males of working ages exceeds by 3 million the increase in the total male population. The gain is particularly rapid in the Eastern region, where it amounts to 11 million, or an increase over 1940 of 41 percent. War losses and probably some emigration will cut heavily into the gains, but they are unlikely to eliminate them. In spite of such losses there is every prospect that males of productive age will become a growing part of the population. The increases, however, will be almost entirely confined to the ages over 35.



Figure 4, Number of males 15–34 years of age, by region and specified country, 1940, and projected to 1970

The projected increase of males of working age in the Soviet Union, like that in the total population, is most spectacular of all. The number rises from 49 million in 1940 to 84 million in 1970, an increase exceeding that in all Europe west of the 1937 boundaries of the U.S.S.R. For 1970, the projections show males of working ages to be substantially more numerous than in either region to the west. Moreover, increases characterize each age segment within the group. Russian losses from the last war and revolution probably exceeded those of all Europe west of her boundaries. Losses from the present conflict would have to be much heavier to wipe out the projected increase. It is difficult to imagine conditions under which a spectacular growth in the Russian male population of working age will not take place during the next decades.

Changes in the number of males 15–34 years of age are particularly important. On this group depends much of the flexibility of productive skills, and from it come the new military recruits and the cream of the fighting forces. Changes in the projected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

values from 1940 to 1970 for the major countries and regions are strikingly apparent in Figure 4. In Northwestern and Central Europe the number declines by nearly 7 million to give a total in 1970 little above that of the Soviet Union in 1940. Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the combination of all other countries each decline by amounts ranging from one to a little more than two million. These declines probably are a minimum, for it is somewhat unlikely that the losses of the war will be more than counterbalanced by immigration and increases in births prior to 1955.

The trends in Southern and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are quite different. The projected increases of males 15–34 in the South and East are small and largely confined to the Balkans. War losses and emigration may more than cancel them. However, by 1970 the number in the region will not be far short of the total in Northwestern and Central Europe.

The projected increase in the Soviet Union is very large, rising from 30 million in 1940 to 43 million in 1970. This increase alone exceeds the total present or prospective number of that age group in Germany within her 1937 boundaries. If the projections were to be realized, the Soviet Union by 1970 would have within her 1937 boundaries more men of prime military age than the total of Northwestern and Central Europe, or than that of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Poland, Spain and Rumania together (these being the seven next largest countries of Europe). Obviously the war will heavily reduce the projected values in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. If the U.S.S.R. should sustain heavier losses than at the present writing seem likely, she might have only 37 million in this group by 1970, or an increase of only 7 million over the number of 1940. Even so, she would have more men of prime military age than the projections show for the four next largest countries (without allowing for their war losses).

V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE

The demographic changes described above are more important than their numerical magnitude suggests because they are not isolated events. They are only one phase of broader processes of social evolution; of the eastward sweep of technology, education and wider popular aspirations. The whole chain of events means growing power as well as population. The broader implications of these trends can be only briefly suggested here.

The Soviet Union is clearly the major power of the Eurasian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continent. Its people are still poor and they have suffered beyond belief from wars, foreign and civil, since 1914. Nevertheless, Russia has great demographic and economic resiliency. Numerically, her population probably will recover its war losses before 1950, even inside the old boundaries, and go on to rapid growth. This growth should bring no serious internal strain, for her resources are ample and industrial skills are being rapidly proliferated. She has achieved political unity and solved serious problems of cultural heterogeneity. Her people have developed a vision of better things to come and will have a confidence bred of victory. Clearly she will play an active rôle in the world's affairs and will not be thwarted easily. However, the problems of recovery and the opportunities for vast development at home should serve to direct her major attention to internal problems.

In Southern and Eastern Europe the basic demographic situation is favorable to economic development. Falling growth potentials already indicate that rapid increases in population will end before the carrying capacity of the region is seriously strained. Moreover, the same changes are generating age structures progressively favorable to the maintenance of high ratios of producers to dependents in the population, and this in turn makes possible rising levels of living.

Whether conditions actually improve in Southern and Eastern Europe is, of course, another matter. Thus far the region has not made effective use of its human resources. The situation is particularly acute in the Eastern region. There, the pressure of population on a predominantly agricultural economy is heavy and rising. Obsolete agricultural techniques, fragmented land holdings, archaic property systems and a plethora of workers on the land have all combined to produce mass underemployment and poverty. Under such circumstances a growing labor force will not yield a growing product. Yet the labor force will increase rapidly. The projections show the number of persons 15–64 years of age increasing by about one-quarter between 1940 and 1955 and by more than one-third between 1940 and 1970 — an additional 13 million by 1955 and over 19 million by 1970. Of course, war losses will reduce this increase but probably without changing the essentials of the problem. Smaller increases will be met with smaller resources. The whole problem is vastly complicated by the fact that the region is a tangle of linguistic, religious and political cleavages. Poor populations, increasingly aware of the advantages they do not share, and fired by hatreds ancient and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

modern, are not the material from which durable peace is easily made.

There is no strictly agrarian solution. Agrarian reform of a sweeping character is needed, but this will not be enough. Indeed, one prerequisite of agrarian reform is the reduction of the number of workers on the land to perhaps two-thirds of those before the war. Emigration from the region may help to some extent. However, as pointed out above, it is not the young and mobile groups that will be increasing rapidly, but the groups over 35 years of age. Under this circumstance, the governments concerned are not likely to favor mass emigration of their youngest workers. The efficient use of the region's growing labor supply can only be obtained by industrialization and urbanization to the limit of the area's potentialities. These potentialities are not large and are not spread evenly. They cannot be realized within a political framework that blocks the movement of men, capital and goods within the region. Problems of this scope are not to be solved by minor border revisions or by ethnic reshuffling. Broader views, integrated planning and the assistance of outside capital and skills will be required for the rapid changes that the situation demands. Such changes could give the people a new hope with which to sublimate their older hatreds. To that goal a world interested in peace should turn its attention.

In Northwestern and Central Europe the demographic problems will be largely those of adaptation to absence of the growth and youth that characterized the region in the centuries of its rising power. On the economic side, rapid aging and the trend toward decline will complicate somewhat the already difficult problems of maintaining a fully functioning economy. However, if the major problems of economic dynamics are solved, and effective use is made of the rising group of older workers, there is no demographic reason why high and rising levels of living should not be attained in times of peace.

Nevertheless, there will be great and growing concern over the threat of depopulation. Probably immigration will not be encouraged as the major solution, for the countries concerned already are worried by cultural inundations. Rather, strenuous efforts will be made to lift the birth rates, probably with some measure of success. However, such developments can bring no substantial change in the projected economic or military manpower before 1960 or 1965.

It does not seem likely that any nation of Northwestern and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Central Europe will challenge the world again. Germany, like her western neighbors, has passed the period in which she could become a dominant world power, owing to the diffusion of technological civilization to peoples that are growing more rapidly. Those who view the prevention of a new German attempt at conquest as the major problem of the peace seem to the writer to be looking backward rather than ahead. The power and interests of the Soviet Union are an adequate guarantee against that contingency. Nevertheless, important issues turn on the nature of the treatment meted out to the German people in the peace settlement. Germans will continue to form the largest ethnic group west of the Slavs. On their continued productive efficiency will depend much of the economic welfare of Europe. It is important that, whatever the political safeguards adopted, this productive efficiency be maintained. Otherwise, a train of poverty and disillusionment spreading throughout the Continent might soon bring a new political upheaval. The realities of the changing demographic and technological situation suggest that the danger of economic frustration in Europe may be greater than that of renewed attempts at military conquest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FUTURE OF THE SKYWAYS

A British View

By Sir Frederick Handley Page

SYSTEMS of land transport operate largely within the boundaries of single countries; when land transport becomes international it is subject to easy control at frontiers. Ships ply across sea frontiers, and control can be exercised without difficulty at foreign ports. But the airplane flies over national boundaries and from one country into the heart of another. Thus the development of the skyways of the world has created a new international problem, that of the freedom of the air.

The problem is complicated by other factors. The more industrially advanced countries reaped a rich reward from being first in the field with adequate systems of land and sea transport. Other nations, seeing how the opening of shipping lines and railways stimulated trade in the past, and fearing to be left behind again in an important economic development, are anxious to open up foreign trade routes under their own flag in the new field of the air. In addition, nations have in general desired to increase their power by creating a reserve of civil pilots and commercial aircraft which might be useful in wartime.

In discussions of these matters, too little attention often is paid to the basic fact about civil aviation — namely that it exists to give the traveller and the sender of goods a better service than other transport facilities can give — service which is quicker, or more advantageous in other ways, and which is not disproportionately expensive. The fundamental question thus is: Can facilities for travel and the transport of goods by air be provided on an ordinary business basis?

II

Air transport, we must emphasize again, is essentially international in character. This is particularly so in the case of the British Empire, with its widely scattered dominions. Obviously, an enterprise affecting the interests of various nations must be regulated; and equally plainly, regulations which were too severe would stifle its development. What degree of regulation is necessary and

Editor's Note: For an American view of this subject see "Airways for Peace," by Edward Warner, Foreign Affairs, October 1943.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how can it best be achieved? Three aspects of the problem need consideration. The first is technical, the second commercial, the third political.

First, there must be safety for those who fly and for those over whom aircraft are flown.

Prior to the war, technical standards of airworthiness were laid down under the International Air Convention or the Pan American Convention. Government departments usually determined and enforced national standards and worked out international agreements. But aircraft operators, underwriters and constructors took an even more immediate interest in safeguarding those who travelled by air. An analogous case had been the development of rules of safety at sea. The insurance regulations governing the commercial operation of national and international marine transport grew out of meetings in Edward Lloyd's Coffee House, where interested parties gathered to underwrite the risks of voyages. From this beginning came Lloyd's Register of Shipping, with constituent representatives of shipowners, underwriters, merchants and shipbuilders, charged with the surveying and classifying of ships. Following this marine precedent, there was set up in Great Britain in April 1927 an Air Registration Board, composed in equal number of representatives of aircraft operators, underwriters and constructors, and of the public. The Air Ministry of the United Kingdom delegated to this Board the work of recommending the issue and renewal of Certificates of Airworthiness for the initial prototypes of aircraft and subsequent similar types. Its duty is simply to determine and enforce standards of normal airworthiness, with such extensions thereof as may be necessary to meet specified abnormal conditions, and to license personnel as fit and proper persons for their work. This form of control leaves military considerations completely out of account.

After the war, an international agreement on technical standards will be necessary. I think the best way of making sure that considerations of adaptability to military use do not enter into civil design is to have those agreements negotiated by representatives of commercial interests. The agreements could be reached in conferences patterned after the Havana Convention or the prewar meetings of the International Commission for Air Navigation, but attended by representatives of commercial interests rather than by government spokesmen.

Second, traffic on air routes must be regulated so that there is adequate but not ruinous competition. There must be some con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trol, by licensing or otherwise, nationally and internationally, to prevent facilities from being created in excess of the actual or potential demand.

Before the war, Great Britain did not exercise as close control over the activities of its airline companies as did the United States. Any company which sought to enter the business and run the financial risks involved could do so, whether or not other services were operating on the same routes, provided its aircraft complied with the British requirements for airworthiness and the crews held certificates of competence. Official recognition was required only if government contracts or subsidies were sought. When the war ends, British shipping companies or any other business concerns will be free under the present law to organize domestic or foreign airlines, so long as they satisfy airworthiness requirements and (in the case of foreign routes) receive permission from the countries they propose to serve. If this freedom is not restricted it may lead to fierce competition, with evil repercussions. And similar trouble will arise internationally if, inspired by reasons of prestige rather than trade, countries sanction air services in areas which are already well provided with them. Some overriding control is necessary, exercised without fear or favor to any nation.

It might be exercised by an International Licensing Board, on the model of the American Civil Aeronautics Board or the prewar British Air Transport Licensing Authority, though neither of these, of course, possesses the powers which would have to be vested in an international authority. The creation of such a Board would be rather revolutionary, for its powers would necessarily extend to both the western and the eastern hemispheres. Probably it would have to be created by government action and should be composed of official or semi-official representatives. The task of framing the terms of reference for such an international board and of considering how its membership should be composed might well be undertaken now.

An alternative form of traffic control would be one analogous to the "conference" in the shipping world, of which the North Atlantic Shipping Conference is a fair example. This organization exists to bring about agreement on the classification of ships with regard to rates charged and on other matters connected with day-to-day marine transportation. A similar air conference organization might be created in the course of normal commercial procedure, open to all those desiring to participate. Although some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nations may wish to maintain airlines chiefly for prestige purposes, the fact remains that commercial and financial considerations are the most powerful of all. No company is likely to put large sums of money into an air fleet unless there is some prospect of adequate return on the investment. There is a good argument that healthy and harmonious international relationships in the field of civil aviation will be best achieved not by setting up a supra-national authority, with all its complicated political implications, but by allowing transport companies to see that reasonable though not ruinous competition prevails through the ordinary conference method.

The third and primarily political aspect of the problem centers about what is called the freedom of the air. This freedom might be said to have four gradations: (1) The right to fly over a country without landing. (2) The right to land and refuel, but not to deliver or pick up passengers, goods or mails from or for another country. (3) The right to land, and to deliver and pick up passengers from and for other countries. (4) The right to land, and to deliver and pick up passengers, goods and mails. This last classification is tantamount to a "free sky."

I doubt that any of these gradations of freedom will generally be granted. Nations — particularly small ones — are not likely to surrender the bargaining power derived from the assumption that they control the air space above their territories. Unless the leading Allied Powers agree among themselves on a clear definition of freedom of the air and insist that it be universally recognized, I am afraid that in the immediate postwar years we shall return to the old system under which each nation bargained for itself as best it could. To some extent the arrangements will be made between company and company, or between company and nation.

As the range of aircraft increases, the bargaining power of nations lying on main-line routes may be reduced. But even after the ground services supplied by these nations are no longer needed, they probably will invoke the danger of espionage as an excuse for demanding special concessions from the companies which wish to operate over their territories. Actually, the danger of espionage by commercial aircraft is not great. What is much more important is to take careful precautions against the use of national airlines to cloak the creation of aggressive military power.

The chief safeguard against the development of a military air

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force in civil guise lies in giving publicity to the operations of air transport companies. This might be achieved by an independent audit of their accounts, revealing how revenues are being expended and to what extent subsidy or other state aid is granted. In a statement of policy submitted to the Prime Minister last June, the Society of British Aircraft Constructors proposed that the right to operate airlines should be restricted to those companies which submitted their books to full audit and agreed to the regular and frequent publication of the results. To enforce a similar rule, or any others which might be agreed upon, some supervisory authority must be established. All countries operating air transport should be represented on it, and if any of them refused to abide by its rules it should have the power to ground the planes of those countries if they landed outside their own borders. The feasibility of imposing economic sanctions might also be considered in this connection.

Germany, of course, will be a special problem. We shall have to go much further than we did last time, when we merely limited the size of her civil aircraft and forbade her to possess a military air force. All the Axis nations must be deprived of the right to design and manufacture aircraft of any kind and to operate air services. It would probably be unwise to denude Germany of commercial air services; yet it would be improper to give any one country a monopoly on supplying her with them. The most practical solution would be to inaugurate a system of air routes to which all nations having trade relations with Germany would have access. The planning of the routes and services would, of course, come within the province of the international control body, which would have to take care to avoid creating "zones of influence." An essential part of the plan would be close supervision on the ground: the entire ground organization should be placed in the hands of the Allied nations. This would amount, in effect, to a European experiment in establishing freedom of the air. Later it might be extended. In any event, the scheme would provide an incentive for the other nations to make sure that Germany did not rebuild her air fleet during the specified period, say 20 years. The defect in the 1919 scheme was the absence of an inducement to constant vigilance by the Allies.

III

Is there any reason why those who travel by airplane or send goods by air should have part of the cost paid out of the public

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purse? Presumably time is money, and if it is worth while for travellers and shippers to use an airplane they should pay an adequate price for what they get.

There are unmistakable signs that air transportation is on the way to becoming self-supporting. Better aircraft, better ground facilities, improved airports and a more closely spun network of air routes will bring down the cost to the user, and will so shorten air passages that the extra cost of using air facilities will become an investment and not an extravagance. For the time being, the state can help greatly by providing ground service, including airports, hangars, radio, meteorological and similar services, at nominal fees, or even free. The objective, however, is for the airlines to operate at a profit on a sound business basis, without depending on revenue from the state beyond the reasonable rewards for services rendered, *e.g.* for the carriage of mails. Governments can help in that direction by closely scrutinizing the operations of civil airlines as revealed in their audits, and by making the issuance of all operating licenses contingent upon a steady decrease in the subsidy required, thus throwing the responsibility for sound business operation upon the airlines and their customers.

In certain cases the state will be the owner and operator of the airlines. Most countries, however, will prefer to leave the management of their air services in the hands of private companies or government-supported corporations. There is no proof as yet that the state can run air services better than private enterprise can. Certainly, the period in which a young industry is expanding is not the time for a government monopoly. When an industry is growing it needs the stimulus of alert, flexible, young minds; it needs vision, courage and drive. These qualities are not found in government offices, which inevitably are cautious and tend to postpone action. Air transportation should remain primarily the responsibility of private business, with the state playing the rôle of a stern but benevolent godfather.

The claim of the United States to a prescriptive operating right in the air bases built abroad by American labor and materials is a source of some misunderstanding at the moment. The British view is that it is difficult to distinguish the part of a nation's war effort which goes into the making of an air base from the parts which go into the making of an aircraft carrier or the making of a cap for a six-inch shell. All these items have a common purpose: to win the war. We do not expect to gain material assets from the war which we can turn to our advantage in the peace. (We think

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the ability to remain free as a sufficient gain. Americans may not altogether realize how near we came to enslavement.) Perhaps the difficulty over the air bases springs from a suspicion in American minds that the eastern half of the world is anxious to shut out the air services of the western half. That, of course, is unfounded. No such exclusion is imaginable unless Americans wished to exclude commercial planes coming from our side of the Atlantic. That seems to me a no less ridiculous suspicion. Undoubtedly, the use of those bases which America built outside her own boundaries will be available to her if she wants them. All that is necessary is that an hour or two be spent in friendly discussion during the transition period in order to arrange the matter.

IV

What is the place of Great Britain and the Empire in the larger schemes of world air transportation? In my opinion much of the future prosperity of the world will depend upon the degree of coöperation — or, to use the fashionable expression, integration — that can be attained by the countries comprising the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The creation of the Empire air routes was principally the work of Great Britain, though each of the Empire countries which they served contributed its quota — chiefly in money — toward paying the operating costs. Attempts to link the British Isles and the scattered territories of Egypt, South Africa, India and Australasia suffered great vicissitudes at first. The handicaps imposed by the refusal of European nations to accept the principle of free passage for civil aircraft was not surmounted till the long-range Empire flying-boats came into use. Today, it is possible — though not in all cases economically sound — to operate Empire routes without seeking the permission of a single foreign country. This fact gives the British Commonwealth much greater bargaining power than formerly, and provides a powerful inducement to all its member nations to come together to complete the task of creating an efficient air transport service. In this I see nothing but good.

A suggestion that an Empire Air Force be built up was made some years ago. It was not wholly welcomed then, but the war brought the idea to fruition a few months after hostilities began. Squadrons of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, the South African Air Force,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Indian Air Force and the Rhodesian Air Force have fought side by side in what can only be described as a single Air Force. Not only have squadrons of the various Air Forces worked together; the personnel of different Forces have made up the crews of individual planes. That closeness of coöperation is reflected in the new name given to the R. A. F.'s old Central Flying School — today it is called the Empire Central Flying School.

Great Britain is now using airliners manufactured in other countries, partly because her prewar civil aviation policy prevented her from equipping herself adequately, but even more because she put all her wartime effort into the building of war planes. Practically no orders had been placed for British transport aircraft as late as the end of last year. The Spitfire, Mosquito, Lancaster and Halifax of today, like other types of British fighters and bombers in the past, have proved that the British aircraft industry can meet the most exacting specifications and more often than not throw in a bonus. The industry is confident that it can produce civil air transports comparable in performance to its notable warplanes. That confidence is doubtless shared by the British dominions and colonies, and will probably induce them to wait to see the British air transports which are now being designed before they commit themselves to buying or building other types.

Before the war, Great Britain supplied most of the aircraft used in her overseas possessions and the dominions. Several of these countries now are in a position to build planes of the largest size, and those with manufacturing facilities limited to the smaller types of airframe and engine will doubtless enlarge their scope to embrace all classes of aircraft. The war has given them all a new conception of their industrial potentialities and a new belief in their skill. In other words, the foundations have been laid for an Empire Air Force and an air transport industry capable of enormous development. Fostered along the proper lines, such a force will be an invaluable asset to each member of the Commonwealth and a common bulwark against any nation that, like Nazi Germany, aspired to world dominion. A unification of effort will work to the disadvantage of no one and to the gain of all.

Such a grouping of skill and resources would not mean that the Empire intended to trade only within itself. It would mean exactly the reverse. Coördination within the Empire is needed to obtain the greatest possible measure of airborne trade in every market that can be reached by air, and to bring into existence the greatest number of air services compatible with the amount of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade available. Whether or not we can achieve the ideal degree of Empire coördination, there is a growing conviction in Great Britain that the "chosen instrument" policy (*i.e.* that in which the government chooses one company to carry the national flag in the air) is not suitable to the conditions that will prevail when the business of air transportation begins its inevitable expansion. The tasks to be undertaken will be too many and too large for a single concern to discharge. One great unwieldy organization would lack the flexibility necessary to meet changing conditions. It would inevitably insist upon so rigid a standardization that orders for aircraft would be unequally distributed within the industry and many aircraft designers would be deprived completely of opportunities to prove their skill. To my mind, the case against monopoly in British overseas air transport services is overwhelming, and no time should be lost in giving official approval and support to sound alternative schemes.

V

At the end of the last war, the builder of military planes was eager to manufacture civil aircraft; but first air routes had to be opened and the industry organized. My belief in the future of air transport led me to become an airline operator at that time. Soon thereafter, however, civil aviation ceased to be a commercial enterprise and became a subsidized instrument of nationalistic rivalries. I mention my personal encounter with that unforeseen development as my excuse for preferring, in this article, to offer my opinion as to how the world should run its air transport services rather than to predict what will actually occur.

Every sign points to a rapid growth of travel and transport by airplane when this war is over. Airlines are ready with ambitious projects for expansion. Shipping and other transport interests are as eager to come into the field as they once were to keep out. I should like to suggest that two facts in particular ought to be kept in mind as we enter this new era. It should be remembered, first, that each aircraft, by reason of its high speed, can carry a large number of passengers in a given period, and therefore that the expansion of air routes will not produce a proportionate increase in the number of airplanes needed. Second, it must be remembered that no great profits will be made in the pioneer years of this era. To hope that the public purse could be enriched by the nationalization of the aircraft industry would be to pursue an expensive delusion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT

By Melville J. Herskovits

A PRIMARY obligation of Europeans and Americans toward colonial peoples is generally held to be to "educate the native" for self-government. In postwar plans this obligation is usually expressed in the form of an injunction that colonial Powers, or any agency which is set up to control colonial areas, shall preserve the interests of the native populations during some undetermined transitional period and instruct them in the art of governing themselves. It is implied or promised that autonomy shall be theirs when their "education" has been completed. On the political side, this represents an extension of the mandates idea; as it applies to native ways of life, it is a blend of the older concept of European colonial policy embodied in the phrase "the white man's burden" and the more modern statement of administrative technique known as "indirect rule."

The principle of tutelage from which the obligation just described is supposed to derive rests on the assumption that native peoples are less developed than peoples whose cultures are marked by a machine technology and the scientific approach to natural phenomena. Native peoples are rarely held to be innately inferior because of race. They are supposed, rather, to be culturally inferior; and because their "backwardness" is believed cultural, the efficacy of education is taken for granted. The length of time a certain native people must be subject to tutelage will depend upon how "advanced" it becomes — that is, how readily it accepts European and American ways of life.

This approach to the problem is regrettably over-simplified. The fact is that native peoples all over the world have in many respects a high degree of competence for self-government, and that much of the present ill-feeling between native peoples and their European rulers is due to the failure of westerners to understand this fact. A still greater degree of friction between rulers and ruled is to be expected in the future if the former do not adopt a different attitude toward the problem of integrating colonial areas into a peaceful world economic and political system.

It should be made clear at the outset that the problem is not approached here on the unrealistic assumption that the hands of the clock can be turned backward. The fact of European and American occupation and control cannot be waved out of ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istence, nor can the requirements of the world economy be ignored. The basic problem is to find and adopt a policy toward native peoples which will contribute to a growing confidence among all the peoples of the world.

II

Only in recent years have we come to perceive how tenaciously "backward" peoples cling to their own ways of life, how devoted they are to what in their eyes has worth and substance. For uncounted centuries in all parts of the non-European world, native folk, unmolested in their relative isolation, created and preserved patterns of living which permitted them to survive. They developed bodies of tradition adapted to the natural settings in which they found themselves, technological skills and economic systems to provide for their physical needs, social and political institutions to regulate relationships within the group, and forms of religious and artistic expression to cope with the unknown and the unknowable and to satisfy their non-material needs.

The advent of European control changed native political and economic systems radically, but many other facets of native culture were not affected to any comparable degree. In some colonies it even happened that native economic and political institutions were not considered prejudicial to the interests of the colonial Power and were permitted to continue relatively unchanged. In fact, all over the native world, many petty chiefs today still carry on much as they did before the coming of the Europeans, and native markets still are held as they always have been. Now, however, a chief acts on the advice of a colonial officer and is paid by the European administration; and the market contributes to the operation of a fiscal system quite outside the control of those whose lives are influenced by it. In many native societies there never was much democracy, as we define it; nevertheless, the change to the district officer from the native ruler and his council of elders is no mere substitution of one power for its equivalent. It is a change from a socially sanctioned system of controls which was a part of the people's cultural heritage to a system imposed and administered from outside the group. The European system is as foreign to the native psychologically as it is politically.

Characteristic of current approaches to the problem of colonial government is the fact that the native is rarely consulted, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that when the colonial administrator takes the native point of view into account he rarely does so realistically. As a result, often unwittingly, the rôle assigned the native in the postwar world is essentially that of a pawn. Although he enjoys better sanitation, a higher standard of living, security from petty depredations, new goods to fill new wants, and our type of religious truth, he still is consumed by the desire to return to "the old days" of freedom from foreign dominance and to ways of life that were satisfactory to him. Yet even when the existence of that desire is recognized, the decision as to whether it would be "best" to gratify it is held to lie in the wisdom of the foreign ruler, not in the desire of the ruled; and this not out of devotion to the autocratic principle but because the native is believed to be like the child whose parent has the advantage of superior intelligence and maturity.

This point of view is acceptable to us because it feeds a congenial belief in our own superiority, for among Europeans and Americans ethnocentrism has been raised almost to an article of faith. It is given the appearance of validity by the military power which colonizing countries always have at their command in order to overwhelm any native opposition. "He who makes the powder," says a West African proverb, "wields the power." Our control of the machine, in contrast to the rude technologies of native folk, has heightened our sense of cultural superiority by providing it with objective proof. When we compare the complexity of our economic system with the economies of primitive folk, and when we consider the advantages that come to us from our possession of the art of writing, we secure further satisfactory evidence of our own preëminence.

It is generally assumed that native ways of life must inevitably yield when they come into contact with "higher" cultures; but the hard fact is that they do not. Evidence from all over the world is at hand to show that contact with another culture can just as easily make the native determined to continue in what seems to him a more desirable way of living. If he cannot do so on the surface of daily life, he will do it sub rosa. In many parts of West Africa, for example, European authorities have tried to suppress worship of a supposed god of smallpox, and numerous officials believe they have succeeded. What is not understood is that this deity is but one manifestation of the earth-god, who must be worshipped if crops are not to fail; worship goes on as always, in a form sufficiently changed to ensure adequate disguise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

What is known, it may be asked, of the ability of native peoples to govern themselves? The range of political systems in primitive society is vast. It includes a great number of civilizations, each with its own set of institutions. Just as the societies of native folk vary in size from small autonomous bands to stable kingdoms with populations counted in the millions, so the political structures range from rudimentary forms almost not discernible in any institutionalized pattern to great dynasties which have held sway for generations. So varied are these forms, indeed, that in many instances they defy the definitions set up by specialists in government, which perhaps is why the latter seem to have given over any attempt at a scientific consideration of native political methods.

Yet whether simple or complex, whether appertaining to societies small or large, these political systems perform the functions of the state as we know it — that is, they control the relations of a man to his fellows, and regulate the drive for power. Functionally, the question whether such controls are exerted by family groups or by designated officials is beside the point. The man who refrains from misconduct through fear that the son of his maternal uncle will subject him to public ridicule is responding to the same type of control as the individual in our society who avoids wrongdoing through fear of the police and the courts — except that the former system perhaps works out the more efficiently of the two.

The problem of how competent native folk are to govern themselves differs in various parts of the world. The political situation on a coral atoll in the Pacific is not the same as in a populous island such as Java. The type and degree of native contact with Europeans often differ from tribe to tribe even within a relatively restricted region, and this adds another complicating factor. Yet the underlying principles are everywhere the same. Colonial peoples the world over were affected by the victories of Japan and have reacted to the implications of the Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asiatics." Similarly, a reaction has been noted to the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms among widely different primitive tribes.

We may assume, then, that while particular situations differ the basic motivations do not, and we may proceed to examine the conditions which antedated European control in various

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regions in order to find clues as to how the problem might be solved aright. There seem certain advantages in choosing to study Africa particularly in this connection. Though racial disunity does not manifest itself in Africa as it does, for example, in India, the tribal tensions there are equally strong. Moreover, Africa is the largest single land area under foreign control. It lies outside the immediate range of the "Asia for the Asiatics" slogan, and it usually is not considered as politically important as the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China or Malaya; yet the problems it presents are quite as pressing as those arising in the latter areas. Indeed, it is especially desirable that students of international affairs begin to accord African problems closer attention than they have done in the past, for this continent seems a likely center of many future irritations.

All over Africa, before the advent of the Europeans, there existed societies ruled under a system of delegated authority which assured a reign of law and order. The Fula, Hausa, Wolof, Fulbe and other empires of the western Sudan have long been famous. The story of their dynastic struggles and of their wars of conquest reads like a page of European history — not of too distant a date at that. On the Gold Coast were the Ashanti and the Fanti kingdoms. The constitutional principles governing the former, and the legal system of the latter, show that these Negro societies were capable of developing a high degree of organization in conformity with their own patterns of government. The Kingdom of Dahomey exhibited an even more closely-knit government structure, as shown, for example, by the annual census, the techniques of levying taxes and the planned agricultural regimen. In Nigeria, the Yoruban people, and those of Benin, were likewise carefully and efficiently organized. Even in such a region as the Niger Delta, where the political unit was small and restricted to an aggregate of villages, the African tradition of regulated procedures to govern all phases of life was as prominent as elsewhere. The Kingdom of Kongo at the mouth of the Congo River was well-established when the Portuguese explorers reached it in the first part of the sixteenth century, while inland lay the countries of the Bushongo and other Bantu rulers. East and South Africa similarly had well-organized political units. Among Africanists, Uganda was long a standard example of the African "genius for organization." Almost mythical was the Kingdom of Monomotapa, in the southern part of the continent. And we have the well-authenticated historical accounts of the rise of the Zulu Kingdom

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under Chaka, and the establishment of the Matabele domain.

Regular processes of law were the rule in the larger aggregates as well as in the smaller autonomous village units of herding bands. The indigenous court systems of the Africans have been commented on by every early traveller who saw them in operation. In the larger groupings, appeals could be taken to a higher court from an adverse decision in a lower one. Litigation — especially in East and South Africa, where issues arose over the ownership of the cattle that passed from one family to another incident on marriage — could go on for generations. That a man argued his own case instead of retaining a specialist to do this for him, that he might cite proverbs instead of legal precedents, merely meant that the outer trappings of the system differed from those known to ourselves. The result was the same: the individual knew his rights, and could expect protection in the exercise of them.

The principles underlying African political systems were of a different order from those in present-day American and European countries. African polity was based on a conception of disciplined obedience in accord with status. The best European analogy to the African monarchy is the feudal kingdom of the Middle Ages, though the analogy, as might be expected, does not hold true in any great detail. The African system was more flexible than the European, and change of status was far easier for the African commoner and even slave than for the European yeoman or serf.

Beneath the seeming differences in position, also, was a democratic reality that is to be grasped only when one understands the basic assumptions concerning the relation of man to man. This was reflected in part in the political realism which inhibited a ruler, no matter how absolute his power in theory, from exercising that power without first ascertaining the reactions of his people to specific edicts. For the rest, this democratic reality was to be seen in the bearing of a man — in the manner in which, once the formalities of greeting were over, he would meet and treat with other members of his tribe.

There were, of course, many aspects of the political systems of Africa (or of other parts of the native world) which from our point of view appear undesirable, distasteful and even repulsive. The institution of slavery was the rule in most of the continent, and the object of most wars between native states in the more densely populated portions, particularly during the period of the slave trade to the New World, was the acquisition of human

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

booty. It is true that, except in special instances, slavery in Africa was not the institution it became in the Americas; it was customarily of the household type, and the adoption of a slave or the child of a slave could on occasion give the bondsman the position of tribesman. But the slave did suffer one peril he did not know in the New World; he might be sent to accompany his master to the realm of the dead, to serve him there as he had served him in the world of the living. When a king died an impressive retinue accompanied him to the other world. We need but read the descriptions given by Canon Roscoe of the funerary rituals of the Baganda royalty, or those by Sir Richard Burton of the Dahomean "customs," to realize how lightly on occasion life could be held.

In the larger groupings, also, not only was life held cheaply; property, too, was owned at the pleasure of the ruler. At this distance in time from the days of autonomous rule it is not easy to obtain information on native taxation systems. But we can reconstruct something of the facts from the chronicles of the early explorers, and in some parts of Africa old men can be found whose memories reach beyond the colonial régime to the autonomous past. Land, whether of a large kingdom or of a village state, belonged in principle to the ruler. When he granted it for use he gave up his rights over it while it was under cultivation; at least he abandoned the right to take the produce. In the larger groupings, however, the ruler often could appropriate a considerable proportion of a man's wealth as taxes. A man's sons could be impressed for military service; his daughter could be taken for the royal household. When there were especially favorable channels for trade, or particularly good opportunities to dispose of produce, the ruler profited first from them; and he exercised other monopolies that offered special chances for gain.

In general, autocratic tendencies predominated in societies in which political institutions were most highly developed, whereas democratic aspects of government bulked larger in groupings "lacking centralized authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions," to quote the phrase employed by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard. Yet whether the systems were democratic or autocratic, they operated successfully for longer periods of time than the historic record covers, to say the very least. They were cast in the patterns of the culture as a whole. Their burdens, which might seem irksome to us, were integrated into the total scheme of living and were accepted as normal. So

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fully accepted were they that they still remain vivid in the unwritten history of peoples who, under foreign control, remember their virtues and forget their shortcomings.

IV

Those who study native patterns of living scientifically probably come closest to being able to understand how the native regards the colonial system. This is very different indeed from the impression given the government official who deals with the daily events of native life. In West Africa, for example, the colonial system has brought many benefits to the natives, as the natives themselves will readily admit. This is especially the case in the British colonies. The native has personal security as never before. He has a higher standard of living than he did in the days of autonomous rule. Health conditions have been greatly improved. Native horizons have been widened in many directions. Only freedom is lacking. Hence, despite all the benefits bestowed, one rarely encounters a native who does not speak with nostalgia of "the time when we were free" and who, if he speaks frankly and without fear, does not say he looks forward to a day in the predictable future when he will be liberated from foreign control.

This raises a question which troubles many who seek a wise decision regarding the place of native peoples in the postwar world. Can the native be granted his own way of life, they ask, if this means that the world society must countenance Melanesian cannibalism, Borneo head-hunting, African slavery? Or can it allow autocratic controls, rigid social stratification, intra-tribal economic inequalities? The problem must be faced squarely and without subterfuge. One type of answer — never very satisfactory — is the *tu quoque*. Have Borneo head-hunters taken the heads of as many persons in long generations as we, for all our boasted culture, kill in automobile accidents in a single normal year, or in a single skirmish in modern warfare? Arguments on this level, however, lead us nowhere. Nor is it useful to be sentimental, to picture native peoples as having lived formerly in a golden age and to think they should retain their aboriginal ways merely because these are picturesque.

Where different peoples come into close contact changes are bound to occur. The point is that the changes must not be imposed, but induced on the one side and accepted on the other. Native folk are just as quick to see and seize upon material advantages as we are ourselves, provided these are not forced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on them or presented to them as an integral part of a system which in its totality is incomprehensible. To do so affronts their dignity as adult human beings. Here the student of primitive cultures can be of service by suggesting transfers of interest which easily and naturally wean a tribe away from practices that will handicap it in assuming its place in a world organization. Many traditions will wither and disappear of themselves as a result of changes in the economic bases of native life. Others will never be resurrected from the tribal past even if the opportunity should offer, because those who would be harmed by them will not, once they have been freed of their disabilities while under colonial rule, countenance a return to the previous status.

A principle well known to students of culture suggests the proper general approach — namely, that while no body of customs is static, any new element which is successfully introduced either from within a group or from without must be cast in terms of preëxisting patterns. Innovations arising within the group are taken up or discarded according as they can or cannot be harmonized with established beliefs and habits. So are innovations introduced from outside, as long as the group is in a position to determine for itself what it will accept and what reject. That is why changes arbitrarily introduced from without "for the good of the people" are resented, no matter how enlightened the intent of the would-be benefactor. And that is why the problem of "educating the native" has proved so baffling. If new political or cultural patterns cannot be integrated with the old ones they will be rejected. Controls which "train for self-government" are thus as little acceptable to natives as would be educational attempts based on a recent interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, which was held to impose an obligation on Europeans and Americans to free the native from the "fears" presumably arising out of his "primitive superstitions."

V

Once again it must be emphasized that the hands of the historical clock cannot be turned back. Native peoples cannot be returned to their aboriginal isolation. The effects of their contact with Europeans cannot be erased. Practically speaking, then, it must be recognized that any abrupt withdrawal by the colonial Powers, even if it could be brought about, would result in chaos. Native political systems long suppressed would not function as they did in pre-colonial times. They could not govern if they were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

catapulted into control. Nor, in the main, are native peoples calling for the abrupt withdrawal of the colonial Powers. Those of their number who have knowledge of the world as it is recognize the need for outside protection against aggression — economic no less than political — until such time as experience has taught the art of self-protection and has provided the means. Most such individuals, as well as the mass of the peoples concerned, would be quite content if they knew that they were being accorded protection until, at definitely stated terminal periods, or according to some fixed procedure, they could achieve complete control over their own ways of life.

There are many fields, however, in which the natives can and should be left to themselves. These include local economic arrangements, forms of local government, marriage forms, social structures, religious beliefs and moral codes. Only in that way can the occupying Powers remove existing irritation or hostility. Most native folk have preserved their customs well enough so that they could easily achieve cultural autonomy of the kind suggested. Only such peoples as have been transplanted to reserves, or whose aboriginal habitat has been invaded by foreigners in large numbers, or who have been compelled to live under conditions that prevented key elements in their cultures from functioning, would find it impossible to exercise even local cultural control over their own societies. But they would be the exception in the colonial world rather than the rule — they would present the sort of situation which has arisen in North America or the Union of South Africa, for example, rather than in Java or the Gold Coast. The difficulty lies in our unwillingness to admit the worth of native ways of life, to refrain from passing judgment upon their values and traditions merely because they differ from our own.

The next step, after we have accorded native peoples local and cultural autonomy, is to *induce*, not impose, such changes as will integrate them successfully into the postwar world. We should proceed entirely realistically. It would be folly, for example, not to recognize that regardless of the degree of cultural autonomy native peoples may be privileged to exercise, they still will continue to occupy land and possess manpower and influence the production of commodities which are essential to the functioning of the modern world's economy and hence are of general political concern.

Education is indeed needed; but it is needed not only for na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives, but for those who wield world power as well. The first lesson to be learned, if successful progress is to be made, is that native custom must be fully and continuously taken into account in all plans for integrating a given people into the world scene, and that their sensibilities must be given as much weight as the sensibilities of the outside dominant group. Secondly, it must be remembered that native collaboration is a minimum requirement. We shall merely perpetuate the existing points of irritation under a new name if we continue to regard native peoples as groups for whom we must make decisions, who are capable of executing plans only under our direction, whose customs are to be respected only if they are not in conflict with our own standards. We must shed the assumption that if there is to be a world order it must be organized wholly on the European and American model. Equally important is the realization that definite periods must be set in which autonomy, or some phase of autonomy, is to be achieved. In some instances, of course, there will be justification for stating that a considerable interval must elapse before even cultural autonomy can be granted. The main thing is to establish a timetable.

Special techniques must be devised to attain the above objectives. An example is the manner in which the Office of Indian Affairs of the United States has used the device of incorporation to permit tribal matters to be placed in tribal hands. The right solutions will be hard to find, for the problem is highly complex. But it is urgently necessary that the search be made and that it succeed, for in native discontents are foreshadowed renewed conflict on a world scale and in the critical form of struggles between races.

With sufficient good will, mutual respect and ingenuity the conflict can be avoided. But the premise of any satisfactory solution, it must be stressed again, will have to be the recognition that no people can speak or plan for another permanently, that every group not demoralized by the long operation of outside controls is capable at least of local self-government, and that those groups not immediately capable of participating largely in world affairs will be able to do so in time. "Education for self-government" thus should mean adopting a procedure which will bring home to native peoples the advantages of participating in the world economic and political order and make them desire spontaneously to adapt their ways of life to its requirements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JAPAN'S POWER OF RESISTANCE

By H. Foster Bain

THE war power of a nation is the product of both mental and material forces. In measuring Japan's capacity to sustain war we must take account of both categories of forces — what the Japanese people believe and will to do, and what they have to do it with. We should also remember that war power and industrial power, while closely related, are not identical. It may happen that a nation poorly endowed with resources but possessed of an ironbound will may accumulate enough materials in advance to enable it to prevail in war, at least for a time, over a nation richer in materials but suffering at the start from a weaker will or a less united purpose.

These considerations apply to the relative situation of Japan and the United States today. To make any reasonable guess as to the probable length of the present struggle we must ask two questions: Can the will of the Japanese be broken or bent while we maintain ours? Can Japan develop the raw materials in the areas occupied by her forces, in sufficient quantity and at a sufficiently rapid rate, to replenish her prewar stocks before they are exhausted?

A complete analysis of all the factors which will determine the answer to either question is beyond the scope of an article. Regarding the first, it will be sufficient to say here that the war would not have begun, at least when it did, if the Japanese had not been misled by appearances into believing that we had neither the interest in the Far East nor the unity of purpose necessary to sustain a long and bitter war there. The Japanese generals constantly preached the necessity of spiritual mobilization. They believed we were incapable of developing this in sufficient degree and quickly enough to affect the result of the war. Our implacable determination to crush Japanese militarism is now clear. It will have a strong psychological effect on the Japanese. But whether people or leaders will crack short of military defeat cannot yet even be guessed.

In the material field, the leaders of Japan were not under any illusions as to our potential power, but they counted heavily on the difference between that and developed power. On their side, the preparations for the great war which they knew lay between them and the fulfillment of their dreams were excellent. Over a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of years, and at considerable sacrifice on the part of the Japanese people, they filled their arsenals and accumulated large stocks of raw materials.

When the great moment came, a series of well-executed moves at once carried the Japanese forces to and through the Malay States and Burma. They failed, however, to get into India and to exploit that country's discontent, on which they had deeply counted. They also seized the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies; but they did not succeed in landing in Australia. They took Wake and Guam, captured two of the Aleutian Islands and held them for a time, and even lobbed a few shells onto the California coast. But they lost out at Midway. Soon, moreover, they found their hands full in the Southwest Pacific.

On the whole, we must concede that the Japanese executed their first moves brilliantly. But though they came close to fulfilling their ambitions, they fell short in important respects. And what the cost of their conquests was and what the profit from them might be were other matters.

II

Undoubtedly the Japanese seriously depleted their accumulated stores of materials in their great opening moves. Even the relatively limited fighting in China had, by the time Hankow fell, called for the expenditure of so much of Japan's precious stocks that high indignation was publicly expressed in Tokyo at the stupidity of the Chinese in not knowing that they had been defeated, and in obstinately forcing Japan to drain her supplies still further. The more extensive campaigns which began in December 1941 have of course made even heavier drafts on the Japanese stockpiles. True, the territories overrun by the Japanese armies contain in abundance many of the key materials which Japan lacks. But these require exploitation, and it is extremely doubtful whether up till now the Japanese have derived much benefit from them.

Many of the elementary facts necessary for estimating Japan's current strength are lacking. We do not know with any sureness just how well supplied she was with certain key materials at the moment she attacked us in 1941, nor do we know how much her stocks have been depleted in the course of operations to date or how much they are being replenished from the conquered territories. Only guesses may be made as to particular items, and these may be wide of the mark.

In the case of petroleum, for example, we know that before the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war Japan drew only about 10 percent of her normal consumption from domestic sources (including the shale oil in Manchuria). Her imports had been cut off some months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, except for the small supplies she received from Sakhalin. Her oil in storage is believed to have been the equivalent of about 18 months' normal consumption. Though additional amounts may have been accumulated in secret underground storage places, this estimate is at least approximately correct.

Japan made long and persistent efforts to enlarge the output of the oil fields under her control, but without notable success. No new field was found on the mainland, except in Jehol. Careful drilling there in 1939 revealed oil in a series of thick fat shales of Jurassic age. It is doubtful whether a large output can be built up in that field, but it has possibilities. There is plenty of oil shale at the Fushun mines, near Mukden; but the difficulty of expanding production rapidly in wartime is very great, given the numerous other demands for materials and skilled operators. The same limitation applies to Japan's plans for increasing her output of synthetic oil made from coal. However, Germany makes a specialty of manufacturing the machinery used in synthetic oil production and she may have supplied her ally with a certain amount of equipment. It is known that various kinds of German machinery and tools were delivered to Japan via the Trans-Siberian railroad, and probably some shipments came in by water.

Capture of the oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies was a major objective of the Japanese, and one of their early accomplishments. However, the employees of the owning companies carried through a thorough campaign of destruction before they withdrew, except in one field where paratroops landed in time to stop the work. The extent of the destruction has been checked by a neutral observer. It was so complete that the owners themselves estimated that it would require a year to restore production under peacetime conditions and with free access to normal machinery markets. The Japanese are cut off from such markets and, having but a small petroleum industry, are not likely to have had in stock any large amount of the necessary tools or parts such as usually are on hand in any American oil field. Moreover, in modern oil refineries like those destroyed at Palembang in Sumatra and at Balikpaipan in Borneo the cracking stills are as large and as difficult to manufacture as big naval guns. It does not seem probable, therefore, that the Japanese have been able to spare material and effort sufficient to rebuild either plant. Besides, just to make sure

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that both plants are out of commission, the Allies have bombed them several times since their retreat.

It is true that if the oil wells can be recovered the crude oil can be shipped to Japan and run through the refineries which formerly operated on California oil. Both plant and practice would need to be altered, however, in order to operate satisfactorily on the Dutch crude. Besides, it is not by any means certain that tankers are available. The distance is much shorter than from California, whence Japan formerly drew much of her crude oil, but many tankers have been sunk and a large number must be operating with the fleet. One may conclude, then, that the Japanese are extremely unlikely to have profited much as yet from their capture of the main East Indian oil fields.

On the other hand, one small oil field in Borneo and one in Sumatra are reported to be in operation. They form an important exception, since they yield a crude oil which is rich in Diesel and lubricating stocks. One is apt to forget, in the excitement of watching air fighting and transport, that lubricants of high quality are as necessary in modern warfare as gasoline and are much harder to produce synthetically or from any other source than crude petroleum of proper quality. In the First World War, Germany found herself more handicapped by the lack of lubricating oil than by the lack of gasoline; and while mechanized and air fighting make immensely greater demands on gasoline supply than were made at that time, lubricants are still a prime necessity. In this connection the conquest of the Netherlands Indies seems to have been of real service to the Japanese.

There are many indications that gasoline is scarce within the Japanese lines and that Japan is still depending largely on her prewar stocks. Extremely severe rationing of gasoline is in effect for the public and even extends to officers. Alcohol and charcoal are largely relied on to provide power for transportation by car, bus and truck. For strictly military and training purposes, however, gasoline is still supplied. Japanese airmen, for example, keep up steady practice and manœuvres far back of the fighting line, and scouting is widespread and constant.

The extent to which rationing can be pushed and petroleum supplies stretched has come as a great surprise to experts who studied such matters in advance. It was commonly believed by men in the petroleum industry that Germany would run out of gasoline in eight to twelve months of active warfare. It is true that there have been long periods of comparative inactivity in this war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and that the periods of extreme consumption are brief, even if they have become increasingly frequent. It is also true that Germany's strategic efforts have manifestly been directed toward getting hold of additional oil supplies; but still lack of oil may finally lead to her defeat. The fact remains that both Germany and Japan are still fighting. This must be mainly due to their success in cutting down ordinary civilian consumption. We in the United States have now seen what large amounts of gasoline can be saved for war use by rationing civilian use. Japan began restricting civilian use of petroleum severely several years before Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, any stored supply must in the end run out. The time when Japan's store will fail may possibly be near — but we cannot say so with any certainty.

Japan's conquest of the Malayan States and the Netherlands East Indies has provided her with a surplus of tin and rubber — two of the materials, incidentally, which the United States needs most. With what the Japanese had and with what is easily available in the conquered areas, they should experience no shortage of chromite or manganese, though they are busy gouging out high-grade ore in the Philippines. They are short of nickel and other rare alloy metals and must use them sparingly. Their supply of aluminum need not fail even if, as reported, it be true that their efforts to reduce the metal from the high aluminous clays found under the great coal beds in Manchuria or from other local sources have not been successful. They can still draw upon the bauxite resources of the Netherlands East Indies and the deposit near Singapore which they secured shortly before the war. It is interesting to note in passing that the Singapore deposit was considered to be gravel and was being worked to secure road material until one of the Ishihara engineers recognized its value. The amount of bauxite needed by Japan is not great enough to impose an over-heavy burden on Japanese shipping, scarce as ships undoubtedly are.

Abundant supplies of coal, the great work-horse of civilization, are available to Japan. She ceased exporting coal as long ago as 1938, but continued to import, thereby adding nearly 3,000,000 tons a year to her domestic supply. She increased production in Manchuria and Korea and received an allotment of 2,000,000 tons per year from Kailan, in China. Probably she has had the use of 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons additional per year. Also, she has been developing water power extensively in recent years. There has nonetheless been a power and fuel shortage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since 1938. Coking coal in particular has always been a problem in Japan; but new mines in Manchuria began to help before the war began, and the supplies from the Kailan mines supplement the local output. There are many evidences that use of coal is closely restricted. In the countries occupied by Japanese troops there is a great shortage of coal; this the Japanese have been unable or unconcerned to overcome. In the home islands, however, while the coal shortage may well have led to inconvenience and hardship, there has been nothing approaching disaster.

Japan has probably been able to increase her steel supply materially since the war began, despite stoppage of the inflow of scrap which in the past had permitted her to manufacture steel in quantities considerably beyond the capacity of her blast furnaces plus her pig iron imports. When the war began, Japan was believed to be making 7,200,000 tons of steel per year and to have 11,000,000 tons of scrap piled up. Her national program called for a total annual output of 10,000,000 tons of steel. She immediately limited the use of scrap to 30 percent in steel making, which would have lengthened the life of the scrap pile to about four years. She had recognized the danger inherent in this dependence on scrap as early as 1936, and lifted the bar against the construction of additional blast furnaces. By now a number of the new furnaces undoubtedly are in blast. In addition, several of the Krupp furnaces using the Renn process are operating in Korea and Manchuria. Though probably these furnaces have not been completely successful, they doubtless do make some contribution, if only to supply the blast furnace feed. Japan has also built a number of electric furnaces for making steel but other projected plants are not completed, and it is doubtful whether actual production has reached even the expected total of 10,000,000 tons.

Japan is known to be deficient in iron ore, and even in prewar years such small local deposits as she possessed were being rapidly stripped. The Japanese steel industry was almost wholly dependent on imports of scrap, pig and iron ore. The supply of the first two has almost entirely ceased, except in so far as the systematic looting of the occupied countries has helped fill the gap in the case of scrap. She began the war with full stockpiles of ore and the major sources from which she imported it remain accessible, though the shortage of shipping has probably cut down supplies. In prewar times, the imports of ore came in nearly equal parts of a million tons each from Malaya, the Philippines and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China (especially along the Yangtze). Of the two mines in the Philippines, one is certainly not shipping since its loading dock was blasted beyond easy repair before our troops retreated. At the other the facilities are available, but it is believed that no shipments have been made. Certainly none was made through most of 1942 and none has been reported since. There is no known reason, other than possibly a lack of ships, why this mine and those along the Yangtze should not be in operation. In northern China an attempt has been made to increase rail shipments. The first results were disappointing because of the unexpectedly high silica content of the ore. It is reported that the mine railroad has now been extended to a point at which a better grade of ore is available. Considerable improvement has been made in the railway facilities to the coast; but at best the line is long and was not built for heavy traffic.

Manchuria may well be now a major source of supply for both ore and pig iron. Since the Japanese came into possession of that territory they have accomplished two major improvements. They found and opened previously unknown deposits of high-grade red hematite along the Yalu River, and they worked out an ingenious process of beneficiating the large low-grade iron ore deposits in south Manchuria which permits the delivery to the blast furnace of a unit of iron, in the form of sinter, at a favorable competitive cost. Doubtless both proceedings are very helpful to the Japanese in their present difficulties, but there would seem to be small warrant for believing that there has been any notable increase in actual overall steel production. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the demand for steel has been sharply increased by the war. If one may judge from appearances, the net result is reflected most notably in a shortage of ships, which persists despite active and fairly successful salvage operations.

It will perhaps be sufficient for present purposes to outline the situation with regard to one other metal in which a critical shortage exists, namely copper. The mining of copper and the making of brass are ancient Japanese industries. Not many years ago Japan stood next after the United States, and second in the world, in copper production. Since then our own production has greatly increased, and Chile, Rhodesia, Canada and the Belgian Congo have risen to high rank as copper producers. Japan's production has also grown, but not nearly enough to enable her to maintain her old position as a producer.

In the years preceding the present war, Japan's domestic pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duction stood at about 70,000 tons, which seemed to meet demands for consumption. Immediately before the war she purchased as much more abroad, mainly from the United States. In the most recent of those years she purchased enough ores and concentrates from Canada, Chile and the Philippines to enable her furnaces to push production up to possibly 100,000 tons per year, much of which undoubtedly went into war storage. Imports were all cut off by the war. But early in 1942 the Japanese took possession of the Lepanto mine in the Philippines, from which they had previously been buying ore, and began to operate it. Incidentally, they found more than a million dollars' worth of ore and concentrate which had accumulated at the shore after shipments stopped. The mine had been producing at the rate of 11,000 tons of copper per year. The Japanese spared neither work nor expense to increase the output and have been very successful. They opened additional workings and were fortunate in finding richer ore. They moved in additional machinery from gold mines in Northern Luzon, improved shipping facilities from mine to shore, and, contrary to their policy elsewhere, raised wages and paid workers a premium for regularity in attendance. They are even reported to have issued gasoline to the large number of trucks plying between mine and dock. This is the only place in the Philippines where the issuance of gasoline for other than strictly military equipment has been reported.

These measures indicate that copper is one of the items most needed to carry out the Japanese program. The belief is reinforced by the news that has come of the widespread campaign for copper scrap under way in the Philippines and elsewhere and of the imposition, in the fall of 1943, of control measures over the use of copper wire. In addition, the Japanese are making efforts to develop mines out of small prospects in the central islands of the Philippines. All these various efforts seem to have been well rewarded. From Lepanto alone by the end of 1943 copper was being drawn at a rate of about 36,000 tons per year, equal to half the normal output of the mines in Japan proper; and active steps were being taken to build up production still further. American submarines had sunk at least two cargoes of concentrate. In this instance Japan can nevertheless be said to have succeeded in deriving notable profit from an occupied country.

This story of copper has been recited in some detail to show that the Japanese situation with regard to at least a certain war material is critical. There are many other gaps which evidently

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remain unfilled. Fibres for weaving into textiles are a case in point; and strenuous efforts are reported to increase food production in the home islands. But so far as an observer in the Philippines could judge, the chief shortage is in shipping. Since manpower seems also to be lacking, one may conclude that the shortage of ships is probably due to lack of steel and of skilled shipbuilding labor.

Beyond any shortage of individual materials is the overall shortage of manpower. This seems likely to be a critical factor in the war. The Japanese have not to any considerable extent won their way into the confidence and liking of the peoples they have conquered. They disorganized industry, removed the men who had been "making it tick," and then were unable to put Humpty-Dumpty together again. Since they had assumed the position of friends coming to rescue the various peoples from exploitation, they are precluded from using over-forceful methods to make them work when disinclined. They must either abandon the pretense of being a protective big brother or wait as patiently as may be until their propaganda becomes convincing or despair forces the various peoples into coöperation. The Japanese themselves are used to repression and yield to terroristic measures. They do not seem to be able to believe that there are people who abhor such methods and resist all the harder when they are applied. From time to time when the Japanese give up persuasion and resort to force they lose any psychological ground that they may formerly have gained. At the same time, the disorganization of industry subjects the people to increasing hardships and steadily increases their hatred of their conquerors, which is not the less intense because concealed as much as possible. Certainly in the Philippines at any rate the people submit only and to the extent that they must.

The failure of the Japanese propaganda is what prevents Japan from quickly organizing industry in the conquered territories and precludes her from replacing promptly the supplies which she is currently expending. If we are able to bring our power to bear against her before the subject peoples give up hope and start collaborating more effectively with their conquerors, she will not have sufficient materials with which to maintain the struggle. However high their courage and determination, the Japanese cannot win without sufficient guns, ammunition and ships. They are not able to keep up the supply alone. For us, then, time is the essence of victory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POTENTIALITIES OF JAPANESE LIBERALISM

By C. Burnell Olds

NOBODY questions now that Germany and Japan have had dreams of world empire, or that their efforts to make those dreams come true must be crushed. But we should understand the nature of the enemy clearly if we are to fight him intelligently. The enemy that we fight and must crush is not Germany, it is not Japan, but it is militarism, that Satanic spirit with which both countries have become possessed — not only the war lords who are primarily responsible, but the people who, whether willingly or unwillingly, are being used by them as their tools. We cannot either exonerate the people concerned, much as we might like to do so, nor condemn them out of hand and irretrievably, as it would be easy to do. We must be discriminating. Going behind surface symptoms, we must try to see how the cancerous growth has little by little sent its roots down so deeply that by now it has infected the entire body politic, primarily in those two nations but in lesser degree throughout the world. This will show us, first, that nothing will now avail but surgery of the most drastic sort, directed toward that area where the disease is worst, yet second, that if our surgery is not done in a way to save the patient, the world itself cannot be saved. The writer believes it can be done if due consideration is given to the factors involved.

As for Japan, let it be frankly admitted at the start that from the beginning of her history she has been, as she is now, a warlike nation. Her own scholars admit that Japanese history begins with martial exploits. Almost the first act of the first Emperor, Jimmu, was to conquer the northern peoples. Ever since, preëminence was accorded to fighting men as the acknowledged aristocracy with a right to rule and to be honored above all others.

It must be observed, however, that this soldier class was only one of the four classes into which Japanese society was divided, and, in point of numbers, by far the smallest of the four. The classification was soldiers, farmers, artisans, tradesmen — and always in this order of importance, even though the soldiers, or samurai, constituted only about 5 percent of the population. Furthermore, it should be understood that until the Restoration in 1868 none but recognized soldiers were permitted to have anything to do with war or more than a little with politics. This is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important, for the cultural skills for which the Japanese are rightly esteemed were developed entirely by the peace-loving, peace-practising 95 percent, and not at all by the soldier class. Still, the commoner was always trained to regard the fighting man as vastly superior to all others and to pay him exceptional deference and obedience. This produced a habit of subserviency and servility which the nation has never yet been able to shake off.

Is it strange that with such a heritage the Japanese soldier of today should continue to swagger and bully, even though he is now, potentially, *every man* in the nation? It is his to command and rule, whether on the battlefield, in legislative halls, in public offices, in the schoolroom, or even in his own home. He is by right the nation's tyrant, feared by all, loved by few, yet aped and deferred to by every aspiring youth.

Whence, we ask, came this spirit? Not even Germany seems to have it in like measure. Most nations divested themselves of it, or thought they did, centuries ago. The Japanese did not. They kept it, and fostered it, and adjusted all their organized life to its imperative. By the close of the twelfth century the whole nation had become organized under a military dictatorship. The Shogun was everything, the Mikado nothing, except perhaps a useful figurehead. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Tokugawas had come to power. From that time on, the populace to the last man was just what a Hitler would have desired it to be. It was kept in that status, rotting and spineless, until the middle of the last century. Then, as a result of the action of our own Perry and others like him, the dawn began to break. Through increasing contacts with the outside world the Japanese began to understand what men might be.

Almost immediately a popular clamor arose for the return of authority to the Emperor. The restoration was accomplished under the leadership of a mere handful of youthful civilians. Many of them had been abroad and had seen for themselves the meaning of representative government and free institutions. When they returned they reported, and their countrymen caught the vision, and soon the entire countryside was ablaze. The new young Emperor saw it, too, and realized what it meant, and faced the challenge of it. One of his first acts was to swear a five-fold oath, beginning with the declaration: "Public councils shall be organized, and all government affairs shall be decided by public opinion." Thus, in 1868, the cornerstone of liberty was laid in Japan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One of the various embassies or groups of men who went abroad in those early years seems to have come back determined to push for a popularly elected legislative assembly at once. This was a dangerous thing to undertake in a country not yet fairly out of despotism. Fortunately, the petitioning group secured the ear of the progressive and determined young Emperor, and in less than two years a public proclamation was issued, promising not only an assembly but a written constitution as well. Soon thereafter the Emperor summoned to his court Hirobumi Ito (afterwards Prince Ito) as the most promising young man available, and to him entrusted the task of framing a constitution. He went abroad for the express purpose of studying constitutions, and in due time came back enamoured of the German model, for the reason that it centered in an autocratic head, as Japan's must do also. The two men worked together on the plan like brothers, the younger (the Emperor was 11 years younger than Ito) deferring to the elder. At length it was finished. The constitution came into effect in 1889, and the next year the first duly constituted legislative assembly was set up.

The constitution was not a wholly democratic document, but it went a long distance in that direction. It expressly made "the person of the Emperor sacred and inviolable," and invested him with all the rights of empire, including the sanctioning of all laws, the convoking and closing of the Imperial Diet, the supreme command of the Army and Navy, the declaration of war and the concluding of treaties. Yet it did provide for a bicameral Diet to which was given wide liberty of action. This was a transition period. The framework of the new order could not be made too different from the old military régime. Ito had seen clearly that there had to be time for the development of democratic practice. The wonder is that a constitution was given at all in such a moment. It positively guaranteed civil rights to the people — something entirely unprecedented — freedom of residence, freedom from arrest, detention, trial or punishment without due process of law, the right of trial by judges legally constituted, freedom of religious belief, liberty of speech, writing, publication and public meetings, and freedom of petition. As for the Diet, it must be convoked every year and every law promulgated must have its consent, including the approval of the annual budget for all expenditures and revenues of the state.

Unfortunately for Prince Ito, he was held responsible for all the blunders that occurred in getting out the document and putting it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into execution. Misunderstandings and dissatisfaction resulted, and in the end he was assassinated by a Korean, to whose unhappy country he had devoted some of his best energies in vain. In his downfall the people's cause received what might have been a mortal wound; but other champions were soon raised up.

In 1898 the first people's cabinet came to power, and in 1901 the first people's party. This was mainly due to the work of Isoo Abe, a young man who began as a Christian pastor but saw an opportunity for larger usefulness in politics and plunged in, after taking a course of training for it in America. He has been the leader of the proletarian masses ever since. The first Social Democrat Party attempted too much and was almost immediately suppressed, but the ideals for which it stood had come to stay, or at least to serve as a constant thorn in the flesh for those who ruled. As Mr. Abe himself said: "It would be a great mistake to judge the influence of socialism from the yet small number of professed socialists only. The socialist spirit is afloat everywhere."[1]

Meantime, however, the militarists strode forward. Embassies sent abroad reported on the martial prowess of the western nations, on their armies and navies. "Here," cried the militarists, "is the secret of the power of the western nations. It does not lie in their peaceful institutions and ideals, but in their superior military organization. If we are to hold our own against their encroachments we must have an army and navy able to cope with the best any other nation may bring against us." Thus did the rising young nation adopt a completely organized military system to take the place of the 5 percent of military specialists. Now all men were to be fighters and all education must be focused on making them so. Furthermore, the reason why the motheaten and all-but-forgotten theory of the heavenly descent of the Japanese sovereigns was taken out and furbished up was to supply a divine imperative behind the program, making of it a religion.

To call it all-but-forgotten is not an exaggeration. A leading Japanese writer, K. K. Kawakami, remarked of Ito's inclusion of the words, "heaven-descended and sacred" in the constitution: "Certainly he did not expect the Japanese of these modern times to accept, at its face value, the *obsolete* doctrine [italics not his] of the divine origin of the Mikado."[2] This agrees with a statement made by a Japanese of prominence within the last three years to the effect that not one of his compatriots in a hundred really

[1] *Cf.* Count Okuma, "Fifty Years of New Japan." London: Smith, Elder, 1909, Vol. II, p. 512.
[2] *Cf.* K. K. Kawakami, "Japan and World Peace." New York: Macmillan, 1919, p. 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

believes in the doctrine. Nevertheless, believed or not, the theory served the bureaucratic manipulators of modern Japan.

As early as 1909, only four years after the war with Russia was over, the militarists succeeded in wangling a law which made it possible for them to take any matter of military importance direct to the Emperor, over the heads of Diet, Cabinet or Premier. Once the sovereign's imprimatur had been secured, those who objected to the procedure had nothing more to say. Of course it was unconstitutional, the people knew that; but the law was pushed through nevertheless. Thus a dual government was saddled upon the nation, to the consternation of those who had the real welfare of the country at heart and who believed even then that such a course would bring the nation to ruin.

The First World War was an unqualified boon to Japan's warmongers, for it threw into their lap exactly the thing for which they had been waiting: a foothold in China. But though the military were in the saddle, there was one element in the population that had to be reckoned with in those days: the student class and the intellectuals. Professor S. Yoshino, of the Imperial University of Tokyo,[3] has told how students, in their effort to understand and sympathize with laboring men and Koreans and Chinese, were going out in large numbers to work side by side with them. "If the question of giving Korea independence or complete autonomy were submitted to the students," he says, "ninety in a hundred would say, 'give her independence or autonomy!' If the question were put to the students, 'Shall we withdraw from Shantung and give it back to China?' ninety in a hundred would say, 'Yes.'"

Though this attitude was stonily resisted by the militarists and punished by the police, it prospered. In 1918 there began a new surge of democracy with the establishment of the first uni-party cabinet under the leadership of Premier Hara. Another important new factor was the growing influence of big business which, in turn, greatly disturbed the Army men, in as much as approval of the military budget was in the hands of the Diet where that influence was powerful.

In the meantime, the Exclusion Act of 1924 was passed in the United States. This played directly into the hands of the military party. A particularly friendly attitude had been developing toward America by reason of her generosity in relieving the distress of the great earthquake of the year before. But the pass-

[3] *Cf.* K. K. Kawakami, "What Japan Thinks." New York: Macmillan, 1921, p. 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

age of this Act aroused the feelings of the entire nation to white heat. There is little doubt that active preparations for a war of revenge against America date from that time. Fortunately, Baron Shidehara was Foreign Minister at the moment. He was able to do much to restrain popular passion, and he also pursued a policy of conciliation toward China. But in 1927 he was compelled to surrender his position and Baron Tanaka was elevated to the Premiership. It was during his régime that the notorious Tanaka Memorial was originated, which set forth in no uncertain terms full details of Japan's world-conquest program.

In 1930 Hamaguchi came to power. But his acceptance of the 5-5-3 ratio in the London Treaty incensed both Army and Navy beyond endurance. Never before had the civil authority successfully defied them on a major question of national defense. This action, they said, constituted an assertion by the Cabinet of the right to control the foreign policy of the nation, a violation of the prerogative of the Privy Council to influence the Emperor in all of his important decisions. In 1931 Hamaguchi was slain by an assassin's bullet. On September 18 of that same year came the famous "Manchurian Incident." Since then the militarists have been firmly in control. It should not be thought, however, that the people surrendered supinely. The press remained rabid against the expansionist policy. Kagawa said he believed 95 percent of the people were opposed to it and to the war which they felt sure would come out of it. In 1931 there were three abortive revolutions, followed the next year by the assassination, or attempted assassination, of a number of prominent liberals. In 1933 the Government withdrew from the League of Nations. From 1933 to 1936 there occurred various intrigues and rebellions, with the people slowly but surely losing out.

Even yet, however, democratic idealism was not dead, as many events during the last ten years have shown. One such was the discussion that arose over Professor Minobe's theory of the Emperor as the organ of the state in contrast to the contention of the militarists that the Emperor was above the state. The latter theory had been taught for more than 30 years and Professor Minobe's action in challenging it caused consternation. His books were banned and he himself was humiliated and forced to resign his position in the House of Peers and his lectureships in three universities. Despite this new victory, the "militant patriots" were far from satisfied, as the famous "incident" of February 26, 1936, shows. So widespread were the assassinations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and plottings that the Emperor himself had to take a hand, which he did by severely reprimanding the Army. That may be a hint that the Emperor is not hand in glove with the militarists and that if he had been free to act he would have checked them.

The year 1937 saw the sudden precipitation of the war with China — by another "incident," this time on July 7 — which marked the last step in crushing every vestige of liberalism. We must look in more detail at what led up to that event.

On January 21, 1937, the Diet reconvened with Hirota as Premier. In a stormy session the Army leaders were challenged as violators of the constitution and the injunctions of Emperor Meiji. This brought the resignation of General Terauchi, Minister of War, and the downfall of the Cabinet. General Ugaki, importuned to form a cabinet, attempted it and failed. No military man would sit with him, though the people all wanted him. His administration as Governor General of Korea had been too lenient for the Army. At last General Hayashi was called upon as being *persona grata* with his military colleagues. He had no sooner taken office, however, than his Government was vigorously assailed in the Diet by the veteran Ozaki, who severely criticized the China policy and the usurpation of political power by the military party. His speech called forth enthusiastic applause, but infuriated the Premier who, at last unable to contain himself, burst out with: "At such a time as this, one touch is liable to set off an explosion." It did, and that soon.

Naotake Sato, just back from serving as Ambassador to France, entered the Cabinet as Foreign Minister and immediately took the lead in a new conciliatory policy toward China, which, he said, he intended to carry out "with the support of public opinion." At the same time he tacitly criticized his chief for developing the trend toward war, declaring that "if the Japanese people make up their minds not to go to war there will be no war."

Summarily, then, the Diet was dissolved, producing a storm all through the nation. The press lambasted the Cabinet's action, one paper, the *Yomiuri*, intimating that the growing secretiveness in politics "must be partly due to the fact that some of the factors leading to these political changes could not bear scrutiny and that consequently those in power did not think fit to take the public into their confidence." In the ensuing campaign, the gendarmerie drew up a list of 16 points regarding which the candidates and their supporters would not be permitted to speak. The phonographic record of Ozaki's speech

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

criticizing the dissolution, and intended for use in the election campaign, was banned, as was also his pamphlet, "Denouncing Dictatorship," despite the fact that Ozaki had served in every Diet from the beginning, had once been Minister of Justice, later Minister of Education, and was twice Mayor of Tokyo. So far as is known at the present writing, he is still in the Diet.

The election returns on April 30 were surprising, in that the vote was much smaller than in the election of the year before. The people knew by now that elections were a farce and that the newly-elected Diet would be disposed of as summarily as the one just dissolved. The "Shakai Taishuto" (proletarian party) made surprising gains. In Kobe half the electorate voted for that party. Thirty-six seats were gained in all. Abe declared that the election returns showed that the nation was squarely against the Hayashi Cabinet and it must resign. Both of the leading parties in the Diet reiterated the same demand.

A month after the election, Hayashi did resign, and was succeeded by Prince Konoye, who found no difficulty in forming a Cabinet wholly subservient to the Army's wishes. Events now marched rapidly to their climax, even though the common man, knowing absolutely nothing of what was going on behind the scenes, was protesting vigorously in all the magazines and newspapers of the country against the Government's policy in Manchuria that was leading to war.

On September 4 the Emperor appeared at the opening session of the Diet and expressed "his will regarding the conduct of the war in China, which was solely," he said, "for the purpose of inducing China to reconsider her attitude so that peace may speedily be established in East Asia." He continued: "In view of the situation I expect that all of my subjects will faithfully serve the public and act in close union, so that the objective may be attained." After that there was nothing more that could be said by anybody. Their Emperor had spoken. God wills it.

When the *Panay* was bombed on December 12 sincere expressions of horror came from the rank and file of people throughout the country, accompanied by large contributions of money as a solatium. On December 13, Nanking was captured and raped. Two days later, 400 leaders of the proletarian party were arrested. They had been too active in fighting Fascism and in agitating against the "China Affair." Admiral Suetsugu, Minister of Home Affairs, in explaining the action, said that the Government was determined to uproot all such movements and asked the nation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to coöperate in making a clean sweep of radical ideas in order that the "brilliant victory of Japan may not be impaired." A few months later Premier Konoye said to the Diet: "Japan is now committed to continuous military effort until its objectives are reached," which implied, he said, "the facing of possible resistance from any of the foreign powers interested in the Far East. . . . A momentous task is before us, unparalleled in history."

In the same year all the political parties were greatly weakened. The Social Mass Party was reduced to complete submission, and Abe, the Party head, was set upon in his own home and beaten. The proletarian and rural parties were dissolved and their leaders jailed. A huge budget of 7,500 million Yen was passed. Leaders in the Christian churches were given a drastic questionnaire regarding God and the Emperor, and one of the foremost Christian leaders was humiliated and made to resign all public offices for misquoting in a speech one word of an Imperial poem by Emperor Meiji. After these events, there was hope of no other end than general war. The date chosen was December 7, 1941.

Why, it will be asked, all this detailed historical review and analysis? For the purpose of showing: first, that from the beginning of her history, the people of Japan have been under the domination of a small but powerful military caste which always sought to make its power absolute; secondly, that in spite of the gradual tightening of the military reins, there has been since the Restoration a strong progressive element of the Japanese people which has steadily attempted to curb the military dictatorship in the interests of popular government; and thirdly, to give room for the conviction that, though almost completely submerged at the present time, the democratic impulse is alive still and, following the complete defeat of the military régime, and given the encouragement of other nations, it may be expected to reassert itself and set up a reform government with which other nations can deal.

What conditions might be regarded as essential to the establishment of a new order in Japan? They may be stated as follows:

1. The existing Government, now in the entire control of the militarists, must be crushed in final and irretrievable defeat. Not until the militarist régime has been completely discredited can we hope for the emergence of a stable government able to promote the real welfare of the Japanese people. But once this has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accomplished, there is no reason to suppose that a sufficient number of strong and competent civilian leaders will not come forward, prepared and able to establish a government with which the other nations of the world can coöperate.

2. The continued sovereignty of the Emperor is indispensable for the realization of a people's government. Veneration of the Emperor and a readiness to yield completely to the dictates of his will are ingrained in the Japanese character. In practice, however, the Emperor has been a mere puppet, overawed and dragged about hither and yon by those able to command his services. There can be little question that he has the interests of his people at heart. If the turn of affairs made it possible, he might be expected to issue an Imperial Rescript completely abolishing the military dictatorship, as his grandfather abolished the Shogunate, and, like him, proclaim his resumption of complete sovereign control. This done, there is little question that the people would follow him gladly.

3. Besides completing Japan's military defeat and upholding the Emperor in his reassumption of power, the United Nations must also insist upon: a) The complete disarmament of Japan and her forfeiture of all conquered territories. b) The abolition of military conscription and the elimination of all military training from the educational system. c) The revision of the constitution, to the extent at least of abrogating the changes of 1909 which gave power to the military party. Other changes in the constitution must be effected to make it henceforth impossible for military leaders to go over the heads of the Cabinet and the Diet and adopt policies without the public knowledge and consent. This stipulation is most important. Mr. John Morris, for some years adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, expressed the opinion in an article in *Harper's Magazine* for February 1944, that the Japanese Government acted in good faith in carrying on its negotiations with our Government prior to Pearl Harbor. He believes that the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched without the sanction of the Government. This opinion is shared by Ambassador Grew, who has said that he believes not even Foreign Minister Togo himself knew war was at hand.

The above may be regarded as our minimum requirements from Japan. With them, however, should go one more condition which we ourselves must supply. We must guarantee the people of Japan that after they have established a government such as will meet the above requirements, they will be given complete

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

local autonomy, the right to trade with other countries, freedom of access to raw materials, and freedom to immigrate into other countries on a quota basis.

Doubtless it will be objected that the Japanese character, as proved by recent shocking developments, is so inherently bloodthirsty and cruel that henceforth it will be quite impossible to trust the Japanese in any capacity. To that one can only say that atrocities do not justify us in making undiscriminating denunciations. We must put the blame where it belongs, on the militarists and not on the common people as a whole. If we see exhibitions of barbaric cruelty among common soldiers, we must take them to be the inevitable consequence of a history during which military despots have made cruelty in its most repulsive forms an integral part of the war system. Not only have the leaders exhibited it in their own conduct, they have insisted on like conduct in their soldiers, drilling it into them as a prime essential of warfare. They have even made it a religion to them, part of the principle of being faithful to their Emperor's cause.

On the other hand, anyone who has had personal relationships with individual Japanese that have not come under the influence of the military regimen can cite innumerable instances where their Japanese friends have shown the utmost fidelity, even at the price of great personal sacrifice and danger. Ambassador Grew has given such illustrations, and every missionary has a hamper full of them. The writer saw so many demonstrations of esteem and affection for America and Americans by the Japanese people generally in recent years that he has never ceased to believe that if the vast majority of them had had their way this war would never have come to pass.

Among the Japanese people's characteristics through the ages have been an intense love of beauty in all its forms — nature, poetry, art of every kind — and a passionate fondness for little children. If we are to understand them at all, we must be able to see something more in them than the workings of sadistic cruelty. They must be released from their abject thralldom to the military ideology by means of a military defeat that will make them loathe the business of war forever. Then out of the ashes there will rise, we must hope, the true Japan that has always been struggling to be born.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICAN FACTS AND AMERICAN CRITICISMS

By Margery Perham

PEOPLE who live in a city get a wholly different impression of it from strangers who look at it from a neighboring hill. The two parties would find difficulty, if they could conduct a discussion by telephone, in coming to any sound conclusions about its architecture or layout. Much the same is true of an institution. It seems desirable, therefore, before discussing any part of that most controversial of institutions, the British Colonial Empire (as distinct from the dominions), to consider frankly the American and British views of it, in the hope that the distance which separates them may at least be measured, and even, possibly, narrowed.

The American view which reaches us through war's interruptions and by way of our shrunken newspapers may be put in the following brief and therefore blunt terms: "The British are guilty of a sin called Empire. They committed it against the American people until these broke clear of British control to become a nation. The Americans are innocent of any such a guilt. They thus are in a moral position to condemn Britain as they watch her continuing in her way of sin against other people. The situation is the more distressing to Americans as they are being asked, in this war, to defend and support the British Empire."

Now let us move over to the British angle of vision: "The American colonists were, in the main, an extension of the British people. They enjoyed a liberty then unknown to colonists of other empires. When a British government foolishly tried to restrict this liberty, the Americans, having reached a situation in which they could dispense with British protection, very rightly asserted their independence. The same expansive energy continued to carry both peoples forward. The Americans, finding a large and undeveloped continent at their doors, drove across it, and, indeed, beyond it. The British, confined to a small island, burst out into large and undeveloped regions overseas. Neither nation allowed the rights or interests of foreign states or of the native inhabitants to stand in the way of their main purpose. The British do not admit, in this context, any fundamental moral difference in the records and character of the two peoples."

All this has to do with past history. But Britain also makes a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claim regarding the present and future of her Empire. This, in so far as it refers to one continent, forms the subject of the present article.

II

Tropical Africa is appropriately chosen to illustrate Britain's position. Of the three main groups of Britain's colonial territories, it is, for obvious strategical and geographical reasons, the one which is likely to emerge from this transforming war with the least change, and to continue the longest thereafter with a minimum of change.

There is one internal reason for this which must be discussed at the start, as it takes us to the heart of the British misunderstanding with America. It is the backwardness of tropical Africa. Critics treat statements of the fact of backwardness with suspicion, on the ground that the British either exaggerate it in words or, still worse, prolong it by policy. Many of us in Britain have shared this view and consequent impatience in some measure. But the word "measure" is all-important. When we in Britain hear it said that the African colonies should be emancipated today or tomorrow we realize that we are working with different conceptions of time and on the basis of utterly different estimates of African realities from those used by American critics. It is ungracious and may be politically embarrassing for Britain to enlarge upon the backwardness of colonial peoples. It also is discouraging to them. That is why the central answer to the demand for their speedy emancipation is seldom given, or given in such general terms that it conveys little meaning and causes much suspicion.

How, then, are the British and Americans to find the common criteria for making the necessary political assessment? It cannot be made in an idealistic vacuum. The only method seems to be to translate Britain's problem into terms of America's own experience. America might, for example, be invited — though in a spirit far removed from that of *tu quoque* — to consider some of her own difficulties in the assimilation of backward citizens. She has found the betterment and education of the American Negroes no easy task, even though these are only a minority, cut off for generations from their African roots and forming a mere fraction of the most active, efficient and prosperous society in the world. There are also the remnants of the American Indians who, as a study of the annual reports of the Office of Indian Affairs reveals, have presented most stubborn problems to those charged with fitting them

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into their changed environment. It is against such difficulties as these that the immeasurably greater problems of African backwardness should be set.

In British tropical Africa there are nearly 50 million tribesmen, who have broken little or at all with their past, and who, instead of finding themselves a small part of a vast new whole, are subjected to the relatively weak and uneven influence of a mere handful of white officials and missionaries. Add to this the fact that the period during which there has been anything like close and full administration is little more than a generation, even in favored areas, and in others has hardly begun. By far the greater part of British tropical Africa was only being occupied in the early years of this century, and the preliminaries of establishing law and order, roughing out forms of administration, driving the first lines of communication into huge, inhospitable regions, and initiating social services, had hardly been completed by the outbreak of the First World War. Tropical Africa was involved in the hostilities and suffered also from the ensuing shortages of staff. Then followed a peace of boom and slump which struck the new unbalanced tropical economies with peculiarly damaging effect.

A nearer view of African backwardness may help to explain both the problem and the pace of its solution. The writer can claim to have such a view in some degree, having spent several years studying and travelling in almost every part of British tropical Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, not only by plane, motor car, river steamer and railway, but on horse, mule, camel and foot.

Except in a few favored regions of the vast area in question, most of the people with whom the first British administrators in the first decade of the twentieth century had to deal lived on a bare subsistence basis in little dark huts made of sticks or mud. Their lives were bound down to poverty, not by any inherent racial inferiority but by the violent whims of a capricious climate and the attacks of wild beasts, tribal enemies and the tropical diseases which flourished in their own bodies and those of their domestic animals. Moreover, they were divided into many hundreds of completely independent units, mutually hostile, and possessing hundreds of different languages and cultures. These material facts are also facts of great political importance. No "progress" by American standards was possible until British administrative officials — often with proportion of one to thousands or even tens of thousands of Africans — had checked tribal wars,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

won some measure of confidence from conservative and suspicious chiefs and elders, and shifted a subsistence economy, in some fractional part, to an export and money basis. Only so could they raise taxes with which to finance the first desperately needed social services and public works. It is necessary to say all this because so many critics of European administration in Africa, even those who have made brief visits to the continent, ascribe the poverty, which despite all the changes of the last quarter of a century is still an outstanding feature of African life, to the neglect or even the positive action of the British Government.

To deal with poverty, ignorance and inertia on the immense scale in which it exists in tropical Africa demands, ideally, a proportionately immense effort. This has to be generated in the metropolitan country, and to do so between the two world wars did not prove easy for the British, distracted by many internal problems, new and old, as well as external dangers. Since we live in a real world and not an ideal one, it may be asked what other country in those particular years would have had the knowledge and devotion to do better. Perhaps Britain might have learned more from Russia's experience in raising the standard of living of masses of people. The two cases are not, however, really comparable. The culture-bearers in Russia were some millions in number, if we count members of the Party and their assistants, and they had leaders who were fired by revolutionary ideas and were ruthless in method. Their task was to push their influence outward over a vast but continuous stretch of territory and to act upon peoples with whom they shared common languages and a long history and who were not divided from them by any single clear racial gulf. In order to judge accurately the effort that has been made in British Africa we would not only have to be aware of the varying conditions of a dozen different territories, but to read the annual reports for each territory of almost a dozen departments of government over as many years, and also to survey the scientific researches that lie behind the activities of these departments. An understanding of the subject as a whole must be based on a knowledge of these details. Fortunately Lord Hailey has summarized much of this vast material in his great "African Survey." Certainly no critic would be justified in judging the British record who had not studied at least that work.

The charge that all this African poverty and backwardness is due mainly to British exploitation is a blind sweeping blow that utterly fails to hit the really vulnerable spots. Africa is a poor con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinent in almost every way apart from some very localized mineral wealth. The whole of Africa south of the Sahara provided in 1929 only 2.8 percent of world exports. Even the proportion of primary products for 1935 was only 2.8 percent. It must be remembered that these figures include the Union of South Africa, a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth, and all the non-British territories. British tropical Africa offered no essential product in important quantity except Northern Rhodesia's 12 percent (1934) of the world's copper. Among foodstuffs, the only striking figure is 57 percent of the world's cocoa. It contributes 43 percent (1933) of its palm-oil, which is, of course, only one of the world's nine main vegetable oils. To see the development of African production in terms of immense British profits is to disregard all the published figures, except in rare and generally short-lived instances; to connect it with monopoly is to ignore the outstanding problem of colonial economics, which, in many of the interwar years, was to find markets at prices which would repay cost of production to European and African farmers.

Discriminating criticism would probably find its best target in the practice of collecting large numbers of raw tribal laborers in certain mining areas. Since southern Africa is no longer an imperial responsibility, this criticism must in the present connection be directed mainly to the copper belt in Northern Rhodesia. Here British and American capital is permitted by the colonial government to maintain two complementary evils. One is the concentration of about 26,000 Africans (prewar figures), some of them from distant areas, as so-called "migrant labor." These men, adults in their prime, leave their homes for a year or more at a time to work in the mines, thereby seriously disturbing tribal and family life. The men may gain physically from regular rations and labor, but they are unlikely to become good farmers, husbands, fathers or members of the tribe. Most of the women stay home and try to do all the heavy agricultural work; but some follow the men to the labor lines to become prostitutes. The complementary evil is that the men are for the most part treated and paid as temporary bachelor labor. The influence of white labor from the south is working successfully to establish a color-bar to prevent the blacks from improving their skill and pay; and government and industry are excused from the burden of providing the social services that established married labor would require. The native reserves are often very poor farming land. They provide cheap breeding-grounds for labor, inadequate maintenance for wives

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and children and a scrap-heap for discarded miners. In the last few years native labor riots have twice had to be put down with bloodshed. It is true that some doubts about the system are at last being expressed and some alleviations are under way. The factors in the problem have been summarized here in strong terms, however, to show that indefinite and generalized allegations about exploitation are far less effective than criticisms which go straight to a few real targets.

The same could be said of the frequent charges against the white settlers in Kenya. There are important inequities in the situation in that colony. But when American critics assert that the Kenya settlers have all the best land, while the natives are confined to the poorest, British critics of many specific conditions existing there are obliged to swing around and hammer in some facts on those who they had hoped were their allies. The truth is that though much of the "white highlands" is good land, much is dry and suited only for ranching, while the two largest, continuous blocks of fertile, well-watered territory are, with very minor encroachments, still in the hands of their original African owners.

American criticism seldom seems to be very specific about economic exploitation. The strongest attacks on imperialism from an economic point of view, inspired by Communist doctrine, seem to come from Negro intellectuals who have grievances of their own against white capitalism. They quite understandably find an ideological safety-valve for these grievances in attacks on the British Empire. It was the writer's impression when in America some years ago that this also was the case even then.

III

The main weight of American criticism falls squarely upon the political aspect of British imperialism. This part of the charge seems to us to be couched, as was indicated at the beginning of this article, in somewhat fundamentalist terms. These conjure up a picture of a strong Power destroying the independence of the weak and keeping under subjection nations which (in the inappropriate words applied to the Sudan by Gladstone, who tended to be fundamentalist himself when in opposition) are "rightly struggling to be free."

Unfortunately the conditions which made it so easy to annex colonial territories at the start make it correspondingly difficult to free them. Once modern means of transport had brought Euro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peans armed with modern weapons to the fringes of primitive lands, annexation by European governments became an urgent necessity. Up to that moment primitive society, however static and simple, had been fitted through centuries to its environment, and had its own equilibrium and vitality. But now with drink and rifles at their command, and new, dangerous ideas and ambitions, foreign and native adventurers had acquired terrible power. They could corrupt or destroy tribes which were unable to defend themselves or even to understand what was happening and what could happen to them. The worst of European governments — and the worst was very bad — was better than the alternative chaos. To understand this we have only to note what happened where pioneers outran government control on the moving frontiers of North America and South Africa, or when European and Egyptian slave-traders penetrated the innocent sanctuaries of the equatorial Nile or the first scum of traders reaching New Zealand exchanged guns, spirits and poison for tattooed heads and other native products. In the late nineteenth century Britain joined with a will in the process of African annexation. There was a time just after the middle of the century, however, when expansion there was contrary to her policy and her economic interest. Yet even in that period she found herself forced by the necessities of the situation in West Africa, and sometimes by the demands of the local tribes, to maintain or extend the power of her grudging settlements on the coast.

Since these annexations, Britain may perhaps be accused of lacking clarity of purpose and a sense of urgency in her task of educating tropical Africans for self-government. But there was never any possibility that self-government would be denied to them. Colonial officials from the first began shaping tribal institutions into local governments, even when they worked to no final design. They were acting upon a tradition which led to the development of dominion status for white colonies; there was no reason why it should cease to operate for brown or black ones.

The progress of some non-African colonies has already made this clear. Ceylon, the only colony comparable to the Philippines in its history and civilization, had before this war reached the threshold of responsible government. Twelve years ago it was given adult suffrage for men and women, by which 50 members of a State Council of 61 are elected. This Council is divided into seven committees which are in charge of the main branches of government and select seven out of the ten ministers. In the ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ministration only the highest directing posts are still reserved for Englishmen. The island has been offered full responsible government after the war under a constitution drawn up by the peoples' representatives. A similar promise has been made to Malta. Jamaica has been offered a constitution, upon lines hammered out by its own leaders, somewhat on the Ceylon model, including adult suffrage.

Even in tropical Africa there has been some advance. Thus, in west Africa, elected African members were added to the Legislative Councils in the early 1920's, and anyone who cares to read the proceedings can judge how great an influence these outspoken men are able to exert, in spite of the official majority. Quite recently, African members have been added to the Governor's Executive Council, the all-important, confidential body in which policy is discussed and legislation planned, and steps have been taken to increase the number and status of Africans in the civil service. The administrative service has hitherto been regarded as the holy of holies, but last year, in the Gold Coast, two young Africans, one a graduate of Oxford and the other of Cambridge, received appointments. In Nigeria, a committee upon which African chiefs and "intelligentsia" sat with officials has just recommended the same step.

All this represents an advance in the central, foreign organization imposed over a large area which had never known any unity before. Hitherto the more important task has been that of "indirect rule," the recognition and education of tribal communities as local governments. It is a highly flexible, illogical and empirical method, and it takes a hundred shapes according to the heterogeneous realities of tribal life to which it adapts itself. It has received its clearest form in Nigeria as a result first of the inspired expediency, and then of the wise rationalization, of Lord Lugard. Under "indirect rule" the people themselves carry out the vast majority of their affairs — judicial, administrative and financial — under British guidance. It is true that there have been places and periods in which British officials have been too lethargic in acceptance of an only partially reformed native government. Let it be admitted, also, that indirect rule could, at its worst, offer a temptation to preserve old lordships in the common interests of conservative chiefs and alien imperialists. In Africa, however, in contrast with some of the Indian states, even where the traditional forms of tribal government appear unaffected, the content is deeply changed. In more advanced units, tribal government in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cludes an audited local revenue, with a civil list; a police force; a public works department; reformed, supervised law courts; schools, hospitals and dispensaries; perhaps a forest department drawing its own royalties from foreign concessionaires or even exploiting its own timber. No more economical and penetrating expedient could have been devised for teaching peoples divided into small tribes the meaning of modern government and civic responsibility. We are now reaching a point where better ways of linking local and central government are required, and these are being developed. In the Gold Coast Colony the chiefs — extremely democratic potentates who rule by and through their peoples' will and are frequently "destooled" — are grouped into three provincial councils which elect representatives to the central Legislative Councils, where they sit alongside, and coöperate fully with, the elected, urban members. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan which is administered by British officials, a central Advisory Council has been set up this year, composed of representatives from Province Councils which, in turn, are really federations of tribal governments.

To the doctrinaire emancipator these must seem small advances. In order to appreciate their importance it is necessary to leave the sophisticated-looking capitals and ports, with their African lawyers, clergy, civil servants and merchants, and go on to see — as in Nigeria — the millions living their almost untouched life in the roadless bush; to visit the naked pagans on hill and plateau; to listen to court cases of witchcraft and inter-tribal fights and occasionally of cannibalism and ritual murder and the pawning of children.

Disunity as well as backwardness adds to the political problem. The semi-civilized Moslem emirates of northern Nigeria represent a different race and culture from the true Negro south, and they always regarded it as a land of pagans whom it was a duty to conquer or enslave. The Sudan is similarly cut in two. Such regional differences, in addition to tribal divisions, are deeper than those that have cracked some eastern European states. To say this is not to argue for eternal tutelage, but to suggest the necessity for a period in which African peoples may develop a common education — a habit of coöperation. The Gold Coast is more homogeneous and the southern of its three sections more ready for further constitutional advance than any other part of British tropical Africa. (One of its African Executive Councillors has recently been expounding his very sensible views

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about this in a committee room of the House of Commons and at Chatham House.) But Sierra Leone has its rift, an accident of history which, as in Liberia, planted a handful of freed slaves generations ago on the coast. They hardly show the sense of beneficent responsibility defined as "trusteeship" toward the primitive population of the large hinterland. And the Gambia, two river-banks cut off by another accident of history, is about as ready to stand alone as, shall we say, a Samoan island.

When we turn to east and central Africa, we find another obstacle to self-government. It is a major difficulty which has common features with America's own great racial problem, although American opinion seldom seems to give much weight to it. The population figures for these countries, with those for the southern self-governing territories (Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa) added for comparison, reveal the racial composition and suggest what the problem is:

Country	*Africans*	*Europeans*	*Indians*
South Africa	6,596,689	2,003,512	989,352 [1]
Southern Rhodesia	1,319,000	60,720	2,460
Northern Rhodesia	1,366,425	13,155	1,174
Nyasaland	1,672,787	1,847	1,748
Tanganyika	5,217,345	9,165	33,900
Kenya	3,280,777	20,894	44,635 [2]
Uganda	3,725,798	2,282	19,141

[1] Including colored.
[2] Arabs 14,077.

What of self-government under such conditions? The white minorities of the two southern territories have self-government and have used it to set up an economically and politically stratified society. The white minorities of the center and east look to them for their model. Yet British opinion, risking as deep and dangerous a clash as once split the United States, refuses to allow minority rule in the name of colonial self-government. Attempts of whites to construct eastern and central federations have hitherto broken against this British opinion, which supports the Africans of the territories next to Kenya and Southern Rhodesia in their fear of the dominant white settler influence.

If a regional council is established for Africa, or for this half of it, and the great conflict of principles noted above comes to an issue, what would be the opinion of an American representative? Would he ask for self-government? If so, self-government for whom? If he condemned the color-bar of South Africa, he would condemn one of the main results of the grant of colonial self-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government. (For just as, by the evidence of American historians, Britain strove to protect the Red Indians from the colonists and so added fuel to the revolutionary fire, so in South Africa, she struggled to the last in the interests of the natives.) And Britain still maintains a refusal, which is most embarrassing to herself, to hand over her three remaining native protectorates to the Union.

Would the American representative be directed to oppose white groups, when, as in the Southern States, these refuse to tolerate the exercise of full rights of citizenship by Negroes? He would observe that the Negroes in Africa are immeasurably more numerous and backward than those in America, and whereas equal rights for one-tenth of the population, and that tenth largely assimilated, could never be a serious danger to the whole American nation, the colonists in Africa can claim with some justice that for them it might mean the utter submergence of their one percent or less under a vast flood of barbarism. Might he not in the end be inclined to agree that, in this dilemma, the arbitral power of the British Government must for the present be maintained?

If we turn back to the economic questions which were raised earlier, we see that here too an American regional representative will face some awkward problems. We in Britain have spent the last quarter of a century learning that a democratic polity is largely sterile unless wedded to a democratic economy. Most people here in Britain think the public interest requires that the huge powers of big business be brought under greater control by the state. Is not this control much more necessary where these business interests operate upon the weak and ignorant African peoples? There are many here, even in the right wing, who support the idea of a large infusion of socialization in the colonies. The Nigerian Governor who kept the coal fields as a state concern, and his successor who warned off Lord Leverhulme when he came there demanding big plantations, were no Socialists. It is very probable that in order to hold the ring long enough for Africans to take their first feeble steps in retail and wholesale trade, in coöperative production and in industry, an increasing measure of government financial assistance, with control of outside capital, may be found necessary. Investment may not therefore be in the form of the "private capital, free capital and competitive capital" which the president of the United States Chamber of Commerce advocated in England a few months ago.

British policy in this matter has not yet taken shape. A com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promise has to be found between a policy which discourages the external equity capital which is so much needed, and one which exploits the natural and human resources of the colonies — an exploitation which offends the rising standards of public morality and the emerging political and economic consciences of the colonial peoples themselves. The discussion, in which Lord Hailey has taken a lead, has covered: the possibility of creating a general investment fund upon which enterprises sponsored or approved by colonial governments could draw; the possible creation of public utility companies in which the governments held a controlling proportion of the shares; and a stricter and more scientific control of the direction of investment and the conditions of its operation. Obviously the emphasis might vary according to which political party was in power in Britain, especially since policy on the periphery in such matters is bound to be a reflection of that in the metropolis. But there is no reason to fear that the Labor Party, which has recently issued the most moderate and well-informed of all its colonial statements, is likely to embark upon sudden and violent measures. Foreign investment has, indeed, always been welcomed in British colonies and is needed more than ever in the coming years. But it carries political as well as social dangers. Situations might arise in which a weak people might be politically independent and yet economically subject, or might be in the political empire of one Power but in the economic empire of another. What nation, we may ask, will prevent its investors from despoiling a territory, will discourage color-bars and will foster long-term loans, bearing little or even no interest, as investments in the people themselves? Only, perhaps, the nation that knows from long experience the need for this restraint, and has the imperial pride and sense of obligation that arise from intimate personal relationships with its wards. If we can achieve this restraint, will American investors and their representatives help us to maintain it?

Here it may be noted that Britain has recently — and this was in the grim days of 1940 — made a decisive break with her former financial policy toward the colonies. She had already, in the previous ten years, assisted colonies that were in difficulties to the tune of nearly £12,000,000. This was, however, in the nature of and subject to the restrictions of poor relief, and the grant in the same period of another £7,000,000 for development was on a scale, and under conditions, which did little to break away from the old principle that each colony must be financially self-contained.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But in 1940 the need of generous external assistance for development was recognized and an annual grant of £5,500,000 was authorized for ten years. This sum was recognized from the first as being on a preliminary scale, and it is certain to be increased as soon as the end of the war makes it possible to spend even this amount. Already plans for development of all kinds, including research and higher education, are being vigorously worked out in the colonies and in Whitehall. But money is recognized not to be enough. The development must be of people rather than of things, and people are not passive instruments even for the most scientific and beneficent planning. They must be protected from dictation and educated into partnership.

Such, then, is the foundation upon which the postwar international or regional councils which are now being discussed will have to be built, as far as Africa is concerned; and such are some of the problems which they will face. The form of these councils presents another problem, since they might be asked to fulfill at least four purposes, each of them requiring a different type of membership: (1) Coöperation in matters of common concern, such as health, tsetse fly control, communications, etc. (2) The allocation of development funds — if such can be raised — and the provision of technical advice. (3) The safeguarding of the interests of the rest of the world (which have still to be defined) with regard to access to raw materials and other economic and political desiderata. (4) The expression of the world conscience with regard to the rights and welfare of the native peoples.

The Mandates Commission did not attempt the first two tasks. It found the third the most practicable. The fourth was, and is, almost impossible for the reason that a common world conscience does not exist. Something has been achieved internationally in the field of native labor, thanks to the skill and persistence of the International Labor Office. But in the more complex issue which is of greatest interest to Americans, the development of self-government, little could — and can — be done in Africa, so long as Britain is the only imperial Power there which is educating its subjects for self-government in anything like the sense in which Americans use this term. There has therefore been some bewilderment in England that Americans should have directed their criticism almost exclusively against Britain. Britain (alone, I believe, among imperial Powers) has officially welcomed the idea of regional councils upon which non-imperial Powers could sit. But if American opinion continues to concentrate all its attention and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disapproval upon only one of the several empires, will this not provide somewhat incomplete instructions to the American members of such councils?

IV

I have now touched on the chief questions that American criticisms of the British Colonial Empire seem to raise. They are not rhetorical questions designed to wound or retaliate. America's armed partnership with Britain throughout the Empire carries with it a right to criticize. Criticism is indeed the salt of empire, but it needs the full savors of knowledge. The influence cannot be good unless the criticism is fully informed.

As, in this sphere, light succeeds to heat, so the possibilities of coöperation will grow between two nations which have some distinct and complementary qualities to bring to the common fund. In the interests of power for peace, the solid, detached, continental strength of the United States needs to be linked with Britain's heterogeneous dominions and dependencies scattered through every part of the world. If Britain can still rise to her changing tasks she will for a period remain the heart of this Empire, a center that must now express itself less in power than in service. This service will be of various kinds; but in the case of the colonies discussed in this article it will include political control for some time.

The world oscillates between the need for progress and the need for order. Europe is perhaps more conscious than the New World of the moment's need for order. Nationalism, whether old and crafty or young and headstrong, must bow to that necessity, either now or after another world war. This seems hardly the time to weaken or abandon a system which, even if it is called an Empire, has yet shown its capacity to act as a setting and a training ground for weak and immature groups and also to fit itself into a peaceful and coöperative world system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SPANISH DREAMS OF EMPIRE

By Thomas J. Hamilton

TIMES have changed since the summer of 1940, when gangs of Fascists roamed the streets of Madrid shouting their claims to Gibraltar, and the Franco government put up official posters laying claim not only to Cuba and the Philippines but to California, Arizona, Texas and Florida. In those exuberant days Fascist toughs stoned both the British and American embassies, Fascist newspapers made daily attacks upon the "decadent pluto-democracies" in the best Goebbels style, and either Franco or his brother-in-law Serrano Suñer delivered a weekly speech attacking the Allies and threatening that Spain would enter the war at any moment.

Now, though the *Caudillo* himself may hang on for a time, he can probably do so only at the price of liquidating the rabble-rousing Falange and putting himself in the hands of the Army, the landowners and the Church. These, as we shall see, have intentions of their own which are contrary to the democratic principles of the American people. But at least they know Spain's weakness and are not likely to risk fighting a foreign war.

The imperial bombast in Spanish publications was as absurdly pretentious as in Mussolini's Italy; its great expectations were built entirely upon the hope of catching crumbs from Hitler's table. Only the most harebrained Fascists failed to understand that Spain's resources were so limited that she could not act independently, but only as an advanced striking base for the Nazis. If ever Franco could have been sure that the democracies were done for, he would have come in at that moment. But Mussolini's glaring miscalculation of June 10 was a standing warning against over-optimism, and the seizure of Tangier in June 1940 — as France lay on its deathbed — was Franco's first and only positive step toward fulfillment of his imperial ambitions.

Although Franco still allows himself the luxury of insulting the democracies — the most striking late example was his message of congratulation to the head of the Japanese puppet government in the Philippines — he has officially declared that his policy is now one of neutrality. The militia of the Falange were dissolved soon after the Allied armies began to make progress on the road to Rome, and the center of gravity is now shifting in the direction of such men as Count Jordana, the successor of Serrano Suñer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as Foreign Minister. It still is possible that Franco, realizing that the Rightists are only biding their time until Don Juan can be put on the throne, may fall back on the Falange, with all its empire-mongering, for support. But since Hitler is now powerless to help, the actual seizure of foreign territory seems to be beyond the realm of possibility. Whether the accent is to continue on Fascism, or on extreme conservatism of a traditional Spanish pattern, the Franco régime has lost whatever opportunity it had to win back the *Imperio* in Latin America and Africa by force of arms. Franco will never make good his boast of four years ago, when he inscribed in the Golden Book of the Archives of the Indies in Seville: "Before the ashes of our dead Empire, and with the promise of another."

However, Spanish imperialism is still a force capable of creating a great deal of trouble in the world. The special characteristics of Spanish Fascism in this respect warrant review and individual study.

II

Fascism in Spain was not merely a consequence of an unsuccessful war (the case of Germany) or an unsuccessful peace treaty (the case of Italy), but an outburst against nearly three centuries of humiliation. Mistress of the world in the sixteenth century, Spain had gradually fallen by 1898 to the status of a third-rate Power. There was some reëmergence of national strength and ambition under the semi-Fascist régime of General Miguel Primo de Rivera. With the advent of the Republic, however, expansionist hankerings were put aside more completely than ever before; the Republican constitution explicitly renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and it is obvious that without wars or threats of wars no empire can be won in the closely-settled modern world.

The domestic aspects of Spanish Fascism do not concern us in this connection, but it should be noted that the "Movement" was also a Castilian reaction against the growth of regionalism — involving the claims of Basques, Catalans, *Gallegos* and still others to home rule or outright independence — which the Fascists considered a potent cause for the decline in the might of Spain. But even more disastrous for Spain than regionalism, the Fascists maintained, was what they called the "anti-Spain" influence of the three great democracies, France, England and the United States. They argued that these countries, acting in turn

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or in concert, had pulled to pieces the empire of Charles V and Philip II.[1] Antonio Tovar, formerly Serrano Suñer's Under Secretary of Press and Propaganda, summed up these feelings in his book "El Imperio de España:" [2] "We recognize that our enemies of today are also those of yesterday; those who, after seeing us fallen, after destroying us as a world power and making us lose the dimensions of an empire, and after taking away from us, as a result of our exhaustion, all our determination and our will and our faith in the destinies of Spain, hold out to us the false hand of a tourist's curiosity."

The Spanish-American War was the final blow to Spanish imperial power. However, Ernesto Jiménez Caballero, in his "Genio de España," [3] gives a list of no fewer than 13 "'98's," or crushing defeats, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia and culminating in the Pact of San Sebastian, of 1930, under which the Republican parties agreed to work together in bringing down the monarchy.

For their sources of imperial inspiration the Spanish Fascists go back to Ferdinand and Isabella. It was Ferdinand who sought expansion on the Continent; it was Isabella who sent out Columbus. Some of the Fascist writers, such as José Maria Peman, believe that it was a mistake for Spain to have concerned herself with European aggrandizement, and regret that she did not concentrate wholly upon the world of Columbus's discoveries. The Falange has a place for Ferdinand; and its symbol, the yoke and arrows, is borrowed from the joint emblem of the Catholic Sovereigns. But the Franco school of imperialism considers Charles V and his son, Philip II, the principal architects of Spain's greatness — Charles, because he was German Emperor as well as King of Spain, and Philip because under him Spanish territories reached their greatest extent, embracing Portugal, the Low Countries, the Kingdom of Naples, Franche Comté, the Roussillon, and the vast territories of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in Africa, Asia, and North and South America.

With magnificent inconsistency, the Fascists claim that Spain won these vast territories because of her unique devotion to the

[1] Although it would be difficult to say definitely which of the three democracies they hated most, I believe that the *Yanquis*, because of the comparative recentness of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba, were their favorite objects of dislike. Many of them spoke with grudging respect of France — "admirable enemy," as the Fascists usually call it — or sometimes even of England. Toward us, however, as a Protestant, Anglo-Saxon democracy, and a new country besides, they managed to combine both contempt and hatred.

[2] Antonio Tovar, "El Imperio de España." 4th edition. Madrid: Aguado, 1941.

[3] Ernesto Jiménez Caballero, "Genio de España." 4th edition. Barcelona: Talleres Gráficos Rex, 1939.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Church, and lost them because of this same devotion. Following the example of various American writers, the Fascists picture Philip as gallantly devoting his life and his empire to an unremitting struggle against the heresy and frivolity of the Reformation and the Renaissance. Another passage from Tovar (a contemporary, we must remember) will give the unspoiled flavor of this doctrine:

> Spanish bones were to rest on every battlefield in Europe. And in a struggle, not for their own empire, not for the rule of Spain over Europe, but for the Empire, the sole Empire, the arm of Rome . . . for the salvation of all Europe by the Catholic religious faith. Spain hurls itself onto the path of spiritual unity, of humanizing the colored races and raising them to the dignity of Christians, to the conservation of undivided Christendom of the Middle Ages. Against the Protestants it raises the banner of Roman and true unity; against Rome, which with Leo X and Michael Angelo — who painted Christ in the nude as if he were Apollo — lost the Christian essence that Rome should represent, Spain presented its discipline, the ecclesiastical reform of Cisneros, its combative spirit, its sober black clothing, the paintings of El Greco. . . . Implacably and serenely, with the consciousness of a sad and firm duty, Spain was to burn its heretics at Valladolid and Seville, at popular and serious *autos da fé*, the grave fiestas of a nation that knows what it is doing.

And from Tovar we have the doctrine that the act of burning heretics was a favor to them, since it gave them an occasion to repent.

This Catholicism was, of course, a special and Spanish kind of Catholicism; it did not mean subjugation to Rome, for both Charles V and Philip II were excommunicated by a Pope who, as Tovar puts it, refused to fulfill his rôle as head of Christendom. And the sack of Rome was carried out by Charles V's soldiers. For all its devotion to the True Faith, and its intolerance of heretics, Spanish imperialism at times approaches perilously near what the profane might call anti-papal and anti-clerical notions. It stands for the virtual independence of the Spanish Church from Rome, and it insists upon the supremacy of the State in all important matters. Thus, although Franco has restored the full State subsidy to the Church, and provided for religious instruction in all government schools, he has been at outs with both the Vatican and with Cardinal Segura, Archbishop of Seville, and with Cardinal Vidal, Archbishop of Tarragona (who recently died in exile), and others. In all important disputes thus far he has had to give way. But if the Fascist régime had gotten itself firmly established it would have been a more dangerous enemy to the Church than was the Republic. The last of the 26 points of the Falange,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the charter of the Franco régime, says flatly: "Our movement will incorporate the Catholic spirit — of glorious tradition and predominant in Spain — in the national reconstruction. The Church and the State will arrange a Concordat defining their respective spheres. But the State will not permit any interference or activity which might lower its dignity or the national integrity." [4]

The empire was lost, according to these imperialists, because the British, French and Americans fought the "arm of the Church" unremittingly — and because the arm itself became too "liberal." The Fascist intellectuals insist upon their preference for the earlier Spanish monarchs of the House of Habsburg, as against the Bourbons, who ascended the throne in the person of Louis XIV's grandson in 1700. They explain that the Bourbons, while better administrators, lacked the devotion to the Church and to the greatness of Spain which distinguished their predecessors. And as the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg is now extinct, the Fascists join with the Carlist *Requetés* in extolling the merits of Ferdinand VII, perhaps the most bigoted and cruel of the Bourbons, and of the Carlist pretenders who twice revolted in the nineteenth century against the constitutional monarchy of Isabella II.

The *Falangistas* have tried to blend the ideology of the Carlists and their own movement by adopting the Carlist wars as the first of the "national movements" — that of Franco being the third — and by claiming such supreme reactionaries as Donoso Cortes, Vazquez de Mella, and Menéndez y Pelayo as the forerunners of Fascism. In the spring of 1937 Franco placed the seal of official approval on the doctrine by unifying Fascists and *Requetés* in the Spanish Traditional Phalanx of the Offense Councils of National Syndicalism (F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S.). The red beret of the Carlists and the navy-blue shirt of the Fascists were combined to make the official uniform. Except in their common hatred for democracy and democracies, it is difficult to imagine two systems of thought more different. Yet they have held together in Spain fairly well. In Spain things do not happen as they do elsewhere. And the Fascists and Carlists were correct and genuinely in harmony in one thing: before she could acquire an empire again, Spain had to regain the "will to empire" which she

[4] This is the official English translation, published in Arthur F. Loveday's "World War in Spain," London, 1939. Owing partly to disputes over the method of appointing Bishops, the Franco régime has not been able to arrange the promised Concordat.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had possessed in the great days of the sixteenth century. The Carlists and Fascists took the lead in instilling this spirit.

III

The charter of empire drawn up by the Fascists and officially adopted by Franco was sonorous indeed. The third and fourth of its 26 points read as follows:

> We have a will to empire. We affirm that the full history of Spain implies an empire. We demand for Spain a preëminent place in Europe. We will not put up with international isolation or with foreign interference. With regard to the Hispano-American countries, we will aim at unification of culture, of economic interests and of power. Spain claims a preëminent place in all common tasks because of her position as the spiritual cradle of the Spanish world.
>
> Our armed forces on land, on sea and in the air, must be as efficient and numerous as may be necessary to assure Spain's complete independence at all times and that world leadership which is her due. We shall restore to the armies on land and sea, and in the air, all the dignity which they deserve, and, following their ideal, we shall see to it that a military view of life shall shape Spanish existence.

Other points of the program are in similar vein, and included a grandiose pronouncement that "Spain is a destined unity in the universe." Anyone who noted the degree to which Spain had developed her resources, appraised the inefficiency of her Government, and understood the resentment of the defeated Republicans, knew that these dreams were impossible of attainment short of a Nazi victory, if then. The *Falangistas*, however, were insulated from a common-sense — that is, an "anti-Spain" — understanding of realities, and pressed their demands with complete conviction. Their claims made Hitler's seem almost modest. Wherever either Spain or Portugal had once ruled, or even been first in the line of discoverers, Spain was entitled to rule again. In view of the fact that Spain's possessions at one time and another had embraced half the world, this was a far-reaching program. The Fascist imagination ran riot; the Prado's collection of Italian and Flemish masters, for example, was the basis of a serious argument that Spain was entitled to reassert Charles V's rule over the regions in which these painters lived.

Since Spain is a nation of many races and languages, no attempt was made to copy the Nazi racial approach to a philosophy of world supremacy. The dogma of imperial Spain had a twofold aspect. First, Spain was destined to rule as the successor of the Roman Empire, for the Catholic Church was the successor of the empire, and Most Catholic Spain, of all nations, possessed the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

best title to the assertion of the Church's temporal power. Secondly, Spain was entitled to a prominent place in the Teutonic world, through the Goth and Vandal invaders of Spain, and the fact that Charles V (Charles I of Spain) was also Holy Roman Emperor.

Such a state of mind implied, of course, the most faithful partnership with Hitler and Mussolini. The imperialists were more careful, when concrete claims were concerned. After France collapsed it would have been logical, for example, for Spain to press her old-time demand to the Basque provinces of France, or to the French territory bordering on Catalonia, on the grounds both of ethnology and prior possession. But as Pétain's France was collaborating with Hitler, this would have produced complications. Moreover, Franco was committed to the extermination of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements, and thus was deprived of one of his most useful annexationist arguments. For these and other reasons Serrano Suñer, in an interview with the *Völkischer Beobachter* in October 1940, stated specifically that Spain had no territorial claims *in Europe*. With great self-restraint, in fact, Franco even refrained after the fall of France from annexing the tiny state of Andorra, which was allowed to stay under joint Spanish-French control.

Even greater restraint has been shown toward Portugal, a forbearance based in part upon gratitude for services rendered. Franco's cause would have been lost at the outset but for Salazar, who allowed the Nazis to pour their war supplies through Lisbon when no Spanish ports were available. The Spanish Fascists had definite designs upon the independence of Portugal, however. Official Spanish publications merely harped continuously on the theory that the "two Iberian sisters" had their greatest days when they were common subjects of Philip II. But *Arriba*, the Madrid organ of the Falange, and the more fiery *Falangistas* were less discreet in their demands for annexation. Franco himself held his hand, knowing that England would never tolerate a move against a country which is so vital to the British defense system as Portugal. His régime has contented itself with talking about what it calls an "Iberian bloc" for maintenance of "neutrality" in the Peninsula. This, in turn, if Franco's plans should work, would be the basis for a Catholic bloc including the France of Pétain, Italy, and possibly Poland. It is too early to say that this project may not be realized in one way or another.

The demand for the restoration of Gibraltar is the most justi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fiable in the imperialist program, and it is unfortunate for Spain that England will probably be less disposed than ever to hand the Rock back after the present war. If Gibraltar had not been a British possession, Malta could not have been supplied nor could the Allies have maintained or so advantageously improved their position in the Mediterranean. There was incessant clamor for Gibraltar in 1940 and 1941. Manuel Aznar, who was then Franco's Virginio Gayda, hailed the arrival of Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid (as France was collapsing) with a series of articles demanding that England hand over Gibraltar at once. And the German guns installed during the Civil War were manned on the heights above Algeciras and La Linea; they seemed ready for action. Gibraltar could have been made useless as a naval base at any time; the arsenals all face toward Spanish territory and are within easy artillery range. Franco's impatience was easy to understand. But he never dared give the necessary order, and it was the Vichy French, not the Spaniards, who bombed Gibraltar after Oran.

Spain's demands for territory across the Strait in Africa have been slightly more successful. Taking advantage of the impending collapse of France, Franco occupied the internationalized city of Tangier on June 14, 1940. In violation of his agreement with the British, Franco has since liquidated virtually all the international governmental machinery in Tangier, and, although still not formally annexing the International Zone — an area of about 225 square miles — has made it subject to the laws of Spanish Morocco. The British are, of course, greatly concerned lest Tangier be fortified, thus strengthening the Spanish position on the African side of the Strait, for Cape Spartel commands the western entrance of the Straits.

Spain's interest in Tangier is symptomatic of the African school of thought developed under Franco. It is ironical that this area adjoining Spain was neglected while the *conquistadores* were pushing out to the ends of the earth. After her defeat by the United States and the complete loss of the overseas empire, Spain began to show real interest in Africa; but then she was hampered by England and France, who were most unwilling to see a third Power installed at the western gateway of the Mediterranean. Spain did at last acquire rights to what is now Spanish Morocco. But misfortune pursued her. She spent many years in an effort to conquer the Riffi; and the great disaster of Anual, in 1921, cost her 10,000 men and threatened to undo everything she had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accomplished. The Spanish people made it plain that they had no desire for empire, and Primo de Rivera seized power in 1923 with the pledge that he would make peace. Afterwards, however, he was able to obtain the coöperation of the French in a joint campaign which finally brought about the subjugation of the native tribes.

Franco won his reputation fighting the Riffi. Perhaps the sole part of Franco's political beliefs about which there is no question is that he was, and is, an *Africanista*. So were most of the successful generals on his side. Under their encouragement, therefore, the imperialists have beaten the drum about Africa ever since the Civil War began. The census figures of Oran three centuries ago were cited to show that this city ought to belong to Spain, and the Spanish domination of the name of Casa Blanca was used to support the argument that Morocco also was inherently Spanish.

Although some of the more outspoken Fascists wanted to take over all of northwest Africa, the official presentation of Spain's demands — "Reivindicaciones de España," published in the summer of 1941 by the Falange's Institute of Political Studies — was relatively moderate. It demanded only Gibraltar, Tangier, *all* of French Morocco and most of Algeria plus a broad strip of desert from the southern reaches of Algeria to the Atlantic below Rio di Oro. But given the northwest corner of Africa, Spain would control the sea and air routes through the Mediterranean, and from western Europe to Latin America and the Far East. Too late! The banners of the Allies now fly over all these strongholds beside that of France, again a partner in the war against Franco's Axis sponsors. But it is interesting to recall that Franco's failure to enter the war openly on the Axis side was due to a quarrel over the division of this territory. Everything, or nearly everything, concerned with his declaration of war was settled at his interview with Hitler at Hendaye in October 1940. Mussolini refused to accept their bargain because he wanted Casa Blanca and Gibraltar himself. Franco, dissatisfied with his revised share of the spoils, thereupon contented himself with pro-Axis "non-belligerency," which included, of course, the use of Spain as a Nazi espionage base and as a channel for the importation of vital raw materials.

IV

The Spanish Fascists entertained even more far-reaching ambitions for Latin America, and these have not been cast aside. "Reivindicaciones de España" dealt primarily with Africa, but it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made plain that there were other claims. Thus its authors declared:

> In this work, it was intended to proclaim above all else *the necessity of a foreign policy for the motherland.* And Africa, although it is one of the indisputable bases of that policy, is not the only one or even the most important; Spain lives in a peninsular symbiosis with Portugal, the flesh of her flesh and the original key of her existence. At one and the same time Spain looks out upon the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Finally, Spain is the head and spinal column of the Hispanic world scattered over the globe. For our generation has nothing to do with doors half-opened. One by one it wishes to open all, destroying at the same time the wall of lack of understanding and fear with which a certain door, once open, has been sealed up. Our uneasiness must watch all horizons and slopes. Spain cannot limit her new foreign policy to the circumscribed space of a parallel or a meridian.

It is not true that Franco has been "playing Hitler's game" in Latin America. He has been playing his own. But it happens to be just as hostile to the United States as any that Hitler has tried and is thus, in effect, working in Hitler's interests. The recovery of the Philippines was a definite aim, although Franco perceived that Spain would for the time have to make common cause with Japan against the United States. Not even the wildest *Falangista* really ever believed that the Spanish flag would again fly over any of the twenty nations of Latin America. But there is ample evidence of the Franco régime's determination to assert itself in that area to the maximum. Such actions as the breaking of diplomatic relations with Chile, the simultaneous cultivation of close relations with Argentina, Peru, and other countries having authoritarian governments, carry their unmistakable meaning.

The most significant single step was the formation of the *Consejo de Hispanidad* on November 2, 1940, with the announced aim of succeeding to the rôle once played by the Council of the Indies. What Franco and his imperialist intellectuals dreamed of was a league of totalitarian governments stretching all the way from Cape Horn to the Rio Grande. Whether they would be out-and-out Fascist governments or would merely lean to Fascism would depend on local conditions. These governments, from the very nature of things, would be coöperative with Franco, as indeed some of them are already. Fascist Spain, therefore, would be in a position to act as their spokesman and tutelary genius in the same way that England, as a democracy, acts in many things for Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the autumn of 1940 General José Varela, then Franco's Minister of War and not a *Falangista*, stated that Spain, with this support, would be the only Great Power in the world besides Germany.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Hispanidad program is the means adopted to "soften up" Latin America. It was set forth in its entirety in Ramiro de Maeztu's "Defensa de la Hispanidad" (Madrid, 1934). It is a characteristic expression of the Spanish imperialist mentality. The imperialists in truth recognize no limitations of meridians or latitudes. Allan Chase, in his book "Falange," has revealed the rôle that José del Castano, Spanish consul-general in Manila, and head of the Falange in the Philippines, played in the collapse of the civilian defense system there. The United States has had difficulties with Franco agents in Puerto Rico as well as in the independent Latin American countries. The recent coup d'état in Bolivia is an example of the influence of Hispanidad.

Spanish imperialism remains a dangerous force in the world even though its territorial aspirations have been defeated. If imperialism were just a matter of running up a nation's flag over another's territory, Franco's schemes could be dismissed out of hand. If, as is quite likely, he himself is superseded by an old-fashioned military dictatorship, with a healthy respect for the might of Allied arms, the more fanatical aspects of Spanish imperialism will be gone for good. But just as the military caste in Germany will remain a danger even after the overthrow of the Nazis, the Spanish Rightists also will remain a problem. Count Jordana, Franco's Foreign Minister, has already told an American journalist that Spain expects to get a good reward out of the postwar settlement. He feels that she deserves enrichment, not in spite of her neutrality, but merely because of it. This, coming from a grandee who is supposed to be anti-Falange, is significant. If by chance we have a reactionary world, or even merely a reactionary western Europe, a reactionary Spain might at last have her opportunity for leadership in a new age of Metternich.

Such a régime in Spain could do us even more harm in Latin America and the Philippines than an avowedly Fascist one. It would be no less hostile to us, and it might have more influence. The anti-clerical aims of the Falange disturbed some of the Latin American first families. The extreme Rightists among our good neighbors were never very enthusiastic about such symbols as the Fascist salute. Their solution was always a dependable dictatorship, based on the sound principles of suppressing labor unions and of being as hostile to the United States as was compatible with the personal investments of the dominating caste. Only democratic governments in both Spain and Latin America can effectively lay the ghost of Philip II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LABOR AND THE PEACE

By George Soule

THE present war has been called not only a war but a revolution. If this were true, we should look for the revolutionary impetus to arise mainly from labor. Yet it is difficult to discern any such drive among the workers in any of the fighting nations. Of course, when the German armies have been defeated the populations of states subjected to Axis tyranny may be expected to overthrow Nazism, Fascism and their collaborators. In so far as Nazism and Fascism were violent revolts against twentieth century civilization this will be an anti-revolutionary movement. The peoples concerned may not want to restore everything just as it was: they will undoubtedly wish to resume their struggle for a world in which there will be a closer approach to security and abundance for all. But if they can adapt old institutions to that end, they will retain them. Once they get back their freedom they will want to go on from where they were, though perhaps in a different direction from that in which they have been led in recent years.

The labor movements of Europe have been crushed and scattered, so that it is difficult to know just what their programs are. To the extent that we have been able to keep in touch with the underground, however, it appears that they are far less concerned than before the war with the struggle against traditional domestic opponents except where these have aided the foreign conquerors. All elements from left to right seem to have united in France, for instance, to help throw out the Nazis. Their rallying point is not so much a new social order as the independence of their country; indeed, their devotion to national tradition is so fervent that it overshadows the customary prewar internationalism of labor, and may even become embarrassing in the task of world organization. A reversion to nationalism, not merely by the old European ruling classes but by labor itself, may be one of the immediate consequences of this war.

The influence of a victorious Soviet Union on the future of the workers, especially in Europe, will undoubtedly be great. One would have supposed that here one would find the chief source of revolutionary activity. Yet the Soviet Union seems to have become, in terms of its own culture, one of the most conservative forces in the world. Obviously it is concentrated on preserving

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and developing its own revolution of a quarter-century ago, and for this purpose has revived nationalist tradition and even is coöperating with the Russian Church. It must be free from the menace of foreign attack, and therefore wants Europe tranquil and stabilized rather than disturbed. Moreover, it must remain on terms of close coöperation with Britain and the United States, and to do this it must refrain from fomenting proletarian revolution anywhere.

The United States has received a startling proof of this tendency in the decision of the Communist Party in this country — which was not affiliated with the Third International before that body was dissolved — to end its organization as an independent political party and to support private enterprise. It will not even advocate nationalization of specific industries such as railroads or banks. However much one may suspect the intellectual and political integrity of the Communists, there can be no doubt that they fervently wish to follow the policy which they believe the Soviet Government has espoused.

They are not alone in this reversal. As Paul Wohl recently pointed out in the *New York Herald Tribune*, the French Communists, who had always opposed colonial imperialism, have declared for the preservation of the French colonial empire. A resolution which they have presented to the consultative assembly at Algiers proposes to "fuse the empire and France into a single economic unit." The Italian Communists, through their leader, Dr. Eugenio Reale, have refused to join the anti-monarchist movement sponsored by Adolfo Omodeo, of the University of Naples, and others of Count Sforza's Action Party. Similar conservative attitudes are observed among Communists in Jugoslavia, the Scandinavian countries, Latin America and Asia.

Mr. Churchill, though the ardent leader of resistance to the Axis challenge, is of course a conservative. Mr. Roosevelt is primarily a conservative too, strange as that statement may seem to his domestic political opponents. His rôle in this country has been essentially that of the more advanced Tories in Britain — to give ground when popular pressure arises and to carry into effect the reforms which labor and agriculture demand, without thereby sacrificing the basic structure of our economic order. Chiang Kai-shek was, before this war, the hated enemy of the Chinese revolutionaries of the Left; he too, like Stalin, is now the conservator of a former revolution. Seen in the light of what these four are trying to do, this is an anti-revolutionary war and will not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have a revolutionary outcome. Each of these leaders has, at least for the time being, the overwhelming support of labor in his own country.

II

British labor is, in politics, traditionally Socialist. Nobody expects, however, that it will be extreme in its demands, or that even if it should want sudden and sweeping changes it will be successful in getting them. Its leadership for many years has been roundly abused by the forces of the Left for lack of imagination and for its feeble opposition to the established régime; but there is little sign that it will either develop or support leaders of a more aggressive type. The economic structure of Britain has a curious way of becoming modified and adapted to new necessities while the strongest advocates of such modification suffer a series of almost uninterrupted political defeats. The Conservatives have held office in Britain for many years, with a few brief exceptions. Yet Britain is far in advance of the United States, as well as of most other countries, in such things as social legislation and public housing. It has even a sort of semi-socialization of industry, arrived at by schemes which merge private ownership with governmental control, or vice versa. Whatever Britain is, it is almost never doctrinaire, and one has to be a doctrinaire to be a successful revolutionist. The same process of important but almost imperceptible change will probably continue in Britain after the war, with the tacit consent of British labor. And Britain's enormous influence on international affairs will be exerted by the same means and in the same spirit.

American labor is, of course, the least revolutionary movement of workers in any nation. It has never organized a national political party of importance, and when it has taken part in politics it has done so with a program which not only was non-revolutionary but also was non-Socialist. It concentrates traditionally on building up its own power as a collective-bargaining agency and on political and social reforms of immediate benefit. Though the split which led to the organization of the C.I.O. brought some changes in its internal structure and produced a far more inclusive membership, the newer industrial unions do not differ greatly from the older ones in political theory or action.

On the national scene, American labor is, on the whole, just as intent on preserving private enterprise as the owners and managers of industry themselves. As long as it is guaranteed the right

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to deal collectively with private employers, and can exercise that right, it looks with a good deal of suspicion on further governmental intervention. It cherishes freedom of action; it has found in many instances that government as employer is more difficult to influence than private corporations, because government contains that mysterious essence called "sovereignty" and can give orders to the police. It finds that even a liberal like Mayor La Guardia of New York, whom it has strongly supported, declares when he is involved in a dispute with the unions on city transit lines that workers have no right to strike against the Government. It is uneasy over the war restraints now imposed by governmental agencies, as well as over the scant representation afforded it in these agencies by an administration which has enjoyed its almost undivided loyalty at the polls. It is far from eager to have government play a rôle in its own jurisdictional disputes, or to exercise over its accounting or other internal affairs the kind of supervision which is being extended over large areas of business. And many of its leaders believe that one kind of intervention leads to the other.

Labor knows how to preserve private enterprise far better than does an organization like the National Association of Manufacturers. It continually presses for those modifications which can make private enterprise tolerable to workers who might otherwise wish to abolish it. Shorter working hours, better working conditions, better pay, a sense of freedom and independence through the backing of a powerful union in the adjustment of countless grievances in the shop, and finally, in advanced cases, a sense of partnership in the enterprise through a sharing of responsibility for production — these are real and immediate values in the life of the worker. They forestall any keen desire for fundamental alteration in the system. Social security and labor legislation of other kinds help patch up the system around the edges, and do so to some extent even in the periods when it tends to fail as a whole in supplying employment. The labor movement is largely responsible for the introduction of all these saving instrumentalities and reforms, often against the bitter opposition of the loudest champions of private enterprise.

One would scarcely expect to find a movement so intent upon domestic reforms taking an interest in any international revolutionary movement. As a matter of fact, the American unions have always been distinctly cool toward close affiliations with foreign labor movements which have had a more radical outlook. Even during the period of greatest crisis and danger in this war, an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effort made by the British unions to create a joint affiliation with American and Russian labor did not meet with approval from A.F.L. officials in the United States. In this case it was not the Communist philosophy of the Soviet unionists which constituted the chief expressed objection, but the fact that, according to the understanding of the Americans, unions in Russia are not free to engage in unhampered collective bargaining or to strike, but are in some sense an agency of the state. They consider the Russian state an undemocratic one. It makes no difference that this state itself is supposed to be an instrument of the industrial workers and has greatly improved their condition. The Americans like to take their freedom directly as unionists, and not as wards of a nominally proletarian dictatorship.

Sir Walter Citrine, who made the proposal for affiliation with the Russians on behalf of the British trade unions, did not include the C.I.O. in the invitation because of a fear that the A.F.L. would not coöperate with its great rival. If he had done so, he probably would have found a warmer reception, since the C.I.O. has gone on record in favor of an international trade union body, including representatives of the unions of all the United Nations. This is not to say that the C.I.O. unions are any less ardent supporters of free unionism than those in the A.F.L.; but their leaders have no tradition of aloofness to defend, and practise a somewhat less stiff trade-union etiquette in deciding with whom they will talk and vote.

The lack of international organization has not prevented certain sections of the labor movement, especially those with a background of European immigration or a substantial percentage of Jewish membership, from maintaining contact with the underground movements in the enemy and occupied countries, and extending help in their struggle against Nazi tyranny. Nor has it prevented a number of the more forward-looking leaders from making closer contacts with Latin American labor and exercising whatever influence they could in helping its efforts to improve its conditions. These efforts, incidentally, have found powerful aid in official circles in Washington.

The net conservative effect of the activities of labor movements like those in Britain and America has long been noted by scientific students of society as well as by revolutionary theorists themselves. The reasons for it are obvious. In so far as labor organizations establish themselves either as collective bargaining agencies or as office-holding political parties, they become, especially

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

within democratic states, institutions with vested interests. In order to flourish they have had to make their gains within the limitations which the going social order imposes; not only their political techniques but their very basis would disappear with the collapse of that order. The usual union leader becomes a skilled politician, devoted to keeping power, protecting vested rights, and advancing a little today and tomorrow — enough to prove his usefulness to his constituents, but not enough to upset the environment in which he operates. These facts are somewhat obscured by the revolutionary language inherited from the early days of struggle, when the hands of all other elements in society were turned against the pioneers of labor organization, and grandiose dreams took the place of tangible progress. But the relationship of the veteran labor leader of today to the revolutionary beginnings of the labor movement is much like that of the rector of a prosperous church to the early Christians — he often uses the old language, but it takes on quite a different meaning in a less obviously hostile environment.

III

The real hope of the advocate of revolution lies not in anything that established labor movements may do, but in the chance — which he usually believes is an ultimate certainty — that the environment in which they operate will collapse of its own inefficiency. Of course this hope is identical with the fear of intelligent conservatives, who do not believe that the existing order is in any great danger of destruction by its professed enemies, but are concerned lest it destroy itself through failure to adjust to new conditions.

It is from a desire to make the present system operate satisfactorily that American labor is likely to influence the peace. Its leaders have been overwhelmed with the day-to-day problems brought by the organization of the war economy, and they have not yet had time to develop more than very general programs for the future. In tentative program making, as is usual, the pioneers have been those not tied to institutions, whether governmental or private. Those in the midst of affairs have little time for speculation, and are inhibited on every side by considerations of prudence. For the early stages of social invention, free minds are required rather than institutionalized ones. Nevertheless, the more influential labor leaders, like the more influential employers and governmental personnel, are conscious that in order to avoid the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

danger of cataclysmic changes in the future — which history has shown them may adopt ugly and cruel as well as benevolent forms — a pretty rapid jump in social evolution must be induced.

First of all, they are so impressed by the dangers emerging in the war economy that, like the peoples of all anti-Axis countries, they want reliable guarantees against its indefinite perpetuation, as would happen in a condition of isolated nationalism. Even more immediately, they are concerned about the terrific jolt to employment which is likely to occur with the demobilization of industry, the accompanying cessation of government orders and the return of millions of job-seekers from the armed forces. After that crisis — if it is successfully passed — they fear the possible results of a postwar inflation and depression like that which followed the last war.

Labor on the whole will vigorously support the kind of world organization foreshadowed in the Declaration of Moscow, though in this country it had little to do with the preliminary thinking which led up to this achievement. Its main energy, however, in so far as it has any time to divert attention from daily chores, is now devoted to the domestic problems of readjustment and the maintenance of a healthy, expanding economy after victory. Secondarily, it will pay attention to international economic institutions. In Britain and on the Continent labor is naturally more aware of the interdependence of national and international economic affairs than it is on this side of the Atlantic. Perhaps it is fortunate that attention to the domestic problem is paramount, since full employment in the great industrial nations is the essential basis of a healthy economy throughout the world.

Both the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. have postwar planning committees. The former is under the chairmanship of Matthew Woll, an extreme right-winger in labor politics, though it also includes such relatively progressive individuals as David Dubinsky, of the Ladies' Garment Workers, and Dr. John H. Childs, of Columbia University. The C.I.O. committee is headed by John Brophy, for many years a liberal opponent of John L. Lewis in the United Mine Workers. Neither committee has more than begun its work, but both submitted interim reports to their respective conventions last autumn. The A.F.L. in Boston and the C.I.O. in Philadelphia adopted several resolutions on this subject.

There is substantial agreement in their recommendations so far. Two subjects have occupied most of their attention — extension of social security and the somewhat technical matter of reconver-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion of industry to civilian production. Both organizations support the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, which changes the present social security law in numerous ways, principally by extending its coverage, increasing the benefits, federalizing the unemployment compensation system, and adding health and disability insurance. This is the present American counterpart of the Beveridge Plan, which of course is on the agenda of British labor. It is, however, considerably less sweeping, and differs in important details; for instance, it continues our practice of varying the benefits according to the previous income of the recipient, rather than attempting to establish a national minimum.

Both labor organizations favor the establishment of an agency composed of representatives of management, labor, agriculture and government to supervise reconversion and the transition to a peacetime economy. The C.I.O. favors job seniority rights for discharged servicemen over war workers, dismissal wages for war workers, and the continuance of pay for demobilized soldiers until they can find jobs, together with educational opportunities. Both favor a strengthened federal employment service. Both stress the fundamental importance of maintaining a full-employment economy and abolishing poverty, not mainly through relief of the unfortunate but through large and expanding production. The statement in the annual report of President Philip Murray of the C.I.O. is typical: "The United Nations in war are conquering tyranny abroad. The United States in peace must conquer unemployment and poverty at home. . . . The nation has shown remarkable prowess in producing a Niagara of materials for war. This demonstrates that it has the knowledge, the skills, the machines and the resources to produce a 'gold standard of living' for every American."

An interesting lead has been given by the Labor-Management Planning Committee of the electrical construction industry, which represents equally the National Electrical Contractors Association and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. A preliminary report surveying the future possibilities and requirements of the industry contains the following statement, which though not particularly original is arresting when coming from such a source: "The difference which lies between the old and the new economy is principally a question of emphasis. In the old economy the emphasis was on production; in the new economy the emphasis is on consumption and distribution. In the old economy the goal is directed toward profits and in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new economy the goal is directed toward full employment. . . . The flow of money is the key to the new economy."

Both British and American labor are converted to the necessity of nationally planned production and a steady flow of purchasing power in the hands of consumers. The concept of laissez-faire is dead in Britain, as in most other countries, even among the leaders of private industry and finance. British labor is inclined to recommend public enterprise as an essential of planning, while other elements in the community would use it only in special instances, and elsewhere would substitute self-government in industry with a liberal admixture of governmental control.

In America, labor conceives of planning, not as a solely governmental process, though it admits the necessity of governmental participation, but as a democratic activity in which labor, agriculture and business are to play equal parts. In one notable pronouncement, issued jointly by the business, labor and agricultural committees of the National Planning Association, it is asserted that the major reliance for employment must be private enterprise, but the corpus of private enterprise is conceived as embracing not merely employers, but labor and agriculture as well. The rôle of government is regarded not primarily as that of employer, but rather as that of regulator in the traditional sense; and one of its duties is declared to be that of creating a favorable environment through a correct fiscal policy.

What fiscal policy is to be favored is a matter that is far from settled in the minds either of labor or of the employers who are willing to give thought to it. Few representatives of either understand in detail the theoretical reasoning behind the Keynes doctrine of over-saving and under-investment. One offshoot of this doctrine — that taxes should be so arranged as to provide an incentive to venture capital — will make a strong appeal to business and may be accepted also by labor. The usual remedy to which the theory leads is that investment by government shall make up for any deficiency of private investment. This of course is not popular with business, but is likely to appeal strongly to labor, especially in times of unemployment.

So far, international economic projects such as those for exchange stabilization, an international Reconstruction Finance Corporation or investment bank, or trade controls in the interest of equitable access to raw materials, have been discussed in such technical terms and by such limited groups of American citizens that they have made little impression on most leaders of either

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

business or labor. However, the progressive forces in both seem to be convinced of the desirability of an expanding foreign trade, of higher standards of living and better nutrition especially in the more backward regions, and of the foreign investment and industrialization which can lay the basis for these advances. It is easy to demonstrate — far easier than it was in the days of preponderant economic nationalism — that these things can be achieved without detriment to our own standards, and indeed are necessary to maintaining them.

American labor has from the start actively sponsored and participated in the International Labor Organization of the League of Nations. It can be counted on to favor the strengthening of this type of activity under any scheme for world-wide industrialization, not merely from humanitarian but also from selfish motives, since it will not want to be subjected, on world markets, to competition from the exploitation of "cheap foreign labor." In recent years it has not been much attracted by the argument that high protective tariffs can solve this difficulty.

IV

Social forces are pushing the world rapidly forward — labor, employers and politicians together. Reluctant as they may be to move, they cannot present a solid front against change because some among them can see that adaptation is necessary if a cataclysm is to be avoided. If labor is conservative, it is so in the sense of conserving as much liberty as possible by an adaptive process; it is not reactionary. In the past its function has been to persuade employers and the state to accept modifications necessary to popular welfare, including collective bargaining and labor legislation. So, in the future, it is likely to be in the vanguard of those who press for new changes on a broader scale.

In this labor will not be alone. History shows, however, that large elements among the chief beneficiaries of private enterprise are likely to fight bitterly against the very measures which are necessary for their own survival. The test will be whether they can be either convinced or out-voted before it is too late. If this war produces revolution, it will not be because labor now has revolutionary aims, but because under our social order — which, after all, is more flexible than the dogmatists of either Left or Right would have us believe — it is proved impossible to achieve the concrete objectives which the peoples of most nations now regard as essential.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KOREA IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

By A. J. Grajdanzev

THE declaration on Korea made at Cairo by the heads of the United States, British and Chinese Governments reminded the world of a problem which it had almost forgotten. Freedom for Korea is not an issue invented by the Allies to weaken Japan. During the 34 years that have passed since the Japanese annexed their country the Koreans have waged an unceasing struggle for independence. The Japanese "Annual Report on Administration of Chosen" for the years 1937–38, the latest available, spoke of "wholesale arrests" at that time of members of secret organizations aiming at liberation, of a force of at least 16,000 Korean soldiers fighting the Japanese along the Manchurian-Korean border, and of the formation of a provisional Korean government in free China.

But although the people of the western nations are once more aware that the majority of the people of Korea have refused to accept Japanese rule, they know little else about the situation there. The wording of the Cairo declaration is itself somewhat obscure, for it merely promises that Korean independence will be restored "in due course." This would seem to mean that, following the defeat of Japan, Korea must pass through a period of tutelage to prepare her for self-government, during which time one or several Powers will exercise a mandate of some sort. Various questions arise when we try to decide whether it is true that Korea is not ready for independence. Has she the economic resources to stand alone? What are her internal problems? Does she have the necessary experienced leaders? Then there is the final question, granted that a mandate over Korea is desirable, as to the country or countries which could assume it.

II

The Korean people form a distinct nationality in the Korean peninsula. In language, traditions and culture they differ sharply from their neighbors, the Japanese and Chinese. The Korean language, like the Japanese, has assimilated a great number of Chinese words, but it is a separate language. Moreover, though there are certain local deviations from the speech of Seoul, the capital city, the language spoken throughout the whole Korean territory of 85,228 square miles is remarkably uniform. Korean art, dress, food and customs, like the Korean language, have much in common with those of their neighbors; yet they remain distinct. The stubbornness with which Koreans resisted Japanese rule, while all the rest of the world looked away, suggests the tenacity of Korean nationalism. It is correct to speak of Korea as a separate nation. After the war Korea may expect a gradual return of perhaps a million of her sons, chiefly those now in Japan, who are unassimilated workers in factories, mines and fields. Her population will exceed 26,000,000. It will be about the same as that of Spain.

Japan's original program in Korea was designed to make the peninsula a base for expansion on the Asiatic mainland and a source of raw materials and foodstuffs. Gradually Korea was supplied with a good system of roads and railways (there were 3,427 miles of railways by 1939), not because Koreans needed it —

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are now less than one horse and cow cart per hundred of population, and practically no motorcars — but because this system of communications was extremely important for moving troops into Manchuria and to the Russian border. The Japanese closed Korea as an import or export market for foreigners; practically all the Korean raw materials which were exported were to Japan. In 1939, exports from Korea were valued at 1,006,794,000 yen; 73.2 percent (by value) of them went to Japan, 20.4 percent to Japanese-dominated Manchuria, 3.3 percent to the part of China occupied by Japan, and only .5 percent to European and American countries. In the same year Japan supplied Korea with 88.6 percent of her imports; of the remainder, 5.8 percent came from Manchuria and only 3 percent from Europe and America.

When Japan annexed Korea she found a typical oriental rural setup with rich landlords and numerous poor tenants the outstanding features. She wanted landlords who had a marketable surplus of rice and so did everything possible to strengthen the system. Three decades later the percentage of tenants and owner-tenants (those who have some land of their own, but are compelled to rent additional land) amounted to almost 80 percent of the total number of farmers. Following the rice riots which took place in Japan at the end of the First World War, the Japanese undertook an intensive development of Korea as a granary of the Empire. Through various devices, moreover, they appropriated at least one-quarter of the cultivated area of the country, including especially the rice fields. Almost half of the annual yield of rice has been exported to Japan, as well as a large proportion of other agricultural products. Even when crops are normal Korea is herself short of food. Governor-General Ugaki remarked in 1934 that the Korean farmers "would dig out and eat roots of trees on the mountains and fields or would beg from every door to keep themselves alive." Evidently the agricultural measures undertaken by the Japanese Government in Korea were designed to meet its own needs, not the needs of the local population.

Japan did not encourage the industrial development of Korea for a long while, but in 1929–30 there was a change of policy. Those were the years when the Japanese militarists began to plan their conquests and to prepare for the great war which they openly advocated. A rapid development of industry followed. The gross value of manufactured goods rose from 327,000,000 yen in 1929 to 1,873,000,000 in 1941 (partly, however, due to inflation). Greater and greater investments have been poured into Korean industry ever since, and by the end of the war Korea will probably have made substantial progress in developing a heavy industry, including machine-tool plants. Even as late as 1938, however, 76 percent of the Koreans were occupied in agriculture.

What are Korea's chief natural resources? Her cultivated area is about 11,000,000 acres, or less than half an acre per head of the population. As the country is mountainous a great increase in the arable acreage cannot be expected; perhaps 3,000,000 acres could be added if large investments were made for the purpose. But climatic conditions in some parts of the south permit gathering of two and in certain cases three crops yearly from the same land, so that the yield for the country as a whole is the same as if the cultivated area were 35 percent larger. At present the yields are very low, in most cases only half those prevailing in Japan. Moreover, the possibilities of irrigation are far from exhausted. With improvements, then, the population of Korea could be better supplied with foodstuffs than either the Japanese or Chinese.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Korea is now producing as much cotton per capita as India. She has a considerable production of beans and oil seeds, and certain possibilities in production of hemp, flax and sugar beets. She is an exporter of silk and has enough raw materials to produce rayon and staple fibre. Thus she may easily reach self-sufficiency in the chief textile materials except wool. Forest area occupies 74 percent of the total area, but much of it is practically worthless; good stands of forest remain only in the north. Many areas could, however, be reforested. The sea near the Korean shores abounds in fish and the annual catch since 1937 is about 1,800,000 tons — more than that of the United States.

Korea is not rich in coal and has no oil, but is relatively rich in water power. Estimates of her reserves of coal, previously put at about two billion tons, chiefly anthracite, have been considerably increased by recent discoveries. Production in 1936 reached 2,300,000 tons and by now has been at least doubled under the pressure of war. The capacity of electric stations in Korea in 1938 was 668,000 kilowatts and by now has probably reached 2,000,000 kilowatts; these are chiefly hydroelectric stations. A recent report of Japanese engineers estimates that the possible total production of hydroelectric power in Korea is 5,000,000 kilowatts. In 1937 only five countries in the world had a greater actual production than Korea's potential production. Sea-water power might add largely to this total. The difference between high and low tide on the western shore of the peninsula reaches 40 feet and, according to Japanese surveys, this power might be utilized.

As to iron, Korea has a reserve of more than one billion tons, chiefly of low grade iron ores, and recent Japanese dispatches speak of discoveries of new reserves of high grade ores. Production of pig iron in 1936 was 156,000 tons. After 1936 no further data on the subject was released, but it may be assumed that production is now at least 500,000 tons. The production of steel is possibly as great. The country is also rich in gold, zinc, lead, magnesium, zirconium, chromium, aluminum and other ores, in graphite and mica, and has a fairly good production of cement (1,560,000 tons in 1939). There is a well-developed chemical industry with one plant capable of producing 500,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia annually, and others either in operation or under construction. In short, the resources of the peninsula make possible a considerable degree of industrialization.

It must be emphasized that any real industrialization of Korea is merely a future possibility. The fundamental fact of the Korean economy today is the poverty of the population. Recent Japanese development of industry has not changed the character of the economy as a whole. In 1941 the *gross* production (*i.e.* in industry, agriculture, fishing, mining and forestry) per capita was about 150 yen (less than $50). Net production would be considerably lower. About half of the national income is taken by the Japanese as taxes or as profits. And again, as in the case of all Oriental countries, most of the income which remains in Korea is concentrated in the hands of relatively few people.

Rapid industrialization is the primary task that will face a reborn Korea. It is not impossibly difficult and will not demand heavy foreign borrowings. In the last few years the Japanese invested several hundred million yen annually in Korean industry. These millions were collected in Korea; a free Korean government could invest them for the welfare of the Korean people. And Korea's gold production, estimated at 200,000,000 yen for 1941, could be made to help greatly in paying for imported machinery.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As soon as the Japanese are driven out, a decision will have to be made which will enormously affect the country's future. The future of Japanese-owned enterprises must be decided. With few exceptions, all large concerns are now in the hands of the Japanese. Unless terms are made exceedingly favorable, there are no Koreans rich enough to buy them (only about 10 percent of corporate capital is in Korean hands). And those who might buy them would inevitably be the same individuals that had coöperated with the Japanese in the past. The alternative, of course, is for the nation to take over these enterprises as public property and, directing all available resources into the channels of reconstruction, to build a new Korea. Here we are at the core of Korea's problem.

III

As in all countries under a foreign conqueror, the Korean political situation cannot be appraised accurately, but many details come through the censorship. There is some antagonism between those who led the revolt of 1919 and the younger generation. The former consider themselves the natural leaders still and cling to the fiction that the government-in-exile formed in Shanghai at that time still exists and is *the* government of Korea. The younger Koreans, though respecting the old revolutionaries, believe that they must be superseded. There is an influential group of Koreans in China which is nearer in spirit to Communist Yennan than to Kuomintang Chungking. There are many Christians in Korea, trained by American missionaries, who look to America for guidance. There are some Socialists and some Communists. The Communist Party has been broken by police many times, but each time it has been reformed. Since 1937 there has been a noticeable tendency of all political groups, except the extreme conservatives who have been dependent upon Japanese favors, to work together. The need of economic reform and rapid industrialization is felt acutely by the young leaders in all groups.

A large part of the population is of course politically inert. This does not mean that there are no experienced and capable leaders. There are thousands of persons with university education (4,000 Korean students were studying in Japan in 1943); there are Korean graduates of American universities in the United States; there are Koreans in Russia who hold important official positions. Hundreds of thousands — if not millions — of Koreans took part in the demonstrations of 1919. They were superbly organized. The Korean representatives were secretly elected, flags were prepared, slogans and leaflets were distributed throughout the entire country. When the demonstrations began, the Japanese, who had packed Korea with spies and police, were taken completely by surprise.

IV

The question of whether or not to entrust Korea's future to some one of the Powers under a mandate can be answered very briefly — and, it seems to me, dismissed — by merely asking one further question: What Power? Some writers have recommended Japan. I cannot think that such cynicism needs to be taken seriously. The United States? Russia would welcome the appearance of the United States as a mandatory Power on its frontier with exactly the same degree of enthusiasm with which the United States Government would welcome the arrival of the U.S.S.R. as a mandatory Power in, say, Mexico. Why in the world should the United States thus antagonize Russia? Should it be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China? China has too many matters to attend to at home. Should it be Soviet Russia? The Chinese Government (and not it alone) would not welcome the idea. There is no Great Power which could be entrusted with the task without arousing at least suspicion and probably energetic opposition on the part of others.

Will the new international organization now under discussion be functioning in time to undertake the job? It does not seem probable to the writer. There is also the possibility that a trusteeship for Korea will be assumed not by a particular country, but by a group of Powers, say, the United States, Great Britain, China and Russia. This form of mandate might be more acceptable to Korea's neighbors and to the Koreans themselves than a mandate entrusted to a single Power, especially if it were fixed for a short duration, say, five years. The possibility of making such an arrangement will of course depend in large part on the relations existing between the principal Powers at the end of the war. If the relations are cordial this sort of mandate might be practicable. In any event, the Koreans themselves will most certainly demand independence and not the status of a mandate. The system of mandates was devised after World War I. Its purpose, at least for mandates in Class A, was to render "administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." Whatever may be said in favor of this plan as a whole, the fact remains that of all the mandated countries and territories, only one, 'Iraq, achieved formal independence; and it may be that even 'Iraq's independence is more formal than actual.

The Allied officers in charge of the army of occupation must arrange general elections in Korea after a certain interval — say, six months — which will give Korean exiles a chance to come home and to take a part in the campaign. Absolute freedom of speech, press and assembly during the preëlection period should be guaranteed. The Constituent Assembly must then prepare a constitution and form Korea's government. There is no doubt that this government will be willing to use expert advice and assistance; but there is no reason to suppose that Korea will not be able to assume responsibility for her own affairs.

The best guarantee of Korea's security and peaceful development lies in friendly relations with all countries, and especially with her neighbors. If the Great Powers — in their own interests — guarantee her independence and territorial integrity, Korea can dispense with a large army and navy, and her full strength can be given to the task of economic development. Christianity will make new strides in Korea, unhampered by Japanese restrictions and suspicions, and this will create a strong bond of friendship with the United States, a country from which much technical advice and some financial assistance may come. There is no doubt that most friendly relations will continue to be maintained with China, from whose cultural treasures Korea has borrowed freely in the past. Russia, Korea's neighbor, will inevitably be a source of influence in the reorganization of Korea's economic life. And economic relations with Japan cannot but continue to be close.

Geography has given China, Russia, Japan and the Pacific Ocean as the frame within which Korean political and economic institutions must develop. It is best for Korea, and for world peace, that she take the responsibility for her own development, not in "due course," but at once.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT EMERGES IN CHINA

By C. Y. W. Meng

AMID the dramatic events of the past several years of war China's development of democratic political institutions has passed almost unreported abroad. Americans hear of "dictatorship" in China and rumors of civil wars. Few have heard of the growth of a governmental machinery which is the antithesis of dictatorial and which is the best insurance against future civil conflict. So far, of course, the program can be given effect only in those parts of China which are free of Japanese domination, and even there it has made uneven headway. The ultimate goal — a Chinese National Congress — cannot be realized until there is peace. But through the creation of representative assemblies in small administrative units throughout the provinces there has been a steady advance toward Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political ideal of direct democracy.

Chinese history is full of racial and religious differences among the "Five Peoples" — Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Mohammedan and Tibetan. From the early days of the Chinese Republic, Chinese revolutionists hoped for the unification of these five peoples into one great family. But after the founding of the Republic this was postponed by a period of internecine conflicts and the struggles of war lords. The vast expanse of China's territory, the absence of efficient means of communication, the high percentage of illiteracy, and an agricultural economy based on small self-sufficient units were among the factors which made the problem difficult.

Japan's blows drove the Chinese people together. The 1,300,000 Tibetans who live on the "roof of the world" now offer regular prayers for the "final victory of the Central Government." From the Mohammedans of the northwest and from Mongolia and Manchuria comes similar evidence of an awareness of national purpose. The Japanese stimulated this spirit with their first attacks. In the battle of Shanghai in 1932, for example, two regiments of Lolos, or aborigines, representing a number of tribes from the frontier districts in Sikang, generally known as China's "baby province," learned to fight not in the name of ancestral pride but as Chinese soldiers, motivated by patriotism. Today soldiers from the four northeastern provinces (Manchuria), from Szechwan and Sikang in the west, from Yunnan, Kweichow and Kwangsi in the southwest and south, from Sinkiang, Kansu and other provinces in the northwest, fight together on every front. Japan expected to demoralize the Chinese masses by bombing inland cities and non-military establishments. She succeeded in filling the hearts of all the people with grief, with a passion of extreme hatred, and with a feeling of brotherhood for one another.

The growth of a spirit of national unity is most strikingly manifested in the rural areas. Farmers constitute no less than 85 percent of the total Chinese population. In the old days, Chinese farmers fled when it was reported that soldiers were coming. They do so no longer. I have asked in the countryside: "How do you like the Army?" I have been answered: "Do you see that our soldiers are helping us in cutting crops, and are singing war songs to us?" And the farmers who have spoken that way have pointed to the fields, in which I

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

saw both farmers and soldiers at work. The Generalissimo had ordered all troops in the rear mobilized to help with the harvest. There is a remarkable new attitude of coöperation between soldiers and farmers. The straw hats which Chinese farmers wear on hot days now bear the same slogans one sees written on walls and buildings — "National Salvation," "Resistance Against Japan," "Fight to the Last," and so on. Everywhere in China today one hears farmers denounce the "Eastern Ocean Devils" who have "invaded and occupied our territory, killed our fathers, uncles, brothers and sisters." The development of national consciousness and political intelligence among China's farmers is, I think, the internal factor of greatest importance for China's future.

II

As early as 1933 the Chinese authorities took steps to organize mass movements for defense and to lay the foundations for democratic government. Upon the outbreak of the present war in July 1937 the effort was intensified. It received a great stimulus when the Congress of Kuomintang representatives, in March 1938, adopted the "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction," which among other objectives urged the formation of occupational groups among farmers, laborers, merchants and students, and guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, with some reservations. The establishment of a Ministry of Social Affairs in 1940, the first department of its kind in Chinese political history, was another important step in the organization of the masses. Up to September 1942 more than 8,000 farmers' unions had been organized, for example, with more than a million and a half members. And there has been a comparable growth in the number of Chambers of Commerce, free vocational associations, and physical education, public welfare, religious and cultural associations of all kinds.[1] The primary requisite of the "period of constitutionalism" toward which all thoughtful Chinese people look is the crystallization of a public opinion in China. Public opinion must provide the effective sanction against any possible recurrence of civil war. This, I believe, is what the Generalissimo meant when he said, last September, "We should realize clearly that the Chinese Communist problem is purely a political problem which should be solved by political means."

China's "Three-Year Program of Reform in Local Government" was outlined in a speech by the Generalissimo in April 1938 and made explicit in a law promulgated by the National Government on September 19, 1939. It began to be put into operation in 1940. Below the unit of the province, China is divided into districts called *hsien*. They suggest the division of American states into counties, although the comparison is not very exact. The "Three-Year Program," "Local Autonomy Program," or "Local Self-Government System" — it has various names — is designed to replace the former system of local government with one which will give the people more voice in their own affairs, through the creation of representative assemblies in all the still smaller administrative units within the *hsien*, and which will help in the development of a constitutional form of government.

The primary unit of government in China is the household. The households are grouped in the local self-government plan into progressively larger units

[1] See "The Annual of the National Government," 1943.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— the *chia*, composed of roughly ten households; the *pao*, composed of about ten *chia;* and the *hsiang* or *chen*, composed of about ten *pao*. (*Hsiang* is the word used in rural areas, *chen* in urban districts.) These are grouped to form the final unit of local government, the *hsien*. If, however, the latter is unusually large, it may be subdivided.

According to the scheme, representative government functions on every level. A *chia* chief is elected by the household heads, and each household also sends a delegate to the *pao* assembly. This body elects a chief, and also two delegates to represent it in the *hsiang* or *chen* assembly. This assembly in turn, besides electing a chief and other officials, sends one delegate to the *hsien* assembly. Above that are the provincial assemblies; and it is expected that the National Congress will form the apex of the pyramid. The organization is designed to create the closest possible relationship between the people, and the administrative functions of education and defense. The chiefs of the second and third levels of the hierarchy, mentioned above, are concurrently principals of the People's School and of the Central School. These chiefs are usually also captains of the local militia.

All Chinese citizens, irrespective of sex, who have lived in the *hsien* for more than six months or have established their domicile for more than a year, may vote and exercise the rights of recall, initiative and referendum. There is no property restriction. Only opium-smokers, persons prohibited by law from owning property, and those with criminal records are barred from citizenship.

By the end of 1942, a total of 1,084 *hsien* had adopted the new system. When the country has been restored and the program has been completed, China will have approximately 2,000 *hsien* (including those in the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol), comprising some 88,000 *hsiang* and *chen*, 880,000 *pao*, 8,800,000 *chia* and 88,000,000 households. There will be one People's School for each *pao*, and one Central School for each *hsiang* and *chen*. At the end of 1941, in 14 provinces, there were 146,451 People's Schools and 15,189 Central Schools.

The functions of the various assemblies can be summarized briefly. The *chia* assembly meets once a month and has such responsibilities as census taking, promotion of public hygiene, and discussion of measures for the improvement of conditions in the area. The *pao* assembly, likewise meeting once a month, adopts the regulations to be enforced within the district, makes arrangements with other *pao* relating to local affairs, passes on problems of labor conscription, questions those in charge of administrative affairs and activities, and discusses and decides measures relating to the welfare of the district. It must consider and act upon any proposal submitted by five or more citizens. In villages, or streets which form natural units by themselves, two or three *pao* may jointly establish a school, a coöperative, public storage facilities and similar community services.

Hsiang and *chen* assemblies are convened once every two months. Among other duties they adopt and audit the budget for the area under their jurisdiction, administer government property, discuss and act upon the proposals made to them by the district chiefs, elect and dismiss those chiefs, receive reports from higher administrative officers and interpellate those officers. Chiefs of these districts must be chosen from among citizens who have passed the ordinary public examinations, have held government posts above the "delegated appointment" rank, have graduated from normal schools or other institu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions higher than the junior middle schools, or have had a good record in handling public affairs of a local nature.

The chief magistrate of the *hsien* is chosen by the higher authorities, but the *hsien* assembly has a large measure of power. It is composed, as we have noted, of delegates chosen by the lower units of government; and it also includes delegates sent by professional unions and trade guilds, to a number not to exceed three-tenths of its total membership. The assembly adopts the laws and regulations to be enforced in the district, decides the collection of taxes, the making of loans, and all other matters pertaining to the local treasury. Like the other assemblies it has the power to interpellate higher administrative officers, and receives addresses of grievances from the people.

Each *hsien* has its own sources of revenue. They include a portion of land tax, 30 percent of the stamp tax, a portion of business tax and earnings from local government property and other public enterprises. Projects ordered by the provincial government or the National Government must be covered by special appropriations from the latter. In principle, all expenses of the district are met by its own treasury, but deficiencies are made good by the provincial government. The provincial government and the National Government make special grants for *hsien* with small populations but large undeveloped areas.

To undertake reconstruction projects, the local government may float loans, upon resolution by the assembly and approval by the provincial government. The assembly must pass all budgetary and final estimates before they are submitted to the provincial government for approval. Only in exceptional cases may the magistrate submit the estimate to the provincial government before presenting it to the assembly. The fundamental principle of the new system is that the people in the *hsien* shall control its budget.

III

The creation of the First People's Political Council in July 1938 opened a new era in the history of the constitutional development of the country. The entire membership of 200 was appointed by the Kuomintang, and the Council's powers were confined to receiving government reports, interpellating government officials and making proposals to the Government. But the membership of the Second Council was increased to 240, and of these 90 were elected by the provincial or municipal councils. In addition to the powers exercised by the first body, the Second Council had the right to organize committees of investigation, upon request of the Government. The present or Third People's Political Council has a far stronger representative character than the two previous bodies. According to the revised organic law promulgated by the Government on March 16, 1943, two-thirds of the members of this Council, 160 out of a total of 240, were elected by the various provincial or municipal People's Councils, by secret ballot.

The Council has five committees to examine reports from the Government and resolutions from the floor, and subcommittees to deal with national defense, foreign affairs, economic problems and so on. When each full session adjourns the Council elects 25 members to form a Resident Committee which, during the recess, is competent to listen to government reports and exercise the Council's power of investigation. Only a majority quorum is necessary for a full session; and resolutions are adopted by a simple majority vote of those present. The councillors have absolute freedom of speech in the conference

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

room. The outspokenness with which councillors questioned government officials during the recent session was noteworthy. On one issue, the Council refused to adjourn until the Minister of Food replied to questions in person and made a detailed report on the food situation in the country, an action which was taken as establishing a precedent for holding high government officials answerable to public inquiry and criticism.

The recent Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang promised that a National Congress would be convened "one year after the termination of the present war." It is expected that the Congress will have some 1,700 delegates and that it will mark the end of the era of "political tutelage" and the assumption of political power by the people. Predictions as to the exact decisions which will be taken by that Congress are premature, but it is probable that after the adoption of the permanent constitution, all political parties in the country will stand on the same footing and enjoy the same right to organize, to hold meetings and to publish literature, so long as their actions are within the law.

The calling of a National Congress and the adoption of a permanent constitution will not settle all party strife nor solve all political problems. Obviously constitutional government is impossible if any party claims the privilege of maintaining armed forces, occupying territory, setting up forms of administrative units not permitted by the law, and disobeying the orders of the National Government. The problem of the Chinese Communists was brought up for discussion at the 11th Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held in September 1943, and it was resolved that "the Standing Committee should be entrusted with the task of settling this matter and in an appropriate manner persuading the Chinese Communists to realize their past mistakes and honestly redeem the pledge which they made in their Declaration of September 22, 1937." That pledge committed the Chinese Communist Party, among other matters: (1) to work for the realization of the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; (2) to abandon the policy of creating disturbances and propagating the Communist movement; (3) to dissolve the present Soviet Government, thus helping to bring about the political unity of the nation; and (4) to disband the Red Army by incorporating it with the National Army under the direct command of the National Military Affairs Council of the National Government.

Beyond that, all China must learn the unwritten laws of "constitutional morality" — the submission of the minority, the practice of tolerance by the majority, and the observance of good sportsmanship in political struggles. Public opinion alone can enforce these unwritten rules that make democratic constitutional government workable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

NOTE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

THE CRISIS OF THE NATIONAL STATE. By W. FRIEDMANN. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 197 p. $3.75.

In his analysis of the self-destructive nature of the sovereign national state, Professor Friedmann is on safe ground. When he ventures to suggest as a remedy the creation of a few large supranational regional combinations his views are debatable.

THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND THE PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE. By A. J. JACOBS. Cape Town: Cape Times, 1943, 320 p.

A South African writer, after surveying the world's failure to set up adequate machinery for keeping the peace, makes some suggestions of his own.

COMMON CAUSE. By G. A. BORGESE. New York: Duell, 1943, 448 p. $3.50.

The author was, before coming to America, one of the leading literary critics and poets of contemporary Italy. The "common cause" of which he writes is the partnership of the democratic-minded peoples of the western world, plus Russia. This he envisages as preliminary to that Utopian commonwealth where there will be no distinctions of birth, nationality, race or religion.

HOW TO THINK ABOUT WAR AND PEACE. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944, 307 p. $2.50.

The author of "How to Read a Book" seeks to describe the intellectual attitudes which should condition thought and planning about the peace to come. Unlike other writers in the field, he offers no complete blueprint of his own, but personal predilections are evident throughout the text.

ROAD TO PEACE AND FREEDOM. By IRVING BRANT. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 278 p. $2.00.

Mr. Brant seeks to visualize the state of the world when peace comes and to suggest present courses of action to prepare for that day. He desires, *inter alia*, continued coöperation among the United Nations and, here at home, a thorough overhauling of the ideals and methods of American diplomacy.

TOTAL PEACE. By ELY CULBERTSON. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 344 p. $2.50.

In this sequel to his "Summary of the World Federation Plan" Mr. Culbertson criticizes the proposals and suggestions of other peace-planners, and then describes his own detailed blueprint for world-wide organization.

BEYOND VICTORY. PLANNED AND EDITED BY RUTH NANDA ANSHEN. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 291 p. $3.50.

A score of noted persons — American and foreign — contribute challenging essays on how to make tomorrow better than today.

PREFACES TO PEACE. New York: Coöperatively published by Simon and Schuster, Doubleday, Reynal, Columbia University Press, 1943, 437 p. $3.50.

This symposium consists of "One World," by Wendell L. Willkie; "The Problems of Lasting Peace," by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson; "The Price of Free World Victory," by Henry A. Wallace; and "Blueprint for Peace," by Sumner Welles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECONSTITUTING THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1943, 304 p. $1.25.

Material selected to illustrate varying viewpoints.

TWENTY YEARS' TRUCE, 1919–1939. By Robert M. Rayner. New York: Longmans, 1943, 248 p. $3.00.

The history of the two interwar decades soberly reviewed and interpreted.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PLACE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. 1918–1943. Edited by Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker. Boston: Heath, 1943, 612 p. $3.25.

Fourteen teachers in American universities have collaborated in this comprehensive survey, though there is no indication as to who is responsible for what section. The scope of the work is somewhat wider than the title might indicate, for there are chapters covering international affairs in western Europe, eastern Europe and the Far East.

HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES. By R. B. Mowat and Preston Slosson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 577 p. $4.00.

A British and an American historian collaborate in an interesting attempt to integrate the histories of their two countries.

WORLD WARS AND REVOLUTIONS. By Walter Phelps Hall. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 406 p. $4.50.

This quite readable review of the last four decades of European history is in considerable part derived from the Princeton professor's other works on modern history.

THE SURVIVAL OF WESTERN CULTURE. By Ralph Tyler Flewelling. New York: Harper, 1943, 304 p. $3.00.

This is a philosophic examination of the bases and trends of Americo-European civilization. The author is no monist for his ideal is eclectic, though it is grounded on a firm belief in the importance of the individual. Unlike Spengler, his outlook for Occidental culture is optimistic.

AN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. Edited by Joseph R. Strayer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 186 p. $2.50.

Essays on how to write — and not to write — history, by a half dozen historians.

TÊTES DE PONT. By Pierre de Lanux. New York: Brentano, 1942, 143 p. $1.25.

Erratic but pithy remarks on the degeneration of the world in our time.

AIR POWER AND TOTAL WAR. By Cy Caldwell. New York: Coward-McCann, 1943, 244 p. $2.50.

The author was for a number of years an outspoken adherent of the school of thought which held that air power alone could win wars. After reviewing the record of the airplane in this war, he has moderated his expectations, though he still holds that air power may yet "prove to be the most decisive factor."

ORDEAL BY BATTLE. By Cyril Falls. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 186 p. $1.75.

A précis of modern strategy by the military correspondent of the London *Times*. The author wears his vast learning easily and has geared his discussion to the level of the average intelligent reader.

THE FRAMEWORK OF BATTLE. By John G. Burr. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 254 p. $3.00.

A comprehensible guide to the fundamentals of military strategy intended for the layman, by a retired United States Army officer.

JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT, 1942. Compiled and Edited by Leonard Bridgman. New York: Macmillan, 1943, v.p., $19.00.

This is the latest edition of a standard reference work. It contains the latest reliable information released by the various governments, and is profusely illustrated with hundreds of photographs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STRUCTURE OF MORALE. By J. T. MacCurdy. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 224 p. $2.00.

This intelligent, objective analysis of the nature of the psychological factor in war was intended for the British soldier, but its interest and application are universal.

THE ITALIAN CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Angelo Piero Sereni. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 402 p. $5.50.

A historical and juridical study.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1944. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1944, 202 p. $2.50.

Despite numerous wartime difficulties, the present issue of this handbook is up to its usual high standards. It is an indispensable source of reliable information about governments, programs and leaders of political parties, and the political affiliations of newspapers of all countries. A particularly useful feature of this edition, brought up-to-date as of January 1, 1944, is the full and accurate section on France.

General: Economic and Social

POSTWAR PLANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Lewis L. Lorwin. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1943, 307 p. $2.50.

A survey of the plans being formulated by 22 of the United Nations, primarily for the reconstruction of their own economies. Since such plans have international implications, Dr. Lorwin stresses the necessity of coördinating them with schemes for international coöperation.

ECONOMICS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION. By Henry Simon Bloch and Bert F. Hoselitz. Chicago: Foundation Press, 1944, 141 p. $1.25.

Practical information and suggestions for occupation officials.

PIUS XII ON WORLD PROBLEMS. By James W. Naughton. New York: America Press, 1943, 223 p. $2.00.

A useful compilation of the Pope's pronouncements, with extensive bibliography.

MISSION FRANÇAISE. By René Ristelhueber. Montreal: Variétés, 1943, 223 p. $1.25.

Somewhat random chapters on contemporary history and Catholic missionary enterprises in various parts of the world, by a French career diplomat.

THE WAR AGAINST GOD. Edited by Carl Carmer. New York: Holt, 1943, 261 p. $2.75.

This book contains a brief chapter of statements showing the anti-Christian objectives of our enemies, followed by a much fuller collection of utterances by religious and lay leaders here and abroad illustrating the religious character of the war.

THE DEVIL AND THE JEWS. By Joshua Trachtenberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 279 p. $3.50.

The author holds that the causes of anti-Semitism go back into the folklore of the western world, medieval as well as modern.

OVERCOMING ANTI-SEMITISM. By Solomon Andhil Fineberg. New York: Harper, 1943, 225 p. $3.00.

Practical suggestions on how to combat anti-Semitism.

THEY SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH. By Otto Zoff. New York: Day, 1943, 258 p. $3.00.

A heartrending description of the unhappy fate of so many of the world's children in this war-ridden world, and a plea that something be done to insure that there be a next generation with a modicum of health and sanity.

ONE HUMANITY. By Howard E. Kershner. New York: Putnam, 1943, 81 p. $1.25.

A vigorous plea for American assistance in feeding the starving children of Nazi-occupied Europe. The author directed the American Friends Service Committee in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe from 1939 to 1942, and is convinced this work can be carried on without materially aiding the Nazis.

The Second World War

WORLD WAR II. By Major Frank Monaghan. Chicago: J. G. Ferguson and Associates, 1943, 558 p. $7.50.

Major Monaghan was, before the war, professor of history at Yale. In this first volume of a projected series he traces, in clear and simple prose, the course of history during the "long Armistice" from 1918 to 1939 and through the Second World War up to December 1942. In addition to the author's skilfully woven text, there are many illustrations, a chronology and a section of maps.

THE AXIS ON THE AIR. By Harold Ettlinger. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 318 p. $2.75.

A vivid, authentic description of how the Axis, led by Goebbels, has used the radio as a weapon for subjugating its enemies.

AMERICAN GUERRILLA. By Captain Douglas M. Smith and Cecil Carnes. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 316 p. $3.00.

Captain Smith gained extensive guerrilla experience while attached to the Eighth Army in the Western Desert. This book is a plea that the United Nations not neglect the important military potential of the oppressed peoples in Axis-held Europe.

TRAIL BLAZERS FOR INVASION. By Z. H. Wachsman. New York: Ungar, 1943, 284 p. $2.75.

A description of the resistance and guerrilla activities of the peoples of the Nazi-occupied countries.

ACTION THIS DAY: LETTERS FROM THE FIGHTING FRONTS. By Francis J. Spellman. New York: Scribner, 1943, 256 p. $2.75.

In these letters to his father, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York and Military Vicar of the Armed Forces of the United States describes his activities and reactions during a 46,000-mile air journey made last year to the British Isles, Spain and Portugal, the Vatican City, the Near East and many parts of Africa. The author confines himself largely to personal and pastoral matters, though occasionally he ventures into the field of politics, as in the case of Spain.

HERE IS YOUR WAR. By Ernie Pyle. New York: Holt, 1943, 304 p. $3.00.

Ernie Pyle seems to get closer to the front, and to the men who really do the fighting, than many of his journalistic colleagues. If you want to know what the American soldier is doing, saying and thinking, this is your book.

FAR ON THE RINGING PLAINS. By George Rodger. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 295 p. $3.00.

An English photographer, on assignment from *Life*, covers nearly 75,000 miles — largely in the war zones of Asia and Africa — in two years, and comes back with this story of his many hairbreadth adventures.

JEAN MALAQUAIS' WAR DIARY. By Jean Malaquais. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 246 p. $2.75.

This is the war diary of a highly sensitive and intelligent young Polish-born writer — another of the "Men from Nowhere" — who served in the French Army from September 1939 to July 1940. Though his tone is too often one of personal injury and complaint, his description of an army in decay and of its collapse has psychological features which the historian will value.

SWORD OF BONE. By Anthony Rhodes. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 278 p. $2.50.

The months of "phony war" in northern France and the evacuation at Dunkirk recounted by a highly literate young British officer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SKYWAYS TO BERLIN. By Major John M. Redding and Captain Harold I. Leyshon. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 290 p. $2.75.

A collection of stories, largely personal, about the exploits of the men in the United States Army Eighth Air Force based in England.

THE CONQUEST OF NORTH AFRICA. By Alexander G. Clifford. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 450 p. $3.00.

Though containing few revelations, this book has the advantage that it comprises the whole North African campaign from 1940 to 1943, which the author observed as correspondent of the London *Daily Mail.*

MERCY IN HELL. By Andrew Geer. New York: Whittlesey, 1943, 264 p. $2.75.

A graphic account of the exploits of the American volunteer ambulancemen who served during the heroic days of the Egyptian-Libyan campaign.

AMBULANCE IN AFRICA. By Evan Thomas. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 175 p. $2.00.

The son of Norman Thomas, Socialist leader, unpretentiously recounts his experiences as a member of the American Field Service in the Western Desert.

THEY FLEW THROUGH SAND. By George W. Houghton. London: Jarrolds, 1943, 120 p. 6/–.

Intimate glimpses of the men and machines behind the victory of the R.A.F. in the Western Desert, by a public relations officer who served there.

DESERT CONQUEST. By Russell Hill. New York: Knopf, 1943, 339 p. $3.00.

One of the youngest but most experienced of the correspondents who are covering this war describes the epic of the Eighth Army — its near defeat and its magnificent comeback in the 1,500-mile advance from El Alamein to Tunisia.

NEAR EAST. By Cecil Beaton. London: Batsford, 1943, 149 p. 12/6.

A noted British photographer reports on experiences in the Middle East and Western Desert prior to El Alamein. Many photographs illustrate the text.

MALTA EPIC. By Ian Hay. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 238 p. $3.00.

The inspiring story of how Malta held out through many dark months, as told by John Hay Beith, a major general in the British Army and author of several well remembered books from World War I.

MALTA MAGNIFICENT. By Major Francis Gerard. New York: Whittlesey, 1943, 253 p. $2.50.

The author served on Malta during two years of the siege that justly won the island the award of the George Cross. Unhappily, Major Gerard has managed to recapture only a part of the drama surrounding the heroic resistance of the Maltese people.

JOURNEY INTO WAR: WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN NORTH AFRICA. By John MacVane. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 330 p. $3.00.

An experienced foreign correspondent and radio reporter gives an account of the Allied invasion of North Africa, which he witnessed. He is very critical of American diplomacy in that area and in France and is full of praise for de Gaulle.

THE END IN AFRICA. By Alan Moorhead. New York: Harper, 1943, 269 p. $2.75.

The author, a correspondent for the London *Daily Express*, has already given us two informative eyewitness books on the war in the Mediterranean. In this latest one he covers the campaign that culminated in the Axis defeat in Tunisia. He adds his voice to those who praise the military, but not the diplomatic, conduct of this campaign.

SPRINGBOARD TO BERLIN. By John A. Parris, Jr., and Others. New York: Crowell, 1943, 401 p. $3.00.

Stirring episodes from the Allied invasion of French North Africa recounted by four United Press correspondents very much on the spot.

ASSIGNMENT TO NOWHERE. By Lowell Bennett. New York: Vanguard, 1943, 316 p. $2.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An American journalist's first-hand account of things seen and heard during the North African campaign, notably in Tunisia.

NO QUARTER. By Konstantin Simonov. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943, 231 p. $2.75.

An illustrated report on the human, and inhuman, side of the war in Russia, by a correspondent of *Red Star*.

WITH GENERAL CHENNAULT. By Robert B. Hotz and Others. New York: Coward-McCann, 1943, 276 p. $3.00.

With the assistance of three of the "Flying Tigers," the author retells vividly the story of that extraordinary little band of fighting aviators.

HONG KONG AFTERMATH. By Wenzell Brown. New York: Smith and Durrell, 1943, 283 p. $2.75.

The author describes the horrors of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. Not a pleasant book to read, but one that has every earmark of authenticity.

ESCAPE FROM JAVA. By Cornelis van der Grift and E. H. Lansing. New York: Crowell, 1943, 166 p. $2.00.

A personal account of the early days of Japanese rule in Java and of the escape of Mr. van der Grift across the Indian Ocean to safety.

ON TARGET: WITH THE AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT BRIGADE IN NEW GUINEA. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1943, 171 p.

Sketches and photographs of war in the jungle by the men who did the fighting.

SOUTHWEST PASSAGE. By John Lardner. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 302 p. $3.00.

An American sports writer supplies local color about wartime Australia and about the American troops stationed there.

TO ALL HANDS: AN AMPHIBIOUS ADVENTURE. By John Mason Brown. New York: Whittlesey, 1943, 236 p. $2.75.

These are the broadcasts which the author, a drama critic before joining the Navy, sent over the public address system of an American naval vessel en route to Sicily. The result of this experiment makes for first-rate reading.

BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC. Edited by Philip Gibbs. New York: Doubleday, 1944, 274 p. $2.75.

Essays of uneven worth by a panel of writers, intended to cement Anglo-American solidarity. On the whole the approach is realistic rather than evangelical.

BRIDGE TO VICTORY. By Howard Handleman. New York: Random House, 1943, 275 p. $2.00.

An American correspondent's first-hand story of the fighting in the Aleutians.

AMERICA'S NAVY IN WORLD WAR II. By Gilbert Cant. New York: Day, 1943, 432 p. $3.75.

Despite the handicaps of Navy censorship and a too close proximity to the events he describes, Mr. Cant has written a good summary of America's naval participation in the war up to the early part of 1943.

ANIMAL REVEILLE. By Richard Dempewolff. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 272 p. $3.00.

An illustrated description of how animals are being employed in the war.

The United States

THE AMERICAN. By James Truslow Adams. New York: Scribner, 1943, 404 p. $3.00.

A stimulating review of the forces influencing the development of our characteristic national traits, by a leading American historian.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN SPEECHES: 1942–1943. Compiled by A. Craig Baird. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1943, 319 p. $1.25.

Selected addresses by a variety of individuals.

THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE. By Kenneth Colegrove. New York: Vanguard, 1943, 209 p. $2.00.

Professor Colegrove of Northwestern University points out the disadvantages in our present legislative machinery of treaty ratification and proposes the adoption of a constitutional amendment depriving a minority of the Senate of its power to thwart the will of the American people.

THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM. By James Constantine Pearson. Washington: Catholic University of America, 1942, 328 p. $2.00.

A scholarly analysis of the American foreign trade policy since 1918 with a sympathetic appraisal of the operation of Mr. Hull's reciprocal trade agreements program.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN RELIEF IN EUROPE 1918–1919. Edited by Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1943, 745 p. $6.00.

This publication of the Hoover War Library contains the texts of selected documents which illuminate an important chapter in the history of World War I.

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES. By Wilfred E. Binkley. New York: Knopf, 1943, 407 p. $3.75.

A first-rate history of the dynamics of American politics. The author explores virgin territory in his analysis of the group composition of political parties.

RADIO NETWORKS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. By Thomas Porter Robinson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 278 p. $3.50.

This sound factual review reaches certain definite, and controversial, conclusions.

LEND-LEASE: WEAPON FOR VICTORY. By Edward R. Stettinius. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 358 p. $3.00.

The author, now Under Secretary of State, until recently the administrator of the American lend-lease program, reveals in this important and well-written book much, though of course not all, of the story of lend-lease. He, however, throws little light on the perplexing problem of how to settle the obligations of the recipients after the war.

BUILDING FOR PEACE AT HOME AND ABROAD. By Maxwell S. Stewart. New York: Harper, 1943, 240 p. $2.50.

An American proponent of economic planning explores the avenues which might lead to permanent peace in the world and economic security here in the United States.

AMERICAN EXPRESSION ON THE WAR AND THE PEACE. Edited by Annie Laurie Mohair and Doris Benardete. New York: American Book, 1943, 326 p. $1.75.

Readings from current addresses, articles, etc., intended primarily for student use.

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ARMY GROUND FORCES. By Colonel Joseph I. Greene. New York: Norton, 1943, 209 p. $2.50.

This is the latest addition to Norton's serviceable series of military handbooks for the layman. In it, the Editor of the *Infantry Journal* describes the organization, equipment and functions of the men who are called on to do the tough fighting that wins wars.

THE ARMY AND THE LAW. By Garrard Glenn, revised and enlarged by A. Arthur Schiller. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 203 p. $2.75.

An up-to-date edition of a useful reference work on the legal relations of civilian and soldier in both peace and war.

THE F.B.I. IN PEACE AND WAR. By Frederick L. Collins. New York: Putnam, 1943, 297 p. $3.00.

An authorized but not official review of the Bureau's growth and achievements since J. Edgar Hoover took over in 1924.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SPY IN AMERICA. By George S. Bryan. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 256 p. $3.00.

The fascinating story of espionage and counterespionage in the United States.

WHAT AMERICA MEANS TO ME. By Pearl S. Buck. New York: Day, 1943, 212 p. $2.00.

Collected articles and addresses in which the principal theme is that there can be no true democracy until all barriers based on race and color have been broken down. India and China come in for particular attention.

NOW IS THE MOMENT. By Harold Ordway Rugg. New York: Duell, 1943, 269 p. $2.50.

A plea and a plan for utilizing the era of rapid change caused by the war for renovating archaic parts of the American economic and social structure.

AMERICAN SOCIETY IN WARTIME. Edited by William Fielding Ogburn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943, 237 p. $2.50.

Lectures delivered at the University of Chicago by a number of sociologists.

EDUCATION IN WARTIME AND AFTER. By Stanford University School of Education Faculty. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 465 p. $3.00.

Several Stanford professors of education explore the problem of how to preserve the American school as an instrument of democracy after the war.

WHERE'S THE MONEY COMING FROM? By Stuart Chase. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1943, 179 p. $1.00.

This is the third volume in Mr. Chase's series "When the War Ends." Even though he has moderated his former reliance on the state as the directing "planner" and operator of the economic machine, he still finds that it has a very necessary function to fulfill in "compensating" for the inadequacies of private enterprise during lean years by means of government spending, based on both taxation and borrowing.

TOTAL WAR. By John Burnham. Boston: Meador, 1943, 339 p. $2.00.

An economist, for some time connected with the WPB, believes that American war production is not what it could be. He suggests means for improvement.

BROWN AMERICANS. By Edwin R. Embree. New York: Viking, 1943, 248 p. $2.75.

A revision of Mr. Embree's "Brown America" first published in 1931, in which he discusses various Negro problems, notably the educational.

RACE AND RUMORS OF RACE. By Howard W. Odum. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943, 245 p. $2.00.

A sociologist's survey of racial tension in the United States from mid-1942 to mid-1943, with practical suggestions for easing it.

ALASKA DIARY, 1926–1931. By Aleš Hrdlicka. Lancaster (Pa.): Cattell Press, 1943, 407 p. $5.00.

A happy combination of wisdom, local color and humor garnered by the author, a noted American anthropologist, during his field trips in Alaska.

Western Europe

THE TWO MARSHALS: BAZAINE, PÉTAIN. By Philip Guedalla. New York: Reynal, 1943, 356 p. $3.00.

Written in the inimitable Guedalla style, this review — and to a certain extent comparison — of the careers of the two defeatist French commanders makes fascinating reading. As history, it is much better on Bazaine than Pétain.

CLEMENCEAU. By Geoffrey Bruun. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, 219 p. $3.00.

This full-length portrait of the French statesman presents him in a fairer and more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sympathetic light than most previous biographies. Professor Bruun's work is the third volume to appear in Professor McKay's series "Makers of Modern Europe."

THE FRENCH RIGHT AND NAZI GERMANY, 1933–1939. By Charles A. Micaud. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1943, 255 p. $3.50.

This study contains a wealth of material from the French press and parliamentary debates illustrating the variations and fluctuations of conservative opinion in France during the years when Hitler was preparing war.

LES PRINCIPES DE MACHIAVEL ET LA POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE. By Reyam. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 367 p. $1.75.

In this interesting experiment the author discusses French policy by means of an imaginary dialogue between Machiavelli and a certain M. Durand.

THE ROAD BACK TO PARIS. By A. J. Liebling. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 300 p. $3.00.

Illuminating experiences and candid impressions of France before and after her collapse, by a representative of *The New Yorker*.

BEHIND THE BATTLE OF FRANCE. By Jacques Lorraine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 136 p. $1.25.

This little book recounts the story of the early months of "collaboration" in France, both Nazi-occupied and Vichy-administered.

THE GERMANS CAME TO PARIS. By Peter de Polnay. New York: Duell, 1943, 280 p. $2.75.

This description of life, intrigue and growing French resistance in Nazi-dominated Paris is one of the best accounts to come out of occupied France. The author is a Hungarian novelist who for a while enjoyed special privileges in the French capital.

J'AI VÉCU DANS PARIS OCCUPÉ. By Pauline Corday. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1943, 241 p.

Vivid pictures of the moral and physical state of France just before defeat, and after. The author pays tribute to General de Gaulle and his movement as the force that has kept French hope alive during the tragic years since June 1940.

DARLAN. By George Mikés. London: Constable, 1943, 112 p. 3/6.

The author lacks consistency in his heroes and villains. He dislikes Darlan but seems to deplore his assassination; he criticizes Eisenhower but praises General Noguès.

THE VAN ZEELAND EXPERIMENT. New York: Moretus Press, 1943, 284 p. $3.00.

An historical review and appraisal of the policies by which Paul van Zeeland sought to remold the economic, social and political life of Belgium during the middle thirties.

THE WHITE BRIGADE. By Robert Goffin. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 199 p. $2.00.

The story, partly fictionalized to conceal identities, of the activities of the patriotic underground in Nazi-occupied Belgium.

THE NETHERLANDS. Edited by Bartholomew Landheer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943, 464 p. $5.00.

Chapters on many aspects of Netherlands history, economics, institutions, culture and overseas possessions — by a score of Dutch writers.

TRUMPETS BRAY. By Odette Keun. London: Constable, 1943, 148 p. 3/6.

An interpretation of Fascism and its creator, not particularly original, yet sensible.

THE ETERNAL CITY. By Desider Holisher. New York: Ungar, 1943, 160 p. $3.00.

A photographic tour of the Rome of the Popes which takes us into many a nook and cranny of the Vatican City, the world's smallest independent state.

BREAD AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY. By Alexander Gerschenkron. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943, 238 p. $2.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this publication of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research of the University of California the author reviews the agricultural policy of the German Government under the Empire, the Republic and the Third Reich, with particular attention to the problems of the tariff and the great estates of the Junkers.

DER FUEHRER. By Konrad Heiden. Boston: Houghton, 1944, 788 p. $3.00.

Mr. Heiden has devoted much of his life to acquiring and digesting all the available facts about Adolf Hitler — his family background, his childhood and youth, his war record and early years as a paid agitator, and finally his rise to power. All of these matters are explored in this book with a profusion of detail and brilliant psychological understanding. The analysis is not only of the man, but of his movement and of the economic, social and intellectual disorder on which it fed and finally attained success. Where many will feel that Heiden's explanation breaks down is in his unwillingness to place responsibility for Nazism squarely on the German people or on any important class or group among them. This ability to dodge the necessities of rigorous and honest self-criticism seems to characterize even the German liberals and German Jews that have suffered most at the hands of their countrymen.

FREEDOM FORGOTTEN AND REMEMBERED. By Helmut Kuhn. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943, 267 p. $2.50.

A deeply penetrating analysis and evaluation of the intellectual, spiritual and moral inadequacies out of which Hitlerism arose.

HITLER'S TEN-YEAR WAR ON THE JEWS. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1943, 311 p. $1.50.

A factual summary, country by country, of the methods and results of Nazi persecution. The appendix contains tables showing Jewish population and property losses.

HOW NAZI GERMANY HAS CONTROLLED BUSINESS. By L. Hamburger. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1943, 101 p. $1.00.

A brief description of the structure and functioning of the Nazi bureaucratic machine for making private enterprise the unquestioning servant of the state.

HITLER'S SECOND ARMY. By Alfred Vagts. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943, 245 p. 25 cents.

A description of the para-military organizations, such as the Hitler Youth and the Labor Front, on which the Nazis may fall back for a last-ditch guerrilla war against us.

LESSONS OF MY LIFE. By the Rt. Hon. Lord Vansittart. New York: Knopf, 1943, 281 p. $3.00.

The author's point of view concerning Germany and the solution of the German problem has now achieved the distinction of bearing his name in popular discussion. Stated briefly, "Vansittartism" holds that the great mass of the German people, and not merely a class or a group (*e.g.* the professional soldiers), are responsible for the internationally anti-social behavior of their country. In the thesis of this veteran British diplomatist and onetime Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (1930–38), the Germans not only accept régimes that periodically plunder and murder other peoples on a wholesale scale; they actively support and incite such behavior. From these premises flows the author's conclusion that the only remedy is to eliminate, forcibly and persistently, the diseased elements in Germany's psychological makeup and gradually replace them with less aggressive traits. It is hardly necessary to say that the reader's reaction to this somewhat discursive manifesto will depend much on his own predilections and prejudices.

MEET MR. BLANK. By R. G. Waldeck. New York: Putnam, 1943, 179 p. $2.50.

This volume is not to be taken seriously. It parades the men who might, in Countess Waldeck's opinion, lead post-Hitler Germany. Most of her choices for this Herculean task are — after Prince Louis Ferdinand, grandson of the late Kaiser — of the military, "he-man" type. However, she expresses so many doubts about even these that in the end she fails to make a case for any of her candidates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HIDDEN ENEMY: THE GERMAN THREAT TO POST-WAR PEACE. By Heinz Pol. New York: Messner, 1943, 281 p. $3.00.

The "hidden enemy" is Pan Germanism, the cause of not only Germany's but the world's woes for two generations. Mr. Pol reviews the history of the Pan German movement, and decides that the solution for this disease lies in a gigantic revolutionary "purge" of those afflicted with it.

HOW TO TREAT THE GERMANS. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Willard, 1943, 96 p. $1.00.

The well-known biographer admonishes the victors not to let Germany off easily.

THE GREAT GERMAN CONSPIRACY. By H. W. Blood-Ryan. London: Drummond, 1943, 276 p. 12/6.

A British writer, well versed in Germany's affairs through long residence there, warns the peacemakers against accepting the General Staff in place of the Nazis.

GERMANY: TO BE OR NOT TO BE? By Gerhart H. Seger and Siegfried K. Marck. New York: Rand School Press, 1943, 190 p. $2.00.

Two German exiles discuss the future of their country on the assumption that, contrary to Lord Vansittart, there are "two Germanies" — and that if given a chance the "good" Germany can fulfill its historic rôle in a free Europe.

WHAT TO DO WITH GERMANY. By Louis Nizer. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1944, 213 p. $2.50.

Mr. Nizer finds no basis for reliance on a "good" Germany and his plans for punishment and reform are drastic.

THE NEXT GERMANY. New York: Penguin, 1943, 144 p. 25 cents.

This booklet is the product of a group of exiled German Socialists who set forth the basis for a democratic Socialist Germany. Unhappily, their assumption that the German people will elect to set up such a state is by no means self-evident.

Eastern Europe

FOR YOUR FREEDOM AND OURS: POLISH PROGRESSIVE SPIRIT THROUGH THE CENTURIES. Edited by Manfred Kridl and Others. New York: Ungar, 1943, 359 p. $2.50.

Excerpts from Polish liberal writers, particularly those of the last two generations.

A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By B. H. Sumner. New York: Reynal, 1943, 469 p. $3.75.

Russian history retold in terms of seven fundamental influences: the frontier, the state, the land, the church, the Slavs, the sea and the West.

THE RUSSIAN ENIGMA. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Scribner, 1943, 321 p. $2.75.

Mr. Chamberlin, well known for his other informed works on Russia, seeks to present a balanced interpretation of the policies and achievements of the Soviet régime. Those who fear that régime will be most inclined to feel that he has succeeded.

RUSSIA AND POSTWAR EUROPE. By David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 230 p. $2.75.

In this sequel to his "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939–1942" Dr. Dallin examines current Soviet policy and tries to plot its future course. He expects a continuation of Russian imperialism, but as a social and revolutionary rather than purely nationalist phenomenon. On the whole, his prognosis is pessimistic on the future of peace in Europe even should Germany be reduced to the status of a second-rate Power.

THE SECRET OF SOVIET STRENGTH. By Hewlett Johnson. New York: International Publishers, 1943, 160 p. $1.50.

The radical Dean of Canterbury continues the highly sympathetic analysis of Russian affairs begun in his book "The Soviet Power."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE GROWTH OF THE RED ARMY. By D. Fedotoff White. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 486 p. $3.75.

The author, formerly an officer in the Imperial Russian Navy, analyzes the origins and development of the Red Army, not only as a remarkable fighting machine but as an extraordinary political and social creation. He strives, not unsuccessfully, to achieve historical impartiality and scholarly accuracy.

RUSSIAN CAVALCADE: A MILITARY RECORD. By Albert Parry. New York: Ives Washburn, 1944, 334 p. $3.50.

A stirring book in praise of the valor of Russian arms since Catherine the Great.

RELIGION IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1917–1942. By N. S. Timasheff. New York: Sheed, 1942, 171 p. $2.00.

A Russian, in exile since 1921, traces the course of Soviet policy towards organized religion, with perhaps too much stress on the importance of this question in the interpretation of Russian developments in general.

MAXIM LITVINOFF. By Arthur Upham Pope. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943, 530 p. $3.50.

This highly sympathetic biography of the Russian statesman, by the head of the Iranian Institute in New York City, is inevitably a survey and appraisal of Soviet foreign policy since the Bolshevik Revolution.

THE DANUBE AND THE GERMAN ECONOMIC SPHERE. By Antonín Basch. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 275 p. $3.50.

Through his wide practical experience in the service of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Basch is well qualified to analyze the economic problems of Central Europe, and to suggest possible ways out. This he has done in the present timely volume.

THE VANGUARD OF THE "DRANG NACH OSTEN." By Vojta Beneš. Chicago: Czechoslovak National Council of America, 1943, 183 p. 50 cents.

Historical evidence that the Nazis were interested, not in the fate of the three million Germans in Czechoslovakia, but in acquiring the bastion of Bohemia.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA FIGHTS BACK. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, 210 p. $3.00.

Documentary material published for the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with an introduction by Jan Masaryk.

MY NATIVE LAND. By Louis Adamic. New York: Harper, 1943, 507 p. $3.75.

The author, an American citizen born in Slovenia, is well known as a writer on Jugoslavia and as a leader among radical elements in the South Slav community in the United States. On so explosively controversial a topic as the Jugoslav problem one apparently cannot hope for objectivity. Mr. Adamic states the case for Tito and his Partisans against Mikhailovich and his Chetniks with passion and eloquence. He also gives his views on Jugoslav federalism and suggests the future organization of the Balkans in harmony with Soviet policy.

COME OVER INTO MACEDONIA. By Harold B. Allen. New Brunswick (N. J.): Rutgers University Press, 1943, 308 p. $3.00.

An account of the reconstruction work carried on in Macedonia (1928-1938) in connection with the resettlement of 1½ million Greeks transplanted from Asia Minor.

GREECE OF TOMORROW. Edited by George H. Chase. New York: American Friends of Greece, 1943, 93 p. $1.00.

Among these essays by a variety of contributors are several of use to peace planners.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

GOD'S ENGLISHMAN. By Leland Dewitt Baldwin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 265 p. $3.00.

What an Englishman is and how he got that way, explained with wit and wisdom.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TESTAMENT TO DEMOCRACY. By Lord Wedgwood. New York: American Chapter, Religious Emergency Council of Great Britain, 1943, 357 p. $3.75.

This is the last published work of the late Lord Wedgwood, a leading light of the Labor Party and a political individualist of the first water. The book deals primarily with the spirit and operation of British parliamentary life, though two chapters relate to problems of foreign and colonial policy.

THE TRUTH ABOUT OUR TANKS. By Ivor Halstead. London: Drummond, 1943, 222 p. 7/6.

The story of the development of British tanks and a rather critical evaluation of their use in the early part of this war.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AT WAR. Edited by William Yandell Elliott and Duncan H. Hall. New York: Knopf, 1943, 515 p. $5.00.

A dozen experts report on recent developments in the British Commonwealth, considered both as a unit and in its separate parts.

EMPIRE. By Louis Fischer. New York: Duell, 1943, 101 p. $1.00.

Like other things by this author, the present little book is quite personal, often passionate, in its approach. When he reports his first-hand observations in India, he is at his best; when he is interpreting wider movements and trends — such as imperialism — he often lacks perspective and becomes dogmatic.

WEALTH FOR WELFARE. By H. W. Foster and E. V. Bacon. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 174 p. $4.25.

At a time when the colonial question is being discussed widely, this book, with its concrete suggestions for imperial development, will be read with interest. The authors take British Honduras as their principal guinea pig, though they also apply their proposals to various other parts of the Empire.

FRENCH CANADA IN TRANSITION. By Everett Cherrington Hughes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943, 227 p. $2.50.

A case study of the social and economic metamorphosis that took place during the last generation in a selected Quebec township.

NEW ZEALAND: A WORKING DEMOCRACY. By Walter Nash. New York: Duell, 1943, 335 p. $3.50.

One of the Dominion's leading political figures describes its advanced economic and social institutions, and gives his views on world problems as seen from "down under."

INTRODUCTION TO INDIA. By F. R. Moraes and Robert Stimson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 176 p. $2.00.

This informative little manual, the collaborative work of an Indian and an Englishman, contains a wealth of facts about all aspects of life in India.

THIS IS INDIA. By Peter Muir. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 237 p. $2.50.

An American observer finds small basis for the hope that India and the Indian people are anywhere near ready for self-government.

INDIAN CRISIS. By John S. Hoyland. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 193 p. $2.00.

The author seeks to present the Indian problem fairly, but he comes to the conclusion that British rule has not justified itself and must therefore be abandoned forthwith.

A STEEL MAN IN INDIA. By John L. Keenan. New York: Duell, 1943, 224 p. $2.50.

The story of the American engineer who helped create India's important iron and steel industry, as told by himself and Lenore Sorsby.

The Near East

JUSTICE FOR MY PEOPLE. By Ernst Frankenstein. London: Nicholson, 1943, 185 p. 7/6.

The author upholds the Zionist solution of the Jewish problem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIAN QUESTION. By Simon Vratzian. Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co., 1943, 106 p. $1.00.

A statement of the case for Armenian independence.

Africa

THE FOOD RESOURCES OF AFRICA. By Thomas S. Githens and Carroll E. Wood, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press and University Museum, 1943, 105 p. $1.50.

A systematic summary of the available facts and figures supplemented by several charts and maps. This is number three in the series of "African Handbooks" being prepared by the Committee on African Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.

I KNOW TUNISIA. By Dahris Martin. New York: Ives Washburn, 1943, 270 p. $3.00.

An instructive account of life as lived by the natives of Kairouan, holy city of Tunisia.

TOP HATS AND TOM-TOMS. By Elizabeth Dearmin Furbay. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1943, 307 p. $3.00.

First-hand impressions and information about contemporary conditions in Liberia, where the author lived for three years.

The Far East

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY. By G. E. Hubbard. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, 97 p. $1.25.

In this latest addition to the Institute's "Inquiry Series" the author seeks to define the principal interests and motives governing British policy in the Orient.

BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST. By E. M. Gull. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, 272 p. $3.00.

This historical and analytical study appears under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The author has long been connected with China — to which he gives his major attention in this book.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. By L. Carrington Goodrich. New York: Harper, 1943, 260 p. $2.50.

This authoritative volume is the most compact and readable history of China now available. The stress is on cultural rather than on political affairs.

MY REVOLUTIONARY YEARS. By Madame Wei Tao-ming. New York: Scribner, 1943, 238 p. $2.75.

The wife of China's present Ambassador to the United States recounts her adventuresome youth as a revolutionary in the late Manchu and early Republic eras.

SHARK'S FINS AND MILLET. By Ilona Ralf Sues. Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, 331 p. $3.00.

A provocative, illuminating but quite personal account of the author's experiences in Free China. Her reactions to persons, movements and tendencies are far from calm, for she finds much in China that offends her democratic idealism.

THE CHIANGS OF CHINA. By Elmer T. Clark. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, 123 p. $1.00.

An account of the Methodist background of the Soongs and of the Generalissimo.

CHINA HANDBOOK 1937–1943. Compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 876 p. $5.00.

A compendium of information, with a 75-page section of Chinese "Who's Who."

SHANGHAI LAWYER. By Norwood F. Allman. New York: Whittlesey, 1943, 283 p. $2.50.

The author was at one time an American consular official in China who later went

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the practice of law in Shanghai. Unlike so many "old China hands," he learned the Chinese language and thus knows the Chinese people as few Occidentals can.

OUR JAPANESE FOE. By Ian Morrison. New York: Putnam, 1943, 129 p. $1.50.

A British journalist long conversant with Far Eastern affairs finds no possibility of an easy victory over Japan. He warns against a settlement based on revenge.

PARADOX ISLE. By Carol Bache. New York: Knopf, 1943, 184 p. $2.50.

Recollections of life in Japan by one who formerly worked in the office of the American military attaché in Tokyo.

MY LIFE WITH THE ENEMY. By Phyllis Argall. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 290 p. $3.00.

The experiences and observations of a Canadian journalist who has passed most of her life in Japan and who was Managing Editor of the *Japan News-Week* in 1941.

MOTHER AMERICA: A LIVING STORY OF DEMOCRACY. By Carlos P. Romulo. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 234 p. $2.50.

Colonel Romulo is a leading Filipino editor who served on General MacArthur's staff during the Bataan campaign and wrote about it eloquently in his "I Saw the Fall of the Philippines." In the present book he discusses the relations between the Occident and Orient — politically and socially. Though not uncritical of American behavior in the Philippines, he finds it far superior to that of Britain, Holland and France in Asia. Some may feel that his criticisms of the latter Powers are occasionally undiscriminating.

THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA: AN INDIAN VIEW. By K. M. Panikkar. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 126 p. $1.75.

A leading Indian historian, Secretary of the Indian Chamber of Princes, holds that the events of this war have put an end to the old colonial system in southeast Asia. His suggestions for bridging the transition period will be read with interest by all students of postwar problems.

NUSANTARA: A HISTORY OF THE EAST INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO. By Bernard H. M. Vlekke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, 439 p. $5.00.

This scholarly history of the East Indies is devoted largely to the period since the fifteenth century and fills a real need in our record of European expansion in Asia.

Latin America

THE PROGRESS OF PAN-AMERICANISM. Translated and edited by T. H. Reynolds. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 418 p. $3.25.

An anthology of speeches, articles and other forms of statement by various Latin Americans concerning Pan American problems. There is a useful bibliography.

RIO GRANDE TO CAPE HORN. By Carleton Beals. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 377 p. $3.50.

A well-known writer on Latin America takes the reader on a somewhat miscellaneous journey through all 20 of our neighbor republics.

NETHERLANDS AMERICA. By Philip Hanson Hiss. New York: Duell, 1943, 225 p. $3.00.

An illustrated description of the geography, history, population, economic life and culture of the Dutch West Indies and Surinam.

ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Santos P. Amadeo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 243 p. $3.00.

In this scholarly treatise the author devotes particular attention to the rôle the Argentine courts have played in maintaining the federal system and protecting the rights of the individual. He also indicates the many points of contact between Argentine and American constitutional history and practice.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Agriculture

Agricultural production in continental Europe during the 1914–18 war and the reconstruction period. Geneva, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations, 1943. 122 p. (1943. II. A. 7.) $1.75.

Commerce

Principal pre-war imports of Far Eastern countries from regions outside Japanese-occupied Asia. Prepared by the Far Eastern unit. Washington, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1943. 46 p. (Economic Series No. 31.)

Coöperatives

Co-operative organisations and post-war relief. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1944. 173 p. (Studies and Reports, Series H (Coöperation), No. 4.) $1.00.

First World War

Handbook of Federal World War agencies and their records, 1917–1921. Washington, 1943. 666 p. (National Archives. Publication No. 24.) $1.25.

Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Washington, 1942–1943. 4 v. (Department of State Publications No. 1815, 1823, 1958, 1963.) v. 1, $1.25; v. 2, $1.50; v. 3–4, $2.00 each.

Immigration

Repealing the Chinese exclusion laws. Report of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 3070. October 7, 1943. Washington, 1943. 2 pts. (H. Rept. No. 732.)

Labor

Man-Power mobilisation for peace. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943. 78 p. 25¢.

Latin America

Report of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission to the governments of the United States and Great Britain for the years 1942–1943. Washington, The Commission, 1943. 94 p.

The Caribbean Islands and the war; a record of progress in facing stern realities. Washington, 1943. 85 p. (Department of State Publication 2023.) 25¢.

Expenditures and commitments by the United States government in or for Latin America. Report by Hon. Hugh Butler and the reply to such report made by Hon. Kenneth McKellar together with accompanying papers from the heads of departments verifying same. November 26–December 18, 1943. Washington, 1943. 170 p. (S. Doc. No. 132, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Improvement and coördination of inter-American peace instruments. Submitted to the Eighth International Conference of American States. Washington, Juridical Division, Pan American Union, 1944.

V. 1, pt. 2. Estudio comparado de los proyectos presentados a la octava conferencia internacional Americana sobre el perfeccionamiento y coordinación de los instrumentos interamericanos de paz. 108 p. *V. 5.* Text of the documents relative to the identification of the aggressor and application of sanctions. 25 p.

Annual Report submitted to the governments of the American Republics, by the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, July 1943. Montevideo, 1943. 287 p. (English edition distributed by the Pan American Union, Washington.)

Development of foodstuffs production in Venezuela; agreement between the United States of America and Venezuela, effected by exchange of notes signed at Caracas May 14, 1943. Washington, 1943. 13 p. (Executive Agreement Series 333.) 5¢.

Economic and social conditions in Puerto Rico. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 26, February 10–May 5, 1943. Washington, 1943. pt. 1–2.

Puerto Rico. Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 952. May 3–11, 1943. Washington, 1943. 335 p. 35¢.

To Assist in relieving economic distress in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Hearings before

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Committee on Insular Affairs, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 981. May 19–25, 1943. Washington, 1943. 86 p. 15¢.

———. Report . . . November 1, 1943. Washington, 1943. 6 p. (H. Rept. No. 810.)

Investigation of political, economic, and social conditions in Puerto Rico. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Insular Affairs, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 159. June 11–July 2, 1943. Washington, 1943. pts. 8–13.

Latvia

What Latvia wishes from this war? By Alfred Bilmanis. Washington, The Press Bureau of the Latvian Legation, 1943. 23 p.

Postwar Planning

First session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; selected documents, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 10–December 1, 1943. Washington, 1944. 215 p. (Department of State Publication 2040. Conference Series 53.)

To Enable the United States to participate in the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 78th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., on H. J. Res. 192. December 7, 1943–January 11, 1944. Washington, 1944. 349 p.

Post-War economic policy and planning. Hearings before the Special Committee on Post-war Economic Policy and Planning, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 102. November 5–23, 1943. Washington, 1943. p. 401–645. pt. 2.

The Role of the Federal Government in highway development; an analysis of needs and proposals for post-war action. Washington, 1944. 87 p. (78th Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Committee Print for the use of the Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning.)

War and peace aims; extracts from statements of United Nations leaders. Special supplement No. 2 to the United Nations Review, December 1, 1943. New York, United Nations Information Office, 1943. 118 p. 40¢.

The Health of children in occupied Europe. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943. 37 p. 25¢.

Second World War — Inter-Allied Coöperation

A Report on mutual aid; text of a white paper presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament by command of His Majesty. November 11, 1943. New York, British Information Services, 1943. 11 p.

Twelfth report to Congress on lend-lease operations; reverse lend-lease aid from the British Commonwealth of Nations. Washington, 1943. 10 p.

Second World War — United States

First supplemental national defense appropriation bill for 1944. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, 1943. 1638 p. $2.00.

Investigation of the national defense program. Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 6 (78th Cong., extending S. Res. 71–77th Cong.) March 22–August 20, 1943. Washington, 1943. pt. 18–20.

———. Additional report, July 10, 1943–January 8, 1944. Washington, 1943–1944. 4 pts. (S. Rept. No. 10, pts. 10–12, 14.)

Investigation of the progress of the war effort. 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 30. Washington, 1943. 3 pts.

1. H. Rept. 733. Renegotiation of war contracts. (Committee on Naval Affairs.) October 7, 1943. *2.* H. Rept. 785. Interim report. (Committee on Military Affairs.) October 21, 1943. *3.* Interim report. (Petroleum Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs.) October 5, 1943.

Visit to the various war fronts by several members of the United States Senate. Remarks of Senator Richard B. Russell, October 28, 1943 . . . of Senator James M. Mead, October 12, 1943, together with a detailed individual report by Senator Ralph O. Brewster, presented by Senator Harry S. Truman. Washington, 1943. 45 p. (S. Doc. No. 109, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.)

War mobilization. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 107 and S. 607. May 18–October 14, 1943. Washington, 1943. pt. 1, 3, 5. 60¢.

War shipping field service. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Commerce, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. J. Res. 82. October 1 and 5, 1943. Washington, 1943. 22 p.

Board of war communications, June 8, 1943. Washington, Board, 1943. 42 p.

Statistics

Statistical year-book of the League of Nations, 1941/42, including addendum 1942/43. Geneva, 1943. 279 p. (1942. II. A. 8.)

Strategic and Critical Materials

Petroleum investigation — petroleum supplies for military and civilian needs. Report of the Special Subcommittee on Petroleum Investigation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commerce, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 290 of the 76th Cong., H. Res. 383 of the 77th Cong., and H. Res. 58 of the 78th Cong. July 3, 1943. Washington, 1943. 8 p. (H. Rept. No. 663.)

STOCK piles of strategic minerals. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Mines and Mining, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1160. June 24–July 14, 1943. Washington, 1943. pt. 1–2. 15¢.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL commodity control agreements. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943. 221 p. $3.00.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

INTERIM report, by S. H. Frankel on the Rhodesia railways. Johannesburg [Union of South Africa], 1943. 40 p.

UNITED STATES

PAPERS relating to the foreign relations of the United States: Japan: 1931–1941. Washington, 1943. 2 v. (Department of State Publication No. 2008; 2016.) v. 1, $2.25; v. 2, $1.75.

EXTENSION of reciprocal trade agreements act. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. J. Res. 111. Revised. April 12–23, 1943. Washington, 1943. 1156 p. $1.50.

FOOD supply of the United States. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on the Food Supply of the United States. March 27–May 30, 1943. Washington, 1943. pt. 2–3. 40¢.

INVESTIGATION of un-American propaganda activities in the United States. Hearings before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. Res. 282. June 8–July 7, 1943. Washington, 1943. v. 15.

MUNITIONS industry. Hearings before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, Senate, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 206 (73d Cong.) Index. Washington, 1943. pt. 40. $1.25.

REGIONAL shifts in population, production, and markets, 1939–43, by J. C. Stokes. Washington, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1943. 66 p. (Economic Series No. 30.)

RENEGOTIATION of war contracts. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 2324, H. R. 2698, and H. R. 3015. Revised. September 9–23. Washington, 1943. 1100 p.

II. PAMPHLETS

ADMINISTRATION OF RELIEF ABROAD; a series of occasional papers. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1943. 20¢ each, $1.50 a set of 8.

1. Foreign relief and rehabilitation, a bibliography compiled by Sigrid Holt. 23 p. *2.* The Near East relief, 1915–1930, by J. L. Barton. 28 p. *3.* The American Red Cross in the Great War, 1917–1919, by H. P. Davison. 28 p. *4.* American aid to Germany, 1918–1925, by Sidney B. Brooks. Together with the Long mile beyond Berlin, by S. M. Harrison. 28 p. *5.* The American Friends in France, 1917–1919, by R. M. Jones. Together with Problems involved in administering relief abroad, by C. E. Pickett. 27 p. *6.* The American Relief Administration in Russia, 1921–1923, by H. H. Fisher. 27 p. *7.* Recent relief programs of the American Friends in Spain and France; — in Spain, 1937–1939, by J. Van G. Forbes; — in France, 1941–1942, by the American Friends Service Committee. 27 p. *8.* American Red Cross famine relief in China, 1920–1921, from the Report of the China Famine Relief, American Red Cross. 25 p.

AMERICA LOOKS AHEAD. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1943. 25¢.

9. Collective security: the why and how, by Joseph H. Ball. 63 p.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Canadian Association for Adult Education, 1943. 10¢ each.

Vol. 3, 9. Newfoundland: sentinel of the St. Lawrence, by S. A. Saunders and Eleanor Back. 22 p. *Vol. 3, 10.* Moscow Conference, by H. McD. Clokie. 28 p.

BRITAIN LOOKS AHEAD; British official statements. Volume 3, September 1942 to September 1943. New York, British Information Services, 1943. 174 p.

BRITISH TRADE UNIONS, by Mary Agnes Hamilton. London, Oxford University Press, 1943. 31 p. (*Oxford Pamphlets on Home Affairs. No. H. 7.*) 6d.

BURIAT MONGOLIA; a brief survey of political, economic and social progress, by V. I. Pomus. Abridged and translated from the Russian work Buriat Mongol A.S.S.R., by Rose Maurer and Olga Lang, with an introduction on recent developments by Rose Maurer. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. 76 p. $1.00.

CANADA-UNITED STATES COÖRDINATION. Report of Canada-United States Committee maintained by Canadian Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Commerce of the United States. No place, Canada-United States Committee, 1943. 17 p.

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE. Fourth report. New York, 1943.

General Statement. Fundamentals of the international organization. 27 p. *Pt. 1.* Security and world organization. 36 p. *Pt. 2.* The economic organization of welfare. 40 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS. New York, The Czechoslovak Information Service, 1943.
4. President Beneš on war and peace. 162 p. 50¢.

DENMARK IN REVOLT. New York, National America Denmark Association, 1943. n.p.

DIVIDED THEY FALL (cartoons), by Stephen. London, John Murray, 1943. 64 p. 2s. 6d.

THE DURHAM STATEMENT, October 20, 1942; the Atlanta statement, April 8, 1943; the Richmond statement, June 16, 1943. Atlanta, Georgia, Commission on Interracial Coöperation, Inc., 1943. 16 p.

EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE, by Leon Baranski. New York, New Europe, n.d. 31 p. 10¢.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR; bibliography, selected and annotated. Washington, Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. 1943. No. 1 —.

EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS. Washington, Editorial Research Reports, 1943.
1943: Vol. 2, 17. Military government of occupied territory, by F. P. Huddle. p. 287–302. *Vol. 2, 19.* Disposal of surplus war materials, by F. P. Huddle. p. 327–339. *Vol. 2, 20–23.* Record of the 78th Congress (First session), by R. M. Boeckel. p. 343–406. *Vol. 2, 24.* Record votes in the 78th Congress (First session). Tables compiled by L. H. Hopkinson. n.p.
1944: Vol. 1, 2. Argentina and the United States, by Kendrick Lee. p. 25–41. *Vol. 1, 3.* Lend-lease settlements by Harold Kellock. p. 45–60.

EDUCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; proposals of the International Education Assembly, endorsed by the Liaison Committee for International Education. Harpers Ferry meeting, September 1943. [New York, The School Executive, 1943.] 30 p.

EDUCATION IN POST-WAR GERMANY, by Minna Specht. London, International Publishing Company, 1944. 39 p. 1s.

EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY AFTER THE WAR; a statement. London, Nuffield College, Oxford University Press, 1944. 70 p. 50¢.

FULL EMPLOYMENT, by Barbara Wootton. London, Fabian Publications Ltd., 1943. 27 p. (Research Series, No. 74.) 6d.

HEADLINE SERIES. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1943. 25¢ each.
43. Look at Africa, by R. G. & M. S. Woolbert. 96 p. *44.* On the threshold of world order, by V. M. Dean. 96 p.

A HISTORY OF THE WAR; in maps, in pictographs, in words, by Rudolf Modley. Washington, Infantry Journal and Penguin Books, 1943. 177 p.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Peter H. W. Sitsen. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, 1943. 65 p. (Bulletin 2 of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council.) 50¢.

INFORMATION NOTES. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, New York, Oxford University Press, 1943. 6d. each. *4.* The U.S.A. 32 p.

INTERCREDAL COÖPERATION, papers by Wilfrid Parsons and J. C. Murray. Washington, The Catholic Association for International Peace, 1943. 43 p.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION AND THE COLONIES, report of a committee of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. London, Fabian Publications Ltd. and Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1943. 32 p. (Research Series, No. 75.) 1s.

JEWISH POST-WAR PROBLEMS. New York, Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of the American Jewish Committee, 1943.
8. Jewish survival in the democracy of the future. 23 p.

THE KEY PROBLEM OF THE PEACE; a United States of Europe, by A. G. Kirkby. Boston, Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1943. 45 p. 75¢.

MONETARY STANDARDS INQUIRY. New York, Monetary Standards Inquiry, 1943.
4. Latin American postwar monetary standards, by C. A. McQueen. 23 p. *5.* Near Eastern postwar monetary standards, by Elgin Groseclose. 14 p. *6.* Far Eastern postwar monetary standards, by E. H. Leavens. 24 p. *7.* Alternatives in postwar international monetary standards. 23 p. *8.* The postwar role of gold, by C. O. Hardy. 26 p.

NATIONAL POLICY MEMORANDA. Washington, National Policy Committee, 1943.
25. Education in the armed forces. 41 p. *26.* The future of industrial risk. 24 p.

NATIONAL POLICY REPORTS. Washington, National Policy Committee, 1943.
18. Postwar employment in Arkansas. 19 p. *19.* India and Anglo-American relations. 21 p. *20.* Preparation for international responsibility. 20 p.

OUR ECONOMY IN WAR. New York, Financial Research Program, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943.
The effect of war on business financing: manufacturing and trade, World War I, by C. H. Schmidt and R. A. Young. 95 p. (Occasional Paper 10); British and American plans for international currency stabilization, by J. H. Riddle. 42 p. (Occasional Paper 16.)

OUR SECOND CHANCE, compiled by Charlotte Burnett Mahon. New York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1944. 55 p.

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS. London, Oxford University Press, 1943.
64. The British Pacific Islands, by Sir Harry Luke. 31 p. 6d.

PEACE AIMS PAMPHLETS. London, National Peace Council, 1943.
20. The renewal of civilisation, by Christopher Dawson. 11 p. 4d. *21.* Planning for abundance,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Nicholas Kaldor and others. 44 p. 1s. *22.* London, Washington, Moscow, partners in peace, by H. J. Laski. 23 p. 6d.

"PEACE THROUGH SEA POWER," by J. E. Otterson, a speech delivered before the Thirtieth convention of the National Foreign Trade Council. New York, American Maritime Council, Inc., 1943. 16 p.

PLANNING PAMPHLETS. Washington, National Planning Association, 1943. 25¢ each.
22. The outlook for the railroad industry, by E. W. Williams, Jr. 22 p. *23.* Public thinking on post-war problems, by Jerome S. Bruner. 36 p. *24.* Reconversion of industry to peace. 24 p. *25–26.* World needs for U. S. food and fiber, by J. D. Black. 71 p. *27.* Business reserves in present tax law, by E. C. Brown and J. K. Butters. 26 p. *29.* Food for Europe after victory. 42 p.

POSTWAR EMPLOYMENT AND THE SETTLEMENT OF TERMINATED WAR CONTRACTS; a statement on national policy by the Research Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1943. 15 p.

POST-WAR INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION, as viewed by the Internal Combustion Engine Manufacturers' Association. London, 1943. 87 p.

POSTWAR RE-EMPLOYMENT; the magnitude of the problem, by K. T. Schlotterbeck. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1943. 27 p. (Pamphlet No. 54.) 25¢.

POSTWAR TAX POLICY AND BUSINESS EXPANSION, by Lewis H. Kimmel. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1943. 46 p. (Pamphlet No. 53.) 50¢.

PROBLÈMES FRANÇAIS DE DEMAIN: reflexions à propos d'un livre recent, par Henri Peyre. New York, Moretus Press, 1943. 48 p. 50¢.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLETS. New York, Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1943. 10¢ each.
86. When I get out? Will I find a job? By M. S. Stewart, 21 p. *87.* Why race riots? Lessons from Detroit, by Earl Brown. 31 p.

PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES. New York, United Nations Information Office [1943]. 64 p. 20¢.

RAILROAD TRAVEL AND THE STATE OF BUSINESS, by Thor Hultgren. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943. 35 p. (Occasional Paper 13.)

READING LIST ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS, compiled by Leisa Bronson, assisted by Elaine Exton. Washington, The Women's Division, Democratic National Committee, 1943. 47 p.

THE REICHSTAG ELECTION OF MARCH 5, 1933, by R. H. Lutz and P. E. Quinn. Stanford University, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1943. Chart. 50¢.

SECOND REPORT OF THE POSTWAR COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS. New York, National Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America, 1943. 95 p.

SEVEN REPORTS ON ITALIAN ECONOMIC POST-WAR PROBLEMS. New York, International Research Service, 1943. 48 p.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTHWEST CHINA. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943.
Case study 1. Three types of rural economy in Yunnan, by Yu-I Li, Hsiao-T'ung Fei, and Tse-I Chang, edited by Hsiao-Tung Fei. 35 p. 25¢. *2.* Labor and labor relations in the new industries of Southwest China, by Kuo-Heng Shih and Ju-K'ang T'ien, edited by Francis L. K. Hsu. 45 p. 50¢. *3.* Magic and science in Western Yunnan, by Francis L. K. Hsu. 53 p. 50¢.

SOLDIER AND PEASANT IN JAPAN: the origins of conscription, by E. H. Norman. New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. 76 p. 75¢.

SPEAKING OF INDIA; 150 questions and answers, by M. S. Farley. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council, 1943. 63 p. (I.P.R. Pamphlets, No. 9.) 25¢.

UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. Boston, The Committee, 1943–1944.
3. Treatment of defeated enemy countries: Germany. Summary of replies. 15 p. *9.* Colonies and dependent areas. 33 p. *10.* The protection by international action of the freedom of the individual within the state. 24 p. *11.* Post-war treatment of Japan. 31 p.

WAR BACKGROUND STUDIES. Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1943.
17. Burma: Gateway to China, by H. G. Deignan. 21 p.

WAR-PEACE PAMPHLETS. Stanford University, Calif., Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1943.
3. Food as an implement of war; the responsibilities of farmers, by J. S. Davis. 10¢.

WHEAT OUTLOOK AND POLICIES, by J. S. Davis. Stanford University, California, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1943. 36 p. (Wheat Studies. v. 20, no. 1.) $1.00.

A WORLD TRADE ALLIANCE. London, World Trade Alliance Association, 1943. 7 p. (BS/No. 1.)

WORLD TRADE ALLIANCE; main outlines of an organisation for international trade, by Sir Edgar R. Jones. London, World Trade Alliance Association, 1943. 31 p. 1s.

WORLD TRADE ALLIANCE; a practical solution of the problem of unemployment after the war. London, World Trade Alliance Association, 1943. 12 p. (E. P. No. 6.)

YOUR BUSINESS AFTER THE WAR? New York, Research Institute of America, Inc., 1943. 61 p. (Research Institute Analysis No. 31.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED